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SUMMARY 
The capabilities of ‘Unmanned Systems’ (USs) are presently at various stages of 
technological development and in-service trials. The induction of USs in future ‘Network-
Centric Warfare’ (NCW) requires interoperability, the ability of multiple systems to 
exchange information, to be addressed for enhanced mission effectiveness. To provide 
effective in-service induction with low life-cycle costs of operation and support, 
interoperability is to be addressed in the conceptual design process. 
 
The focus of this research is on the conceptual design of ‘Vertical Take-off Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles’ (VTUAVs). The traditional helicopter design methodology was re-visited 
to encompass interoperability design requirements in the conceptual phase. The research 
covers the following: (a) Holistic investigation of interoperability issues governing 
VTUAV operations; (b) System hierarchy development for identification of the mission 
payload and vehicle components of an interoperable VTUAV; (c) Interoperable 
architecture development from a ‘Network Centric Operations’ (NCO) perspective; and 
(d) Verification of the interoperable VTUAV design methodology through a conceptual 
design exercise – case study on Counter- ‘Improvised Explosive Devices’ (IEDs) operations 
by VTUAV and UGV. 
 
The research updated the interoperable VTUAV design methodology and provided the 
following key contributions: (a) Identification of pre-emptive and situational mission 
requirements to maximise mission effectiveness for a stipulated operational need and 
environment; (b) Mission systems hierarchy and structure for identification of an enhanced 
mission payload through synergistic integration of on-board and off-board systems; (c) 
Interoperability architecture that complies with NATO interoperability standards; and (d) 
Vehicle system hierarchy and structure for design of vehicle components to meet design 
constraints and the stipulated mission requirements for optimising interoperability. 
 
The methodology developed for interoperable VTUAV design provides the avenue to 
achieve an optimal interoperable conceptual design – critical for integration of systems for 
NCW and total system effectiveness. 
Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Unmanned Systems (USs) technology has recently demonstrated its operational 
effectiveness in military missions. The defence forces have strategically invested in design, 
development, and induction of USs to augment or replace manned systems to enhance 
mission effectiveness. Capabilities of ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’ (UAV), ‘Unmanned 
Ground Vehicles’ (UGV), and ‘Unmanned Marine Vehicles’ (UMV), are presently at 
various stages of technological demonstration [1-3].  
 
The transformation of warfare from conventional to unconventional has impacted the 
prevalent military doctrines. This has resulted in technology development or modifications 
to meet the re-defined mission requirements emanating from the doctrines. ‘Network 
Centric Warfare’ (NCW) is an emerging warfare concept of shared awareness for command 
and operations, to enhance lethality and survivability. This is achieved through self-
synchronisation [4]. As technology develops and matures, the induction of USs will be 
established with manned systems in the NCW. The key technological challenge in the 
induction of USs, is the issue of interoperability [4, 5], the ability of multiple systems to 
exchange information, for mission effective ‘Network Centric Operations’(NCO) – (a) inter: 
between USs; and (b) intra: with manned systems. 
 
The UAV Roadmaps [1, 6] presents futuristic vision of UAV capabilities for ‘Fixed-Wing’ 
(FW-) and ‘Vertical Takeoff’ (VT-) UAVs. It presents a set of UAV operational doctrines to 
be addressed for meeting the defence force requirements. Though the operational doctrines 
for Platform-Centric designed UAVs have advanced; the ‘Concepts of Operations’ 
(CONOPS) for interoperability of UAVs with other systems needs to be addressed [4]. This 
comprises of the roles and missions of UAVs in joint operations with other unmanned and 
manned systems [7]. 
 
Present UAVs utilise proprietary software and hardware. This limits the technological 
degree-of-flexibility to integrate for joint operations and synchronise tasking with other 
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systems [8]. Recent projects (“Forward Look”) demonstrated [8, 9] interoperability by 
modified software and hardware to existing UAVs and USs. This interim design is neither 
cost-effective nor viable in the long-term as a mode for interoperability transition [10]. 
Interoperability needs to be addressed in the conceptual design process of the UAV for an 
effective in-service induction with low life-cycle costs of operation and support. 
 
This research addresses the requirement of interoperability, with the design of VTUAVs as 
the prime focus. The generic system methodology of VTUAV preliminary design, based on 
the “Preliminary Helicopter Design Methodology” [11-16], is presented in Figure 1.1. The 
design methodology is platform-centric governed, limiting the VTUAV design process in 
considering other systems capabilities. 
 
VTUAV System
Mission 1 Mission 3Mission 2 Mission n
Requirements & Constraints
Design 
Acceptance?
Multi-Mission Payload Design
VTUAV System Evaluation
Optimum VTUAV System Design
Other Systems
Mission A
No
Yes
Mission B
Mission C
Mission m
Vehicle Design
 
Figure 1.1: VTUAV Preliminary Design Methodology 
 
 2
The research will re-visit the traditional helicopter design methodology to encompass 
interoperability design requirements in the conceptual phase. Contemplated operational 
doctrines on operational integration of VTUAVs with unmanned and manned systems will 
be investigated holistically. A systems approach will be adopted to address the mission 
requirements analysis for identification of an advanced mission payload – one that meets 
inter- and intra- operability requirements. Interoperability functional characteristics of state-
of-the-art mission systems will be analysed for the design of an optimum mission payload. 
 
Systems engineering principles [17] are applied for the design of an interoperable VTUAV 
system. It includes the functional and design requirement analysis of the stipulated VTUAV 
missions. It also includes design synthesis, and verification of the design through a case 
study. The case study comprises of a VTUAV interoperating with UGVs for Counter-
Improvised Explosive Device operations. 
 
The investigation stages adopted and the prime objectives in the research are as follows: 
• Stage 1: Holistic investigation of the various interoperability issues governing VTUAV 
operations, such as operational commonality, by adopting a systems approach. This will 
stipulate the inputs to develop the VTUAV design framework at the mission analysis stage 
with the following objective:  
o Provide the VTUAV with synergistic interoperable operations capabilities, i.e. 
enhanced collaboration. 
 
• Stage 2: System hierarchy development for identification of the mission payload and 
vehicle components of an interoperable VTUAV. The components and functional attributes 
will be analysed with the following objective:  
o Identify the capabilities of the payload and vehicle to address the stipulated mission 
requirements and design constraints for interoperable operations. 
 
• Stage 3: Interoperable architecture development (i.e. a fundamental structure by which 
interoperability can be achieved), from a NCO perspective with the following objective:  
o Comply with international interoperability standards for effective VTUAV 
integration with allied forces and nations. 
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• Stage 4: Interoperable VTUAV design methodology verification through a conceptual 
design exercise, and illustration of interoperability with UGVs as a case study. The design 
will be evaluated with the following objective:  
o Measure the degree-of-system effectiveness (i.e. mission and cost effectiveness) of 
the interoperable VTUAV design by investigating the application through an illustration. 
 
The research framework with the investigation stages (1 to 4) and the corresponding Thesis 
Chapters (3 to 8) is presented at Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Research Framework: Investigation Stages and Thesis Chapters 
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Systems Concept 
“A system is an assemblage or combination of elements or parts that form a complex or 
unitary whole”. The size of the system varies. It may be as large as the universe or as small 
as an atom [17]. 
2.1.1 Systems Concept Development 
During the Machine Age in the 20th Century, the development of system concepts was from 
a ‘Reductionism’ and ‘Mechanism’ perspective. The function of the system was governed 
by the sub-functions of the parts of the system under the reductionism philosophy. 
Mechanism adapted a cause and effect philosophy of relationships. Any event was the cause 
of another event [17]. 
 
The transition from the Machine Age into the Systems Age was on an intellectual 
framework. Reductionism, mechanism, and analytical perspectives were supplemented by 
expansionism, teleology, and a new synthetic (system) approach to the system concept 
development. In expansionism, all objects and events were considered as parts of a larger 
whole and focused on the wholes. The synthetic approach, the function is analysed in terms 
of the larger system. Analytical approach involved an outside-in thinking and synthetic 
approach was inside-out thinking. The synthetic approach to systems problems was referred 
as ‘systems approach’ [17]. 
2.1.2 Elements of a System 
A system is comprised of components, attributes, and relationships, working together 
toward a common purpose. Components are the operating parts of a system, consisting of 
inputs, processes, and outputs. Attributes are the properties of the components of a system. 
Relationships are the links between components and attributes. The properties and 
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behaviour of each component affects the properties and behaviour of at least one other 
component [17]. 
 
The components of a system are systems, and a system may be part of a larger system in a 
hierarchy. If two hierarchial levels are involved in a system, the lower hierarchy is called a 
subsystem. The designations of system, subsystem, and component are relative, since the 
system at one level in the hierarchy is the component at another [17]. 
 
The action performed by a system is its function. Processing of material, energy, or 
information are functions of a system. The system under consideration is defined by 
specifying its limits or boundaries. Outside the boundaries of the system is the environment. 
No system is completely isolated from its environment. Material, energy, and information 
that pass through the boundaries to the system are the inputs. Material, energy, or 
information processed by the system and passed to the environment are the outputs [17]. 
The general concept of a system [18] is presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Outputs 
Boundary 
Environment 
Environment 
SYSTEM 
Relationships
Elements 
Inputs 
Figure 2.1: General Concept of a System 
(Sinha, 1998) 
 
Natural systems occur by natural processes. Man made systems involves the intervention 
through components, attributes, or relationships by humans. A physical system occupies 
physical space and conceptual systems are organisations of ideas. Static systems have 
structure without activity and dynamic systems combine structural components with 
activity. A closed system does not interact significantly with its environment and an open 
system allows material, energy, and information to cross its boundaries [17]. 
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2.1.3 Systems Engineering Process 
Systems engineering processes is critical for systematic development of man made systems. 
The process commences with the identification of a need arising from a perceived or real 
deficiency. A feasibility study establishes the set of requirements, constraints, and design 
criteria. An example of a requirement definition process [17] is presented in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Definition of Need 
Feasibility Studies Advance System 
Planning 
System Operational 
Requirements 
Technology 
Development and 
Application 
System Maintenance 
Concept 
Preliminary System 
Analysis 
Figure 2.2: System Requirements Definition Process 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1990) 
 
The system engineering process is adapted to meet the stipulated requirements. It involves a 
sequential and iterative methodology to provide cost-effective solutions to design 
alternatives. The process incorporates feedback actions necessary to ensure convergence and 
corrective action to evaluate alternatives. Changes are implemented for an optimum 
solution. Constraints are imposed to eliminate non-viable alternatives. The fundamental goal 
is to optimise operational, economic, and logistic factors through trade-offs and analyses 
[17, 19]. 
 
System Specification 
Conceptual Design 
Review 
Requirements & 
Constraints 
Design Criteria 
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Systems engineering processes selects the best system design concept from all proposed 
alternatives by a comparative analysis. The output is a system configuration that meets the 
operational, economic, and logistic requirements [17]. 
2.1.4 Decision Support Systems 
Selecting the best system design from a set of alternatives is a complicated process. 
‘Decision Support Systems’ (DSS) are a flexible tool to assist in the decision making 
process by automating the decision analysis. The development of DSS is based on various 
decision analysis methodologies, from complex automation, to simple decision trees that 
require user inputs. The decision problem governs the suitability of the DSS [20]. 
 
A commonly used methodology is the ‘Analytical Hierarchy Process’ (AHP). The AHP 
addresses multi-criteria decision making problems by explicit logical analysis to select the 
most optimum solution. It comprises of three concepts [21, 22]: 
• Structuring Hierarchies: A functional hierarchy is developed to establish the 
composition of the complex system according to its essential relationships. At the top level 
of the hierarchy, the problem and the objective of the system is identified. Subsequent levels 
with elements, governs the decision criteria, and further sub-criteria and sub-sub-criteria. 
The last level of the hierarchy comprises of the alternative solutions, linked to the decision 
criteria on which it is evaluated. 
 
• Setting Priorities: The priority of elements in the hierarchy in terms of its contribution 
is dictated by the objective of the system. Priority analysis involves pairwise comparisons of 
elements against a stipulated criterion in a matrix format. The qualitative assessments are 
transformed into quantitative values based on a scale of 1 to 9, as follows: (a) 1 – equal 
importance; (b) 3 –  moderate importance; (c) 5 – strong importance; (d) 7 – very strong 
importance; (e) 9 – extreme importance; and (f) 2, 4, 6, 8 – intermediate values between two 
adjacent assessments.  
 
The pairwise comparison matrix determines the local relative priorities, or “Vector-of-
Priorities”, with respect to the system objective that designates the relative ranking of the 
dependent decision criterion. The Vector-of-Priorities are synthesised for a global Overall 
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Vector-of-Priority to rank the alternatives. The highest rank denotes the optimum 
alternative.  
 
• Logical Consistency: This evaluates the consistency of the matrices. The degree of 
assessments of the relations among the elements is based on a particular criterion to justify 
the logic. The AHP measures the overall consistency of assessments by a ‘Consistency 
Ratio’ (CR), which is a function of the maximum eigenvalue, the order of the matrix, and a 
Random Consistency value. Inconsistencies in the matrices (i.e. CR higher than 5% for 3 by 
3 matrix, 9% for 4 by 4 matrix, and 10% for a larger matrix) indicates the requirement of re-
assessment.  
2.2 Network Centric Warfare 
The transition into the Information Age has affected the military doctrines of operations and 
technologies. The Industrial Age focussed on platform-centric systems, and superiority over 
adversaries was governed by number of systems in the inventory. In the Information Age 
that comprises of networked systems, superiority is governed by the availability of the 
required information [4]. 
 
‘Network Centric Warfare’ (NCW) is an emerging theory of warfare in the Information 
Age. The objective of NCW comprises of networking the following: (a) Sensors; (b) 
Decision makers; and (c) Shooters. The network results in shared awareness for self-
synchronisation to increase speed of command and operations, and enhance lethality and 
survivability [4]. 
 
There are four domains of NCW with specific characteristics as follows [4]: 
• Physical Domain: It includes the physical platforms and its communication networks. It 
resides in the war zone and is a measure of the combat power. 
• Information Domain: It includes the acquisition of information from sensors, and its 
analysis for intelligence sharing within the battle-ground. 
• Cognitive Domain: This resides in the soldier and includes leadership, morale, unit 
cohesion, training, experience, and situational awareness. This results in the development of 
doctrines and tactics. 
 9
• Social Domain: It is the domain in which soldiers interact, for deliberations to make 
joint decisions.  
 
The cognitive domain overlays the social domain as the individual’s cognitive activities are 
influenced by the social requirements. This results in shared awareness and tactical 
innovation at the cognitive, social, and information domain intersection. The information 
and physical domains overlay results in the identification of the precision force for joint 
operations. The cognitive, social, and physical domains together display the compressed 
operational requirements for tactical and strategic advantages. The NCW window is the 
overlay of all four domains [4], as presented in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Domains of NCW  
(NCW Report, 2005) 
 
Network Centric Warfare is the theory, and its application is termed ‘Network Centric 
Operations’ (NCO). Presently, the implementation of NCO in coalition operations is 
limited, as platform-centric forces require systems and tactics to operate as a network-
centric force [4]. 
 
NCW is a means to supplement war-fighting capability through enhanced collaboration for 
situational awareness, as compared to platform-centric warfare. The implementation of 
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NCW requires the following: (a) Establishment of a network capability; (b) New networked 
sensor technologies; (c) Human factors; (d) Updating of tactics and doctrines; and (e) 
Addressing allied and coalition NCO challenges [4, 23].  
 
The limited implementation of NCO in recent combat operations and training exercises has 
demonstrated the effectiveness of NCW. In operation “Enduring Freedom”, ground and air 
forces were networked in real time, providing a sensor-shooter network for precision attacks 
on targets. ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’ (UAVs) network with ground commanders 
provided near-real time battlefield situational awareness. Operation “Iraqi Freedom” further 
demonstrated NCO through technology and an understanding of associated human factors. 
Networked coalition forces shared battlefield images that included friendly and adversary 
locations. Training exercises have demonstrated that a robustly networked force is more 
capable then a platform-centric force. In many engagements, less capable platforms 
outpaced superior platforms through improved information sharing capability. Small 
networked forces outperformed larger forces (without network capability), by replacing 
information for number of systems [4]. 
 
A critical technology for the implementation of NCW is UAVs. UAVs’ success in recent 
operations and training exercises as part of a network-centric force has demonstrated the 
future potential [23]. 
2.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Development 
The UAV is an aerial vehicle with no operator on-board. It is piloted remotely or 
autonomously. Developments now include lethal payloads and design focus extends from 
expendable to recoverable airframes. The applications include military and civil [6].  
2.3.1 UAV Military Roles 
In the Korean War, UAVs were deployed for reconnaissance, and in the Vietnam War the 
full potential was exploited. The Q-2C Firebee was modified with engine air intake screens, 
radar absorbing blankets, and anti-radar paint to create the AQM-34 Ryan Firebee ‘stealth’ 
reconnaissance UAV. The success of the Firebee resulted in further modifications, and 
included a decoy UAV and a high altitude communication intelligence monitoring UAV 
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[24]. The first rotary-wing, or ‘Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’ (VTUAV), was 
the QH-50A. The modified QH-50D was deployed in Vietnam for aerial surveillance [25].  
 
The concept of UAVs equipped with weapons for active combat missions was subsequently 
developed. The Firebee was modified with weapon pylons, IR imaging systems, and laser 
designators to fire laser guided bombs. The VTUAV QH-50D and its successor QH-50E 
were both designed to launch torpedoes. Despite successful tests of weapons equipped on 
UAVs and VTUAVs, the detailed design and development was limited due to the following: 
(a) High cost; (b) Technological immaturity; (c) ‘Command and control’ issues; (d) 
Vulnerability of communications links to jamming and spoofing; and (e) High risk to 
civilians and/or friendly troops [24, 25]. 
 
Reconnaissance and surveillance UAV development progress included the Scout and the 
Pioneer, that transmitted data in real time [24]. Advanced technologies in navigation, 
communications, and sensors enhanced the effectiveness of UAVs in reconnaissance roles. 
The Predator and the high altitude Global Hawk were highly efficient on surveillance roles 
in “Operation Allied Force”, “Operation Enduring Freedom”, and “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom” [1]. 
 
Technology advancements have expanded the UAV’s mission capability for new tactical 
applications [26]. UAVs are emerging as the preferred solutions over manned systems in 
terms of cost and mission effectiveness, in surveillance & targeting, precision attack & 
strike, force protection, and communication relay domains [27]. 
2.4 Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Missions 
2.4.1 VTUAV Capabilities 
VTUAVs are valuable assets due to their ability of vertical takeoff/landing, and hover and 
manoeuvre in any direction at low speeds. Vertical takeoff and landing from any unprepared 
site or terrain provides mobility and efficient response times. The unique operational 
attributes of VTUAVs include [28]: 
• Independent: It is operationally independent of launch runways/rails or landing nets, 
and is effective in urban, forest, and other high density terrains; 
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• Response Time: Tactical advantages through rapid repositioning; 
• Precision hover: Zero ground speed sensors provides a unique motionless capability for 
event monitoring and actionable identification; 
• Ground loiter capability: Extends the endurance by continuing monitoring while 
situated on ground; and 
• Scalable: The above attributes applies to all VTUAVs of all sizes from large to micro. 
 
The future battlefield is fluid with high risk and complexity. VTUAV designs will need to 
encompass lethality on-board, be globally responsive, and operable from inaccessible areas 
[27]. It needs to be designed for extended operation to provide a high level of persistence 
with limited crew turn-over requirements. Further, it needs to be interoperable with all other 
assets in the battlefield, manned and unmanned with adequate survivability capabilities.  
 
Additional mission capabilities [29] include the following: (a) Ability to carry weapons to 
perform combat missions; (b) Capability to operate over areas contaminated with chemical 
and/or biological agents; (c) Extended endurance over hostile environments for persistent 
surveillance; (d) Full autonomous operation with man-in-the-loop options for special tasks; 
(e) Rapid response; (f) Broad area coverage with multiple sensors; and (g) System 
invulnerability. 
2.4.2 VTUAV Operations 
A VTUAV is an unmanned system and its operational doctrines and tactics in several stages 
of development are similar to manned helicopter systems. Thus, VTUAV operations need to 
be analysed from a helicopter operation perspective. 
 
The mission profile is a chronological representation of the flight phases, time, and flight 
mode. A generic mission profile comprises of the following phases [30]: 
• Takeoff: Taxing and takeoff time, which can be open or concealed for more covert 
operations; 
• Transit (outbound): Transit to destination; 
• Ingress: Entrance into operation zone; 
• Engage: Execution of mission; 
• Disengage: Accomplishment/abortion of mission; 
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• Egress: Exit from operation zone; 
• Transit (inbound): Transit to base; and 
• Landing: Landing and taxing. 
 
Military missions that can be accomplished by VTUAVs in various stages of 
implementation includes reconnaissance, surveillance & target acquisition, battle damage 
assessment, and battlespace management [26]. New mission payload technology will 
provide additional capabilities as follows:  (a) Close air support; (b) Signal intelligence; (c) 
Indirect fire; (d) Deception operations; (e) Search and rescue; (f) Electronic warfare 
countermeasures; (g) Nuclear, biological, & chemical detection; and (h) Mine detection. 
 
The present UAV military missions are categorised as “dull”, “dirty”, and “dangerous” [1]. 
Future potential VTUAV missions are listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: VTUAV Military Missions 
(UAV Roadmap, 2002) 
Mission Type 
 Dull Dirty Dangerous 
‘Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance’ (ISR) X  X 
C2/Communication X   
Force Protection X X X 
‘Signals Intelligence’ (SIGINT) X  X 
‘Nuclear/Biological/Chemical’ (NBC) Detection  X X 
Combat Search & Rescue   X 
Mine Detection/’Countermeasure’ (CM)   X 
Meteorology & Oceanography X  X 
Counter Narcotics X  X 
Psychological Ops   X 
Strike   X 
‘Anti-Submarine Warfare’ (ASW) X   
Precision Target Location and Designation    
Deception    
Electronic Warfare    
Communication/Data Relay    
Team Resupply    
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2.4.3 Network Centric Operations 
Aerial, Ground, and Marine ‘Unmanned Systems’ (USs) are under various stages of 
technological demonstration; from prototype development to operational trials in recent 
operations. The NCO capability is critical for USs. The VTUAV missions will need to be 
re-investigated from a NCO perspective [2, 3, 6]. 
 
The potential military applications [2] of ‘Unmanned Ground Vehicles’ (UGVs) are: (a) 
Reconnaissance & surveillance; (b) Mine detection; (c) ‘Explosive Ordinance Disposal’ 
(EOD); and (d) Force protection. The potential military applications [3] of ‘Unmanned 
Marine Vehicles’ (UMVs), which include ‘Unmanned Surface Vehicles’ (USVs) and 
‘Unmanned Underwater Vehicles’ (UUVs) are: (a) Reconnaissance & surveillance; (b) 
Mine countermeasures; (c) Anti-submarine warfare; and (d) Strike. 
 
The USs share similar mission capabilities, hence a team based mission assignment will 
provide a synergistic approach to enhance mission capabilities [31]. Teaming of VTUAVs 
with other USs will provide fusion of data from multi-sensors on-board various platforms in 
operation [32]. Multi-sensors provide complementary capabilities, to include higher 
probability of detecting hazards, widening the field of view, and enhancing redundancies. 
An all sensor US team is defined as homogeneous and a weapon carrying US intermixed 
with a sensor US team is defined as heterogeneous [33]. 
 
VTUAVs will also interoperate with manned systems in a NCO environment. There are 
presently no manned-unmanned ‘Concept of Operations’ (CONOPS). A potential CONOPS 
includes the “Bird Dog” concept where a UAV is linked to a reconnaissance/attack 
helicopter as a ‘wingman’ to enhance its current operational capability [5, 34]. 
 
The NCOs may also alter the method of US deployment. Concepts include USs being 
deployed from other large USs and/or manned aircrafts, submarines, and ships. This 
includes mini UAVs deployed from the rocket pods or wing pylons of a larger UAV, an 
UUV being dropped into the sea by a VTUAV, or a VTUAV taking off from an UGV [1, 2, 
31]. 
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Various operational concepts have been investigated, with no official doctrines established 
for NCO [4] nor any formal CONOPS to state how VTUAVs will operate with other 
unmanned and manned systems [7]. The type of unmanned/manned system a VTUAV will 
team with, the number of unmanned/manned systems involved, and the tactics to maximise 
mission effectiveness are yet to be addressed. The speed, altitude, sensor package, signature 
and connectivity (Line-Of-Sight/Beyond-Line-Of-Sight, and real-time/near-real-time/post-
mission processing) of the VTUAV are also to be addressed. Increasing the number of 
systems may increase mission effectiveness, but adds complexity in terms of airspace 
management and coordination, and communication bandwidth. There is a point of 
“diminishing returns” when the marginal benefit gained by adding another system does not 
outweigh the cost [7]. 
2.4.4 Operating Environments 
A VTUAV will operate in similar environments as the helicopter, which includes varying 
terrain, threats, and weather [11]. 
 
Different terrains include desert, mountain, jungle and urban. The desert environment 
includes: (a) Sand ingestion in the engines causing damage, and erosion on components 
including the rotor blade; (b) High temperatures causing heating of components; (c) 
Featureless terrain with navigation challenges; and (d) High winds with sand decreasing 
sensor visibility. The mountain environment includes: (a) Snow ingestion in the engines 
causing damage; (b) Low temperature resulting in icing; (c) Wind generating hazardous 
flow patterns; and (d) Limited landing sites due to sloping terrain and unstable snow/ice. 
The jungle and urban terrain pose threats in the form of dense tree formations and high 
buildings respectively [11]. 
 
Threat environments can be natural or manmade. Natural threats include operating at night 
in total darkness and turbulence which can cause structural degradation and decrease aircraft 
control precision. Pylons, cables, and wires are difficult to detect. These are manmade 
threats that are present in several terrains, mainly in urban. In military operations, manmade 
threats include adversary gun fire, anti-aircraft defence systems and missiles, and electronic 
jamming/interception. Additionally, a VTUAV may operate in nuclear/biological/chemical 
contaminated environments. Threat also includes friendly forces utilising the same airspace. 
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Several simultaneous missions in the same battlespace will pose threat of mid-air collisions. 
The VTUAV may also operate in disparate weather conditions such as hot, rain, snow, 
wind, and fog causing adverse effects on the structure and/or reduce visibility [1, 11, 33]. 
2.5 Mission Systems and Functionality 
The mission systems are payloads that provide operational capabilities for mission 
accomplishment. The types of mission systems placed on-board the VTUAV are defined by 
the stipulated mission requirements. The payload capacity is a measure of the size, weight, 
and power available to perform advanced functions contributing to the mission. The systems 
must be affordable to maintain and cost effective over manned systems. Design of optimum 
payload is critical and trade-off analysis provides the avenue to identify payload’s potential 
to meet stipulated requirements [35]. 
 
To date, the payload technology have placed VTUAVs in a reconnaissance role. The 
missions now cover additional roles due to advancements in payload technologies [26]. 
2.5.1 Navigation 
Navigational equipment and mission management software, provides the capability to fly a 
given route for the desired information. The degree of navigational accuracy and reliability 
is dependent on the mission and traffic management. An accurate highly robust system is 
needed on missions requiring precise navigation, like transit through shared airspace by 
other aircrafts. Robustness is achievable by redundant navigational systems [6, 10]. 
 
Observation sensors may determine position from video image but is not effective, 
especially in unfamiliar terrain/battle-zones. Data link communication systems provide 
range and bearing of the VTUAV from the ground station but require a line-of-sight link 
and a large ground antenna for high angular resolution. A loss of link may result in loss of 
navigational information. Dead reckoning uses the VTUAV’s air speed and direction to 
determine position but is unreliable and imposes significant operator work load [36, 37]. 
 
An effective and commonly used navigation system is the ‘Global Positioning System’ 
(GPS). Based on a constellation of satellites, the GPS provides positioning information, 
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accurate to 20 m. A ‘Differential GPS’, with an accuracy enhancement system, provides 
accuracies in the order of 1 to 5 m. This can be enhanced to 10 cm with other error 
correcting techniques. Since signals are not contaminated by the weather, and interference 
and obstruction from terrain and topography is negligible; the GPS system is effective for 
all weather day/night operations. GPS systems can be jammed by the adversary [36-38].  
 
‘Inertial Navigation Systems’ (INS) measures aircraft accelerations to compute velocity and 
displacement. The system is self contained, with no signals emitted. External signals are 
needed during initialisation only. Hence, it is not susceptible to interference or jamming. A 
Laser Gyro based INS reduces weight, power, and size. This system requires accurate pre-
flight alignment, and the positioning errors increase with time [36]. 
 
Radar altimeters measure altitude by computing the time for a transmitted wave to be 
reflected back. The accuracy and resolution of altimeters are limited to a few meters and are 
thus effective for short range altitude readings such as approaches and landings, and in some 
cases, low level flight/hover [39]. 
2.5.2 Sensors 
Sensor payloads are required for sensing and weaponised missions for reliable detection and 
identification of targets, and enhancing strike accuracy. The type and number of sensors are 
mission capability, payload, and cost governed. The sensing requirements are for imaging 
(visible, infrared, and radar), communications (SIGINT missions), and for detection 
(radiological, chemical, biological, meteorological, & magnetic - ASW and mine detection). 
Sensor information can be transmitted to other assets or the ‘Ground Control Station’ (GCS) 
in real time/near real time, or stored on-board for post mission analysis [1, 36]. 
 
Still and motion imagery sensors are the most commonly used. A turret mounted video or 
‘Electro-Optical’ (EO) system can provide imaging data and when coupled with an 
‘Infrared’ (IR) system can provide imagery during night and/or adverse weather. A 
‘Synthetic Aperture Radar’ (SAR) makes use of the Doppler shift of a radar signal moving 
across the target to synthesize the azimuth resolution of a very narrow beam. SAR is 
effective in ground mapping and detecting objects day and night, through fog, cloud cover, 
rain, and snow [36].  
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 The imagery systems can provide data with varying degrees of resolution quality and 
complexity. Higher resolutions provide greater picture clarity and allow for a greater 
standoff range. This increases data size, resulting in the requirements of larger bandwidth to 
transmit the data or increase the data storage requirements on-board the aircraft. Larger data 
sizes will become a critical design parameter and will require data compression and 
innovative data transmission techniques [1]. 
 
SIGINT systems provide geo-location of emitters to enhance situational awareness, exploits 
and determines signal content, and analyses new signals. ‘Hyper-spectral Imagery’ (HSI) is 
an emerging technology which can provide radiological, chemical, and biological detection, 
either in passive mode or in combination with a ‘Light Detection and Ranging’ (LIDAR) 
illuminator [1]. An alternative is small dispensable detectors that are self contained, which 
can be aerially deployed and provide detection and identification without risk to the vehicle. 
A LIDAR can be used for surface mine detection while ground penetrating radars can be 
used for buried mine detection [40, 41]. 
2.5.3 Autonomy 
On-board processing and computing power is critical for the following: (a) Responsive 
flight control systems; (b) On-board data processing; and (c) Autonomous operations. Data 
collected can be collated and analysed by the on-board processor, and transmitted via data 
link or recorded on an on-board storage device such as tape media or solid state storage 
[42]. 
 
The function of the autopilot is to provide autonomous flight control, with minimal input 
from the operator. Autopilot algorithms provide autonomy to the VTUAV in all phases of 
the mission. Low level control includes stability and control loops to enhance dynamic 
stability and regulate flight parameters such as speed, altitude, and direction. Mid level 
control, provides guidance and navigation capability for the flight. High level control is 
complex and involves interpreting mission objectives, safety constraints, environment 
conditions, updating mission plans, and detecting faults to reconfigure the low and mid level 
control algorithms accordingly [43]. 
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Higher autonomy off-loads the operator and reduces communication bandwidth 
requirements [32]. Autonomy software development and maintenance increases VTUAV 
acquisition costs. 
 
Ground control software that interfaces with the autopilot provides mission and flight 
planning. These are Windows PC or laptops based, and are user-friendly. It provides GPS 
waypoint navigation, monitoring the autopilot, and allows manual overrides by ground 
operator for full manual vehicle control via a control stick [44, 45]. 
 
Presently, UAVs such as the Global Hawk can conduct real time health and diagnostics, and 
has substantial adaptive behaviour to flight conditions and in-flight failures [1]. The Avatar 
displays autonomous optimum route planning based on flight and weather data evaluation 
[46]. Achieving NCW will demand future UAVs to have fully autonomous group 
collaboration and planning [1]. The trend in autonomy [6] is presented in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: UAV Autonomy Trend 
(UAV Roadmap, 2002) 
2.5.4 Survivability 
UAV losses in recent conflicts were primarily due to small arms, air defence artillery, and 
unspecified ground fire. Survivability of VTUAV in absence of human component on-board 
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is required for mission accomplishment in hostile environments. Survivability is a balance 
of CONOPS & tactics with technology & cost for a determined threat. Survivability needs 
to be considered from a systems perspective, as the adversary can employ additional 
techniques (communications and navigation jamming) to make a VTUAV ineffective [6]. 
 
CONOPS and tactics enhance survivability. UAVs may overcome human thresholds 
through design to execute defensive manoeuvres [27]. Higher altitudes and greater standoff 
ranges enhance survivability [35]. Network-centric UAVs improves information sharing and 
situational awareness for effective collaboration and self-synchronisation to enhance 
survivability [4]. 
 
Detection and susceptibility reduction measures include visual, acoustic, thermal, and 
electronic signature reduction. The absence of crew on-board provides flexibility in 
designing low observable airframes with seamless skins, and fewer windows and hatches to 
reduce risk of detection [6, 27]. Antenna apertures and sensors generate high levels of 
emissions and/or radar returns that reduce the vehicle’s ‘stealth’ characteristic [6]. Larger 
UAVs can support active susceptibility reduction measures in future by use of active 
countermeasure technology [10]. On-board manned systems include; warning sensors 
(radar, laser, and missile), jammers (radar and infrared), and chaff and flare dispensers [47]. 
 
Manned systems also offer tolerance and redundancies potentially transferable on unmanned 
system. Ballistic tolerant materials, such as Kevlar, can provide some survivability against 
certain calibre bullets. Redundancy by duplicating and separating systems also enhance 
survivability [47, 48]. 
 
Additional threats include electronic attack. This can be active jamming, meaconing, or 
deception of the vehicle’s communications data link and GPS system, or passive 
interception or exploitation of the VTUAV’s collected data.  Unintentional jamming from 
friendly or neutral communication emitters also reduce the vehicle’s capabilities. Higher 
levels of autonomy maintain the vehicle’s effectiveness in case of data link jamming. 
Redundant navigation systems allow the VTUAV to continue its mission in case of GPS 
jamming. Encryption of data link, or flying close to the ground station or at low altitude 
reduces possibilities of interception and exploitation [6].  
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 Mid-air collisions with friendly forces occupying the same airspace pose a threat to the 
VTUAV. Present proposed collision avoidance concepts are not practical. The challenge is 
in developing an effective system that will work on small UAVs, and vehicles that 
demonstrate irregular performance characteristics [49]. Most UAVs carry transponders or 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems which assist automatic identification when 
interrogated by outside forces [47, 50]. A practical all-weather solution for UAV collision 
avoidance is limited and certification standards are to be addressed [49, 50]. 
 
The level of survivability in the design is governed by mission type, present threat, and the 
number of assets available. It needs to be considered in the early stages of the design 
process to avoid cost and performance penalties resulting from follow-on modifications in 
the design cycle. The entire spectrum of threat types must be considered including physical 
(gun fire, missiles, energy weapons, nuclear, biological, and chemical), and electronic [6]. 
2.5.5 Armament 
Traditionally, UAVs have demonstrated weapon carrying capabilities using ‘Commercial 
Off-The-Shelf’ (COTS) weapons. The RQ-1 Predator was armed with AGM-114 Hellfire 
missiles and was used in operations “Enduring Freedom” and “Iraqi Freedom” to destroy 
key targets [29]. The long endurance variant (MQ-9 Predator B) was fitted with GBU-12 
laser guided bombs, with plans to fit future prototypes with GBU-38 ‘Joint Direct Attack 
Munitions’ (JDAMs) and another air-to-surface weapon [51]. To maintain UAV’s 
development costs and stealth benefits over manned systems, size is a critical factor. Thus, 
smaller weapons and smaller weapon bays are required [1]. 
 
Smaller and/or low number of weapons carried per mission requires enhancement of 
lethality for mission effectiveness. Small weapons will require more lethal warheads and 
precision guidance. Present technological programs have demonstrated precision guidance 
options, including hardening of systems such as resistance to GPS jamming [1]. NCW 
allows greater data fusion for more precision targeting [4]. Innovative UAV size-compatible 
weapons have demonstrated high lethality against targets as follows: (a) Flying plate 
weapon to destroy concrete and steel structures; (b) Inter-metallic incendiary to generate a 
firestorm for neutralisation of biological and chemical agents; (c) ‘High Power Microwave’ 
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(HPM) to disrupt or destroy transistors in electronic facilities; and (d) the ‘Small Diameter 
Bomb’ (SDB), a lightweight bomb with high lethality [1]. 
 
Placement of weapons payload is critical. External carriage designs are easy to integrate at 
reduced cost. Internal weapon carriage reduces signature and provides easier entry points for 
internal component maintenance, reducing cost and time [1]. 
 
A VTUAV’s capability to find, fix, and fire its weapons at a target is a critical design 
parameter. Rules-of-Engagement considerations will require a man-in-the-loop to analyse 
and authorise a VTUAVs weapons release request on a target. This requires targeting and 
weapons control systems off-board to the vehicle. Design trade-offs are complicated since 
weapon system safety and operational control are considered critical performance 
parameters [1]. The CONOPS for a strike VTUAV, given human authorisation required for 
weapon release, is presented [1] in Figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: VTUAV Strike Concept of Operation 
(UAV Roadmap, 2002) 
 
UAVs’ targeting systems are governed by weight, volume, power limitations, performance, 
and cost. Targeting can be accomplished by EO/IR systems with customisation for 
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application as targeting devices for EO/IR weapons, and/or Radar with advancements in 
SAR to include ‘Ground Moving Target Indicators’ (GMTI). Inaccuracies in EO/IR are due 
to system stabilisation and sensor misalignment. SAR accounts for increased weight, 
volume, and power requirements [1]. 
2.5.6 Communications 
The data link is a key subsystem for VTUAV systems. It provides communications, on 
demand or on a continuous basis. An up-link provides control of the VTUAV and its 
payload. A down-link provides transmission of command acknowledgement, vehicle status, 
and transmission of sensor data. The data link consists of two major subsystems, the ‘Air 
Data Terminal’ (ADT, located on-board the VTUAV) and the ‘Ground Data Terminal’ 
(GDT, ground equipment) [35]. 
 
The factors that contribute to VTUAV data link design are the following: (a) Operating 
range; (b) Data rate; (c) Resistance to unintentional interference; (d) Anti-jam capabilities; 
and (e) Cost. The cost associated [37] with the data link is dictated by its complexity (i.e. 
combining higher data rates with higher anti-jam margins and/or with longer ranges). 
 
Radio frequency is the most commonly used form of data link implementation [36]. Military 
UAVs tend to operate at the ‘Very High Frequency’/’Ultra High Frequency’ (VHF/UHF) 
range with few in the ‘Super High Frequency’ (SHF) range [1, 52]. Higher frequency bands 
potentially offer higher data rates due to the larger amounts of available bandwidth [53], and 
are less affected by atmospheric noise and interference than lower frequencies [52, 54]. 
Smaller and less protruding equipment (particularly antennas) can be used with higher 
frequencies due to the shorter wavelengths. Higher frequencies generally provide higher 
anti-jam margins. Smaller frequencies are less absorbed by atmospheric moisture, and 
benefit from ionosphere reflection more than higher frequencies, thus providing greater 
range. Higher frequencies are more easily blocked by land features and buildings than lower 
frequencies, limiting the ‘Line-Of-Sight’ (LOS) range [52, 54].  
 
‘Beyond-Line-Of-Sight’ (BLOS) operations, requiring relay, can overcome LOS limits. 
Relay is provided by another UAV in the air or via ‘Satellite Communications’ (SATCOM). 
A relay UAV incurs the costs of another UAV (operating cost, maintenance costs, etc.) 
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while SATCOM requires a steerable antenna on the VTUAV, large enough to contact the 
satellite which adds significant weight and power requirements [1]. 
 
The efficiency of the radio frequency spectrum depends on coordination among users in 
order to minimise interference [55]. UAVs utilising larger volumes of communication 
bandwidth is a critical design issue [10]. Data compression techniques and increased 
processor power are thus critical. Higher on-board processing power allows sensor data 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination processes to be automated and moved directly 
on-board the UAV [27]. 
 
Future communication frameworks will be globally networked infrastructures. The United 
States ‘Department of Defense’ (DoD) have initiated the ‘Global Information Grid’ (GIG), 
to allow all assets to post, access, and exploit information to and from an Internet Protocol 
(IP) based network. The sources of information include traditional ISR (space, airborne, 
ground, etc.) and non-traditional (combat platforms, personnel, commercial, etc.). Users will 
be able to ‘plug in’ to the GIG globally, around-the-clock to access the data [1, 6]. The use 
of ‘Military Satellite Communications’ (MILSATCOM) via the GIG enhances information 
security, anti-jam performance, and bandwidth availability [10]. 
 
An alternative to radio frequency data links is optical communications. Optical 
communications via laser (lasercom) potentially offer two to five times the data rate of radio 
frequency. It utilises small apertures that weigh 30 to 50 percent less than radio systems, and 
consume less power than radio systems. The apertures provide lower signatures, higher 
security, and more jam resistance. They are currently not preferred due to problems in 
pointing, acquiring, and tracking the link, and at lower altitudes do not have the same all 
weather capability of radio systems [6], [36]. 
2.5.7 UGV & UMV Mission Systems and Functionality 
UGVs and UMVs share similar mission systems to an UAV. The systems require the 
following: (a) Navigation to provide positioning information; (b) Communication to an 
operator and/or other platforms; (c) Some level of autonomy; and (d) Payloads to meet 
mission requirements [2, 3].  
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UGVs primarily use differential GPS to provide navigation, with some UGVs utilising dead 
reckoning and landmark referencing technology as secondary navigation aids [2]. USVs can 
utilise GPS similarly, but pose problems for UUVs unless they come to the surface. UUV 
navigation methods thus include acoustic and magnetic. In shallow waters, acoustic is 
limited due to surface and bottom reflections. A small UUV ‘Communication/Navigation 
Network Node’ (CN3) near the surface acting as beacons, can provide GPS positioning to 
larger and deeper UUVs by using transponders [3, 5]. 
 
Technologies used as communications for UGVs include radio frequency, fibre optic cables, 
and optical [2]. UUVs can utilise acoustic underwater communications, which have 
demonstrated reliability and effectiveness, but its preference is limited in shallow waters. 
Fibre and optical links are also used for communications. Radio frequency and SATCOM 
links can be made only if the UUV surfaces, or by utilising a CN3 UUV relay [3, 5].  
 
Autonomy is a major issue for all unmanned systems for operations and interpreting raw 
sensor data. Missions are executed through pre-programming or real time adaptive control. 
The USs effective operation in a complex, cluttered environment off-loads the operator. 
Processing and exploiting raw sensor data into useful information that the system can utilise 
enhances its effectiveness, further off-loading the operator [3, 5]. 
 
Typical UGV sensors include cameras (black and white, colour, infrared, thermal, and zero 
light), NBC sensors, UXO/countermine detection sensors, laser rangefinders, millimetre 
radars, and ultrasound. UGVs can also be equipped with arms, grippers, manipulators, 
breaching tools, and disruption tools. Weapons include various calibre machine guns and 
rocket launchers [2, 5, 56]. 
 
Potential UUV sensors include high resolution acoustic and optical sensors, passive ASW 
sensors, NBC sensors, and explosive sensors. Synthetic Aperture Sonar, currently in 
development, is the most promising sensor for countermine missions. There is also 
development in non-traditional ASW sensors that can be utilised by smaller UUVs and are 
undetectable. UUVs can also be equipped with neutralisation devices, manipulators, 
offensive mines, net countermeasures, and underwater weapons [3, 5]. 
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2.6 Interoperability 
Interoperability is the ability of multiple systems to exchange information for enhancing 
mission effectiveness [57, 58]. Interoperability is critical for UAVs in NCW, to 
communicate and exchange data for coordinated operations [4, 5]. Though UAV systems 
inventory and deployment has widened, interoperability is presently limited [57, 59]. In 
recent operations, reconnaissance UAVs of coalition forces confronted the operational 
challenges of asset and information sharing [59]. Additionally, there is threat of mid-air 
collisions amongst friendly (manned and unmanned) aircrafts due to an inability to share 
route and status information between the two systems [57]. 
 
Present UAVs utilise proprietary air vehicle software and unique hardware. This reduces the 
capability to integrate activities and synchronise operations with other systems [8]. Recent 
projects (“Forward Look”) demonstrated [8, 9] interoperability by modified software and 
hardware to existing UAVs and USs. This short-gap solution is neither cost-effective nor the 
mode to interoperability transition [10]. 
2.6.1 Standards 
To achieve UAV interoperability, standardisation of data, control, flight operations, and 
interface is required [1]. NATO has initiated a set of standards that aim to achieve UAV 
interoperability [59].  
 
Data standards ensure that data from on-board sensors and payloads can be processed and 
interpreted by any user. This includes raw data and on-board processed product data as 
follows: (a) Still imagery; (b) Motion imagery; (c) Signals, radar, & hyper spectral imagery; 
(d) Nuclear/biological/chemical data; (e) Geographical data; and (f) Associated metadata. 
The NATO data standards [1] applicable to these data types include the following: 
• STANAG 7023: Primary Imagery;  
• STANAG 4545: Secondary Imagery;  
• STANAG 4559: Image Library; 
• STANAG 4607: GMTI Radar Data;  
• STANAG 4609: Motion Imagery; 
• STANAG 3809: Digital Terrain Elevation Data;  
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• STANAG 7074: Digital Geographic Information Exchange Standard; and  
• STANAG 5500: Message Text Formatting System.  
 
Control standards involve the control of UAV operations, including mission planning and 
sensor control. “STANAG 4586: Unmanned Control System Architecture” [1] defines the 
levels of interoperable control as: 
• Level 1: Receipt and transmission of secondary imagery and/or data; 
• Level 2: Direct receipt of imagery and/or data from the UAV; 
• Level 3: Level 2 and control of the UAV payload; 
• Level 4: Level 3 and control of the UAV itself; and 
• Level 5: Level 4 and control of the UAV during take-off and landing. 
 
The interoperability levels provide design flexibility. It allows a nation’s military to design a 
fully controllable UAV (Level 5) and allow coalition allies to acquire data from it (Level 1 
and 2) for interoperable/network-centric operations [59]. 
 
The ‘Tactical Control System’ (TCS) will achieve NATO compliance to STANAG 4586 
[59]. Its scalability [60] provides all levels of interoperable command and control of UAVs 
for all services of coalition forces [61]. The TCS is critical for broad interoperability, and is 
designed to support any UAV and ‘Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and 
Intelligence’ (C4I) combination [60]. TCS is also being evaluated for the purpose of 
controlling other USs including UUVs and USVs, and control of the vehicles from a variety 
of platforms including carriers, submarines, and manned aircrafts [60]. 
 
Flight operations standards are required to operate the UAV in airspace occupied by manned 
and unmanned aircrafts including flight clearance, Air Traffic Control, certification, and 
aircrew training. These standards are yet to be developed but will closely resemble manned 
aircraft standards, adapted to the unmanned environment [1]. 
 
Interface standards ensure UAV system elements can communicate. This includes physical 
interfaces that provide mechanical connectivity within the UAV, and the electromagnetic 
(communication) interfaces that provide connectivity between an UAV and a control station 
and the file transfer protocols for data exchange [1]. Data collected from the mission 
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systems can be saved on storage mediums via the physical interfaces or transmitted via the 
communications interface [42]. 
 
Physical interfaces include wideband tape and solid state interfaces, governed by NATO 
standards “STANAG 7024” and “STANAG 4575” respectively. Electromagnetic 
(communication) interfaces include Link 16, ‘Common Data Link’ (CDL), and SATCOM 
standards; and communication protocols such as the following: (a) ‘Transport Control 
Protocol’ (TCP); (b) ‘Internet Protocol’ (IP); (c) ‘File Transfer Protocol’ (FTP); (d) 
‘Network Time Protocol’ (NTP); and (e) ‘Hypertext Transfer Protocol’ (HTTP) [1]. 
 
Link 16 is a tactical digital data link network used by NATO. It has improvements over 
existing communications systems but its high cost, weight, and size of its air terminal is 
unsuitable for tactical UAV application [58]. The ‘Common Data Link’ (CDL) is a point-to-
point ISR data link [1]. Future revisions will include networking and interface standards to 
provide interoperability, including enhanced point-to-multipoint capabilities and transition 
to IP based user interfaces [6]. “STANAG 7085” embodies the CDL specification and is in 
development [1]. The ‘Tactical Common Data Link’ (TCDL) is designed for UAV 
platforms, with future plans to extend to manned platforms, for near-real time connectivity 
and interoperability between multiple TCDL platforms & surface terminals, and currently 
fielded CDL systems [62]. It is low cost, light weight, and provides high data rates. It will 
also interface with the TCS [62]. 
 
UAV system compliance to NATO standards has been analysed [42, 63], as presented in 
Figure 2.6, but requires further development. 
2.7 Operators 
The operators for both manned and unmanned vehicles are considered as part of the total 
system. On-board a helicopter, the aircrew are tasked with piloting and tactics [18]. UAV 
operators at the GCS (ground crew), are tasked with vehicle, payload, and mission control 
[64]. 
 
 29
 
Figure 2.6: UAV System with NATO Standards 
(Daniel, 2004) 
2.7.1 Helicopter Operators 
The aircrew is integrated in the design as a component of the helicopter system. Based on 
the information received, the aircrew of a helicopter develop tactical pictures of the 
battlefield for critical decisions. In addition to interpreting the information, the armament, 
communications, navigations, and countermeasures system are to be operated. The crew 
workload results in stress and fatigue, limiting performance. Stressful conditions, intense 
concentration, or complex cognitive demands cause mental fatigue. Tiredness, illness, or 
poor nutrition causes physical fatigue [18]. 
2.7.2 UAV Operators 
Ground crew at the GCS are traditionally considered as a subsystem of the total UAV 
system. It is the command and control centre of the UAV system, deployed during pre-
launch, launch, recovery, and operation of the UAV platform. It is defined as fixed, 
transportable, or a mobile assembly of hardware, software, and firmware that has a 
communications interface with the platform [65]. 
 
The GCS is to be maintained and operated with minimum training, logistics, and personnel 
[64]. The number of operators per GCS is governed by the type of UAV. The Pioneer has 
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only two operators, one for piloting and the other for payload [66]. The larger Global Hawk 
has up to six [64]. 
 
Technological maturity has altered the function of a GCS and the responsibilities of 
operators. Emerging control stations are being designed with capability to control the 
vehicles from a variety of platforms including carriers, submarines, and manned aircrafts, 
with various C4I combinations [60]. Advanced autonomous behaviour decreases the 
workload of an operator, requiring minimal human input. Rules-of-Engagement 
considerations will always require a man-in-the-loop to analyse and authorise certain UAV 
actions [1]. 
2.8 Rotary Wing Vehicle Design Process 
The life cycle of a system comprises of two phases; the acquisition phase which involves the 
design, manufacture, and production of the system and; the utilisation phase which is the 
actual usage of the system and its logistic support while in service. The conceptual or 
preliminary design, is the first component of the life cycle [11].  
2.8.1 Preliminary Helicopter Design 
The preliminary design process of a helicopter has been developed [11-16]. The process 
involves a series of sequential computations and iterations based on past design data and 
statistics, to meet an optimal design configuration that meets pre-defined customer needs. 
The process involves a set of specific requirements derived from the operational needs and 
established by the customer. Design constraints are placed on the designer to meet 
operational and safety standards. The design optimisation is to meet both the parametric 
requirements and constraints, while economising size, weight, and cost of the system [11]. 
 
The computations (Appendix A) comprise of the following: (a) Weight and aerodynamic 
load estimations; (b) Power and speed evaluations; (c) Rotor design; and (d) Establishment 
of physical dimensions which includes three-view drawings of the external and inboard 
profiles of system layout [11-16].  
 
The series of estimation, computation, and iteration stages involved [11], are as follows: 
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 • Stage I - Weight and Power: The aircraft’s design requirements are compared with that 
of in-service helicopter specifications to establish first estimates of weight and power for 
subsequent design computations; 
 
• Stage II - Fuel: The fuel required is governed by the time required to accomplish the 
mission, the fuel consumption rate of the engine, and the installed power; 
 
• Stage III - Weight: The weight estimate from Stage I is refined by evaluating the useful 
weight (crew, mission systems, and fuel) and factorising it to gross weight based on 
chronological statistics;  
 
• Stage IV - Vertical Drag: The vertical drag, or “downwash”, is a function of the drag 
coefficient for all components in the remote wake, disc loading, and the projected area in the 
remote wake. The projected area is evaluated from the plan view of the airframe; 
 
• Stage V - Main Rotor System: The rotor diameter is evaluated from the disc area. Disc 
area is a function of disc loading which is the thrust per unit area of the rotor. Compatibility 
between rotor diameter and fuselage length is critical.  
 
The design constraints on tip speeds are governed by the limits of noise, compressibility, 
stall, and kinetic energy storage. The tip speed is computed from the design requirements of 
maximum speed and the evaluated rotor diameter. The number of blades is evaluated from 
the thrust coefficient-to-solidity ratio. The aspect ratio of the blade governs the chord of the 
blades which is constrained by Reynolds number, being a product of chord and velocity. 
 
Other parameters that are considered in the rotor system design are the following: (a) Airfoil 
of blades; (b) Tip shape; (c) Blade taper; (d) Blade twist; (e) Root cut-out; (f) Rotor inertia; 
(g) Hinge offset; and (h) Rotor hub. 
 
The tail rotor diameter is evaluated from the main rotor diameter and disk loading. 
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• Stage VI - Drag in Forward Flight: In forward flight, the drags evaluated are parasite 
drag from the non-lifting portions of the aircraft, and profile drag due to frictional resistance 
of the blades passing through the air; 
 
• Stage VII - Power Required in Forward Flight: The power required to sustain 
forward flight is evaluated, which includes miscellaneous power for tail rotor, payload, and 
mechanical loss. An engine is selected and values of gross weight and drag coefficients are 
iterated, including new fuel weight based on the sfc of the new engine; 
 
• Stage VIII - Refinement of Gross Weight: The weights of each section/component of 
the helicopter are evaluated from equations established through mathematical processes 
[16]. These equations undergo updates based on the usage of composite materials and state-
of-the-art systems. 
 
Once the weights are refined, the balance is then considered. The ‘Centre-of-Gravity’ (c.g.) 
is evaluated from the static moments about a ‘datum line’, for all components including 
mission systems & crew, and group weights. 
 
• Stage IX - Trade-Off Analysis: The last stage of the preliminary design involves a 
trade-off, of design parameters to economise weight, size, and cost. 
2.8.2 Preliminary VTUAV Design 
The preliminary helicopter design process has been refined to be applicable to VTUAVs 
[67], and includes the autonomous component. As the unmanned and manned vehicle share 
common components, such as the airframe shape, rotor, and powerplant, the theories, past 
design data, and processes involved in preliminary helicopter design, are still applicable in 
VTUAV design. 
2.8.3 UAV Regulations 
The ‘Civil Aviation Safety Authority’ (CASA), established on 6 July 1995, conducts the 
safety regulation of civil air operations in Australia and the operation of Australian aircraft 
overseas. The ‘Civil Aviation Regulations’ (CAR) 1988 and the ‘Civil Aviation Safety 
Regulations’ (CASR) 1998, made under authority of the Civil Aviation Act, provide for 
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regulatory controls, through high levels of safety standards, for the safety of air 
navigation [68]. 
 
CASR Part 101 consolidates the rules governing all unmanned aeronautical activities into 
one body of legislation, which includes UAVs. It contains operational, maintenance, 
controller, and operator requirements for various UAV classifications.  
 
The document, UAV Design Standards – Aeroplanes; covers certification requirements for 
small and large UAVs. The UAV design standards have deleted all consideration of crew 
comfort and crash survivability, and focus largely on providing safety for those on the 
ground. There are additional requirements for telemetry, flight termination, and redundancy. 
It focuses clearly on the systems and design requirements for safe operation amongst other 
manned aircraft [47]. 
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Chapter 3 
 
MISSIONS ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction 
The operational doctrines for platform-centric designed UAVs are being established. 
CONOPs for interoperable VTUAV missions are still to be addressed (Sec 2.4.3). It 
comprises of the roles and missions of VTUAVs in joint operations with USs. In this 
Chapter, a systems approach is adopted to holistically investigate the various 
interoperability issues governing VTUAV operation. This will govern inputs to develop the 
VTUAV design framework at the mission analysis stage to provide the VTUAV with 
synergistic interoperable operations capabilities. 
3.2 Holistic Analysis 
The design of an “Interoperable Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” (iVTUAV) 
system is considered holistically as an input-process-output configuration. The inputs are 
the operational needs of the iVTUAV, and the environment in which the iVTUAV will 
operate. An additional input dimension of NCW is considered. The stipulated mission 
requirements of the iVTUAV to be designed are its functional attributes. The design 
methodology transforms the mission requirements into an iVTUAV design as an output of 
the system with the required functional attributes. The iVTUAV in combination with other 
manned and unmanned systems will enhance the mission capabilities to meet the NCO 
mission requirements. A systems perspective of the iVTUAV for holistic design analysis is 
presented in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: Systems Perspective of iVTUAV for Holistic Design Analysis 
3.3 Requirement Analysis 
The mission requirements are derived from the operational needs and operational 
environment with an additional NCW dimension. The operational needs are either civil or 
military. NCW is specific to military needs and environment, and has not been considered in 
the analysis of civil missions. The operational environments are broadly classified as natural 
and manmade. 
3.3.1 Operational Needs 
The present and future military mission requirements of UAVs comprise of “dull”, “dirty”, 
and “dangerous” operational needs. “Dull” missions refer to protracted operations, where 
extended endurance and persistence is achieved by UAVs with no crew turn-over/rest 
requirements. “Dirty” missions refer to operations over areas contaminated with nuclear, 
biological, and/or chemical agents, where the hazardous materials pose no threat to UAVs. 
“Dangerous” missions refer to operations in hostile environments suitable for UAVs, as 
there are no operators on-board (Sec 2.4.2). 
 
The UAV missions, categorised from a dull, dirty, and dangerous perspective (Sec 2.4.2), 
are presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Present and Future UAV Missions 
Mission Description Operational Need 
  Dull Dirty Dangerous 
Intelligence, Surveillance, & 
Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Provide vital observational information of 
an area of interest X  X 
C2/Communication Access and manage battlefield, and provide command & control to all systems X   
Force Protection Enhance military survivability X X X 
Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) 
Intelligence recovered via interception and 
analyses of electromagnetic signals X  X 
Nuclear/Biological/Chemical 
Detection Detect and report hazardous emissions  X X 
Combat Search & Rescue Aid in search and supplement rescue   X 
Mine Detection/Counter-
measure (CM) Detection and neutralisation of mines   X 
Meteorology & 
Oceanography 
Atmospheric and oceanic data collection of 
operating environment X  X 
Counter Narcotics Monitoring and interdiction of narcotics X  X 
Psychological Ops Leaflet and pamphlet dispensing   X 
Strike Weapon delivery on a selected target   X 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) 
Detection and neutralisation of adversary 
submarines X   
Precision Target Location 
and Designation 
Provide precise location data for target 
cueing X  X 
Deception Disrupt and degrade adversary radar separation X  X 
Electronic Warfare Use of electromagnetic energy to confuse or disable adversary defensive systems   X 
Communication/Data Relay Relay audio and data through an airborne network X   
Team Resupply Dispense logistic supplies and military equipment   X 
 
In a ‘Future Combat System’ (FCS), the UGVs and UMVs will also be a component of the 
battlespace. The potential military missions of UGVs and UMVs (Sec 2.4.3) in NCOs are 
presented in Table 3.2.  
 
The mission requirements of VTUAVs (Table 3.1) are analysed considering commonality 
with other manned and unmanned (UGV/UMV) systems (Table 3.2) and its future 
integration of mission capabilities in a network-centric environment. This will provide 
inputs in the design analysis of the VTUAV from an interoperability perspective. The 
intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance, force protection & strike, and re-supply, are 
generic missions to be met by other systems in addition to the VTUAVs. UGV 
communications will need enhancement by manned and UMV systems. Combat search & 
rescue, precision target location & detection, and electronic warfare support will continue to 
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be provided by manned systems. The results of the commonality studies of mission 
requirements are presented in Table 3.3 for the operational needs of long endurance (“dull”), 
hazardous neutralisation (“dirty”), and hostile action (“dangerous”). 
 
Table 3.2: Military Missions of UGVs and UMVs 
Military Missions 
Unmanned Ground Vehicles Unmanned Marine Vehicles 
Detection, neutralization, and breaching of minefields and 
other obstacles Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
(RSTA) of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
UXO clearance Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Oceanography 
Force protection and physical security Communication/Navigation Network Nodes (CN3) 
Logistics Inspection/identification 
Fire fighting Payload delivery 
Urban warfare Information Operations (IO) 
Weapons employment Time Critical Strike (TCS) 
Contaminated are/denied areas operations Barrier patrol (homeland defence and force protection) 
 Sea base support 
 
3.3.2 Operational Environment 
A VTUAV will operate in similar environment as the manned helicopter platform. The 
operating environments of helicopters have been adequately identified (Sec 2.4.4) and 
comprises of various terrains, weather conditions, and threats. The iVTUAV missions 
(Table 3.1) in addition to these will operate in a network-centric environment. 
 
The terrain for interoperability will cover from desert to mountain, jungle, urban, and 
onward to marine environment. Time of operation is round-the-clock in all weather 
including low visibility (rain, snow, wind, hot, fog, and night). 
 
The environment will include threats from pylons, cables, wires, adversary 
gun/missile/electronic attack, hazardous material (nuclear/biological/chemical), and mid-air 
collision. NCW will encompass a higher degree of situational awareness for the FCS 
including the iVTUAV. Hence, data fusion across sensors and across platforms  is needed to 
provide comprehensive visuals of the environmental threats such as pylons, cables, and the 
threat zones including the location of various adversary units.  
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Table 3.3: iVTUAV Mission Requirements 
Operational 
Needs iVTUAV Mission Requirements Other Systems 
   Manned Aircrafts UGV UMV 
Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) X X X 
C2/Communication X  X 
Force Protection X X X 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) X   
Meteorology & Oceanography   X 
Counter Narcotics    
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) X  X 
Long 
Endurance 
Communication/Data Relay   X 
Force Protection X X X 
Hazardous 
Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Detection  X  
Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) X X X 
Force Protection X X X 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) X   
Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Detection  X  
Combat Search & Rescue X   
Mine Detection/Countermeasure (CM) X X X 
Meteorology & Oceanography   X 
Counter Narcotics    
Psychological Ops X   
Strike X X X 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) X  X 
Precision Target Location and Designation X X X 
Deception X   
Electronic Warfare X   
Military 
Hostile 
Action 
Team Resupply X X X 
Civil N/A 
 
The NCW, an additional environment, is manmade and networks all systems for C4I (Sec 
2.6.1). The iVTUAV will form part of this integrated network. The operating environments 
of an iVTUAV are presented at Table 3.4. 
3.4 Design Framework Analysis 
In the traditional design methodology (Figure 1.1), the mission requirements derived from 
the operational needs and environment are met by the VTUAV platform. The iteration 
during mission payload design provides the mission capabilities to the VTUAV from a 
platform-centric perspective.  
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Table 3.4: iVTUAV Operating Environments 
Operational Environment iVTUAV Mission Requirements 
Desert 
Mountain Terrain 
Jungle 
Hot 
Rain 
Snow 
Wind 
Weather 
Fog 
Natural 
Time Day/Night 
Terrain Urban 
Pylons/Cables/Wires 
Adversary  Attack (Physical & Electronic) 
Hazardous Material 
Threats 
Air Collision 
Manmade 
NCW Integrated Network 
 
The NCW battlespace includes FCS with manned and unmanned (air, ground, and marine) 
systems. These systems are to operate in a synergistic network to enhance the mission 
capabilities by shared situational awareness, precision, and rapid operations (Sec 2.2). Thus, 
the VTUAV operations in a NCW will be in coordination with these systems to meet the 
slated mission requirements. 
 
The traditional design methodology when applied for the iVTUAV will need to address the 
network operational issues discussed at the requirements analysis stage (Sec 3.3). 
Operational concepts of NCW will need to be considered in mission analysis. Hence, the 
requirement analysis will include an additional parameter of mission analysis to 
appropriately address payload design for interoperability capabilities. 
 
The network-centric mission requirements are categorised as follows for mission analysis: 
 
• Pre-emptive: Mission requirements specified for the iVTUAV deployment in 
cooperation with other specified systems is referred as - “Pre-emptive mission 
requirements”. This is addressed in the design of the iVTUAV for its specific mission, with 
the NCW operational concept considered in the mission analysis for suitable design of the 
payload - one that provides coordinated operation capabilities with other designated 
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systems. This includes interoperability and data fusion occurring across payloads of 
designated platforms to provide the required mission capability.  
 
• Situational: In modern warfare, battles are fluid making continuous changes to the 
operational scenarios at a rapid rate. There are several missions executed consequently in 
the same battlespace. The iVTUAV may be required to alter its mission mid-flight based on 
new information/priorities/requirements. In addition, allied services and/or nations may 
request interoperable ‘handover’ of the iVTUAV or its payload. “Situational mission 
requirements” refer to these specific changed missions for which the iVTUAV will adapt to. 
This additional requirement will need to be addressed with the inclusion of a global 
communication infrastructure (Global Information Grid) capability in the design (Sec 2.5.6). 
The grid identifies available platforms within operational range that contains complimentary 
payloads with interoperable capabilities to fuse its payload data with these platforms. 
 
The identification of pre-emptive and situational mission requirements to meet the 
interoperability capabilities leads to the development of the design framework at the mission 
analysis stage. These two requirements are the network-centric mission requirements that 
need to be addressed in the design of an iVTUAV. The mission analysis for the design of a 
payload that provides the required mission capabilities now needs to include operational 
concepts analysis of pre-emptive missions. The mission payload analysis will also need to 
consider situational missions. This is in addition to the mission analysis of long endurance, 
exposure to hazardous material, and operations in hostile environments.  
 
As an illustration, based on Table 3.3, pre-emptive network-centric CONOPs may include a 
homogeneous (all sensor) team of VTUAVs for a ‘Long Endurance’ ISR mission (Figure 
3.2), or a heterogeneous (weapon carrying intermixed with sensor) team of VTUAV and 
UMV for a ‘Hostile Action’ Anti-Submarine Warfare mission (Figure 3.3). 
 
The design framework at the mission analysis stage for iVTUAV based on the framework 
analysis is presented at Figure 3.4. The mission analysis governs the subsequent stage of 
payload design. 
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Figure 3.2: Network-Centric CONOPs – Long Endurance ISR 
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Figure 3.3: Network-Centric CONOPs – Hostile Action Anti-Submarine Warfare 
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Figure 3.4: iVTUAV Design Framework at Mission Analysis Stage 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
The mission analysis covered a holistic, requirement, and design framework analysis for the 
iVTUAV. 
 
• Holistic Analysis: The design of the iVTUAV was conceptualised in a typical input-
process-output configuration. This analysis resulted in the identification of an additional 
input – network-centric operations. At the output stage, the mission capabilities of the 
iVTUAV designed was enhanced by the capabilities drawn from other systems. The block 
diagram (Figure 3.1) developed, provided a systems perspective of the iVTUAV design for 
further holistic analysis. 
 
• Requirement Analysis: The mission requirements were derived from the operational 
needs and operational environments of the iVTUAV. Present and futuristic UAV missions 
Payload 1 Payload 2 Payload n 
Design 1 Design 2 Design n 
Design Evaluation 
iVTUAV * End. - Endurance 
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(Table 3.1) were identified as long endurance, exposure to hazardous material, or operations 
in hostile environments. The military applications of UGVs and UMVs were also identified 
(Table 3.2). Considering the requirements analysis from a network-centric operational 
perspective resulted in the identification of mission commonalities (Table 3.3) for 
investigation of future integrated mission capabilities. 
 
The operational environment analysis resulted in another iVTUAV dimension of NCW, in 
addition to terrain, weather, and threats (Table 3.4). The iVTUAV will form part of the 
integrated network, which links all systems. 
 
• Design Framework Analysis: To address the slated mission requirements for network-
centric operations, the design framework was developed to include pre-emptive and 
situational missions (Figure 3.4). The analysis of pre-emptive mission included its 
respective operational concepts. The analysis of situational missions was incorporated in the 
mission payload analysis to provide the required interoperable mission capabilities. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The design framework with the inclusion of network-centric operations provides the avenue 
for further detailed analysis of missions and its corresponding payloads. With the 
establishment of the systems perspective of the iVTUAV design, the next Chapter develops 
the systems hierarchy to identify the components of the mission payload that provides 
interoperable capabilities. The inter and intra relationship studies of the components will 
provide the interoperability design configuration. 
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Chapter 4 
 
MISSION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
The iVTUAV design framework at the mission analysis stage included network-centric 
operations. This provided the avenue for investigating appropriate mission payloads for Pre-
emptive and Situational missions. Pre-emptive deployment included the iVTUAV in 
cooperation with another system, and situational missions included reallocation of iVTUAV 
missions. In this Chapter, a systems approach is adopted to develop the system hierarchy for 
identification of the mission payload components of an iVTUAV. The components will 
identify the data fusion requirements across platforms, including functional redundancies of 
mission systems across networked platforms. 
4.2 System Hierarchy and Elements  
A system is composed of components, attributes, and relationships. The components are 
also referred as subsystems. The attributes are the functional characteristics of the 
components and also referred as mission requirements in the design of a system. 
Relationships are the inter and intra relationships between components and attributes. A 
system may be part of a larger system in a hierarchy, and its components may be referred as 
a system. The purpose of the system is achieved by the system elements and their 
corresponding attributes (Sec 2.1.2). 
 
The VTUAV design methodology has traditionally been platform-centric and comprises of 
the vehicle, its mission systems, and the GCS as subsystems of the total VTUAV system. To 
provide VTUAVs with interoperability capabilities in a design methodology, the VTUAV 
system needs to be considered as part of a network-centric system – Total system. 
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4.2.1 Total System Hierarchy 
The total NCW system is considered as the top level of the hierarchy (Level 0) with the 
subsystems and components at lower levels of the hierarchy. These subsystems and the 
components are further investigated to identify the attributes and relationships. 
 
The subsystems of the NCW system at the next level of the hierarchy (Level I) comprises of 
sensor/weapon systems for meeting the stipulated force requirements, and C4I systems for 
the command and control of the sensor/weapon systems. Within the sensor/weapon systems 
(Level II) lies the manned and unmanned systems. As the research focus is on the unmanned 
system, a partial system hierarchy is developed only for the sensor/weapon - unmanned 
systems. The C4I and manned sections of the hierarchy will need separate investigations. 
Within the unmanned domain, there are aerial, ground, and marine platforms – the next 
level of the hierarchy (Level III). The iVTUAV is placed at this level – referred as “aerial 
platform system” to include fixed wing and rotary wing (VTUAV). 
 
The VTUAV system traditionally comprises of subsystems and included the vehicle, the 
mission systems (payload), and the support system – GCS. The control switch to transfer the 
iVTUAV’s control station from manned aircrafts, to carriers, or submarines based on its 
mission, location, and/or situation is critical. The iVTUAV will need to be connected to a 
non-specific operator for C4I, at Level I, in a network-centric environment, to meet the 
control standards under development. Future control systems aim to achieve compliance to 
these standards, and the iVTUAV’s mission payload will need to interface and interoperate 
with such control stations (Sec 2.6.1).  
 
Hence, the GCS as a component of the Aerial Platform system (presently considered as part 
of the UAV system) of the hierarchy at Level IV, is operationally not in-line and will 
include only the vehicle and the mission system components. The system hierarchy from 
Level 0 to IV is presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: System Hierarchy – Levels 0 to IV 
4.2.1.1 System Elements – Level II 
The identification of subsystems of the total system provides the avenue for analysis of the 
system elements – components, attributes, and relationships. At Level II, the components 
are the manned and unmanned systems with the principle difference of a pilot/crew on-
board, and hence, the attributes are accordingly analysed. To illustrate, the analysis of the 
iVTUAV’s mission requirements for identification of the system attributes are as follows: 
• Human Factors: The pilot/crew on-board manned systems have human thresholds-of-
concentration, over sustained operations. Stressful conditions, intense concentration, or 
complex cognitive demands cause mental fatigue. Tiredness, illness, or poor nutrition 
causes physical fatigue (Sec 2.7.1). While an unmanned system has the flexibility of crew 
turn-over on-ground thus enabling the vehicle to remain in operation for sustained missions 
(Sec 2.4.1). Thus, the attributes of the two components are as follows:  
o Unmanned: Sustainability; and 
o Manned: Crew Fatigue. 
 
• Design: The absence of crew on-board provides the design avenue for low observable 
unmanned systems with the elimination of manned cockpit (seating and comfort systems). 
The UAV design may incorporate small sized airframes with seamless skins, windows and 
hatches reducing visual and radar signatures; thus enhancing survivability of the platform 
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(Sec 2.5.4). The design gains in structures and materials reduce cost. A risk to crew on a 
manned system in highly dangerous missions (Sec 2.4.2) imposes design constraints on the 
vehicle contrary to unmanned systems. Thus, the attributes from a design perspective are as 
follows: 
o Unmanned: Design flexibility, survivability enhancement, and cost effective; and 
o Manned: Design and survivability constraints. 
 
• Communication and Response: Unmanned systems require uninterrupted 
communication link with an operator for near real-time data transmission, vehicle status 
monitoring, and receiving commands for mission management (Sec 2.5.6). This is critical in 
combat situations when the man-in-the-loop is to authorise weapon release to adhere to 
Rules-of-Engagement under the present operational doctrines (Sec 2.5.5). This requires high 
communication bandwidth. In manned systems, mission management occurs on-board the 
vehicle. This includes interpreting information, release of weapons on a target, and evasive 
manoeuvres from an incoming threat (Sec 2.7.1). Thus, the response is in real-time, without 
the need to transmit data for response and decision making. It provides the manned systems 
a degree of independence. Thus, the attributes from a communication and response 
perspective are as follows: 
o Unmanned: Communication constraints, specific power, external decision 
dependence, and near real-time response; and 
o Manned: On-board decision independence, and real-time response. 
 
• Autonomy: Autonomy will decrease the workload of an operator and the 
communication bandwidth to a certain degree only, that being limited and governed by the 
present operational doctrines. Autonomy may include from flight stability adjustments to 
adaptive behaviour. Increased on-board processing and specific computing power is the key 
enabler to enhance autonomous operations (Sec 2.5.3). This additional attribute is applicable 
to unmanned systems only and present scope is as follows:  
o Attributes: Specific power, and on-board processing. 
 
• Situational Awareness: Manned system crew utilise imagery and data from on-board 
and networked sensors as well as their own on-board real-view of the operation (Sec 2.7.1). 
This provides higher degree of situational awareness in real-time with fusion of sensory 
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imagery and crew view. In unmanned systems the situational awareness is in near real-time 
and is only sensor imagery based with no ‘crew view’ fusion (Sec 2.5.2) – thus limited. The 
attributes from a situational awareness perspective is as follows: 
o Unmanned: Near real-time and limited awareness; and 
o Manned: Real-time enhanced awareness. 
4.2.1.2 System Structure – Level II 
To develop the system structure in addition to the identification of the attributes of the 
components, the inputs, outputs, relationships, and environment needs to be identified. The 
environment may be classified as manmade and natural (Sec 3.3.2), and may be further 
analysed in detail at the next levels of the hierarchy. The input to the total system mainly 
comprises of the military operational doctrines and that of output is network-centric mission 
capabilities. The relationships are inter and intra – component & component, component & 
attribute, and attributes & attribute.  
 
The system structure based on the identified system elements and the environment is 
presented in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: System Structure – Level II 
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4.2.1.3 System Elements – Level III 
The formulation of the system structure at Level II identified the components, attributes, and 
relationships. The system hierarchy (Figure 4.1) identified the components at Level III, 
which comprised of the following: (a) Aerial platform; (b) Ground platform; and (c) Marine 
platform. These platforms to be designed are to meet the stipulated mission requirements - 
the functional characteristics (attributes) of the components. 
 
The mission requirements were identified and categorised as follows (Sec 3.3.1): (a) Long 
endurance; (b) Hazardous exposure; and (c) Hostile action. These are the attributes of the 
three platforms at Level III.  
4.2.1.4 System Structure – Level III 
The system structure is developed similarly to Level II by identifying the inputs, outputs, 
relationships, and environment. The environment at Level II is further analysed in detail and 
identified as time, weather, threat, terrain, and NCW (Sec 3.3.2). The input is the NCO of 
the unmanned systems, and the output is iVTUAV mission capabilities. The relationships 
are as previously identified inter and intra – component & component, component & 
attribute, and attributes & attribute. 
 
The system structure at Level III based on the identified system elements and the 
environment is presented in Figure 4.3. 
4.2.2 Mission System Hierarchy 
The functional characteristics (attributes) of the aerial platform system (Level III) are long 
endurance, hazardous exposure, and hostile action. These attributes are to be met by the 
vehicle or the mission system component (Level IV) of the aerial platform system. Only the 
mission system component is addressed in this Sub-chapter, being the focus.  
 
The ‘Commercial-of-the-Shelf’ (COTS) available mission systems technology need to be 
grouped based on their functional characteristics, to identify the components at the next 
level of the hierarchy. 
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Figure 4.3: System Structure – Level III 
 
An investigation of the functional characteristics of the COTS (Sec 2.5) resulted in the 
following categorisation: 
• Navigation : Systems that aid in flight control; 
• Sensors : Systems that sense, track, locate, and identify a source; 
• Computers : Systems that enable responsive flight control systems, on-board  
  sensor data processing, and autonomous behaviour; 
• Defensive : Systems that provide active threat countermeasures; 
• Weapons : Systems that provide the means of destroying selected targets; and 
• Data Links : Systems that provide two way communications between the 
  iVTUAV and a control station. 
 
Categories of the COTS were designated as the components of the mission systems – 
components at Level V of the hierarchy. The mission systems technology categories are 
further investigated in detail to sub-categorise the functional characteristics for formulation 
of the next level of the hierarchy – Level VI. To illustrate, the sensor categories of the  
technology is sub-categorised depending on the capabilities it offers – still/video image, 
electronic signals, nuclear, biological, chemical, and/or magnetic detection. In the design 
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methodology, the slated mission requirements will govern the technologies to be considered 
for the design of the mission system. 
 
The iVTUAV is one component of the NCW total system and in the network-centric 
environment its slated mission requirements may be derived from other components of the 
system – manned/unmanned platforms and its corresponding mission systems. Additive 
components, or mission systems, are available to the iVTUAV for mission accomplishment 
– a concept-of-operations. Thus the issue is – which of these components identified for 
formulation of the mission payload are to be on-board the iVTUAV and which are on-call 
from other platforms. 
 
The lower levels of the hierarchy (Level V & VI) for the unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) 
and unmanned marine vehicle (UMV) systems needs to be developed accordingly, with due 
consideration of inter and intra usage of the components for mission accomplishment. The 
pre-emptive and situational network-centric mission requirements state the need of mission 
systems from other platforms to achieve wider data fusion for enhanced situational 
awareness and mission effectiveness (Sec 3.4). Thus, the development of the Level V & VI 
of the hierarchy is in-line with the concept-of-operations. The mission payload design of an 
iVTUAV needs to consider the mission systems on-board other unmanned systems to 
optimise its payload on-board and enhancement of its mission capability beyond its payload 
capability. 
 
The Levels V & VI of the iVTUAV mission system hierarchy with an additional segment 
for UGVs and UMVs are presented in Figure 4.4. 
4.2.2.1 Mission System Elements – Level V 
A total of six components of the mission systems have been identified by a categorisation 
process. The functional characteristics (attributes) of the components need to be slated in-
line with the mission requirements of the iVTUAV. The detailed mission systems analysis 
for the identification of the attributes is as follows. 
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Figure 4.4: Mission System Hierarchy with UGV and UMV Segments – Level V & VI 
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• Navigation: Navigational equipment is to provide the iVTUAV with positioning 
information to aid in its flight control (Sec 2.5.1). The accuracy depends on the technology. 
Precise positioning information is essential to aid the iVTUAV in collision avoidance with 
other airborne vehicles (Sec 2.5.4). It also assists with precise weapon guidance (Sec 2.5.5). 
Thus, the required attributes of the navigation systems are the following: (a) Flight control; 
(b) Survivability; and (c) Lethal precision. 
 
• Sensors: Sensors provide multiple applications of tracking, locating, and identifying a 
source for situational awareness – imaging or signal/magnetic/hazardous material detection. 
This data is transmitted or stored for analysis via C4I systems for dissemination to other 
systems for enhancing the tactical picture of the battlefield. Bandwidth requirements 
increase with the increase in information to be transmitted (Sec 2.5.2). Sensors also provide 
observational information, to assist in obstacle detection and avoidance, and threat detection 
for targeting the weapons (Sec 2.5.5). The required attributes of the sensors are as follows: 
(a) Observation & detection; (b) Communication; (c) Survivability; and (d) Lethal precision. 
 
• Computer: Computing capability on-board is required to enhance sensor data 
processing, and autonomous behaviour. Autonomy, in the form of autopilot and algorithms, 
provides various degrees of autonomous behaviour from simple stability adjustments to 
complicated adaptive behaviour (Sec 2.5.3). This reduces the vulnerability of the iVTUAV 
and maintains its effectiveness during non-deliberate communication loss or deliberate 
jamming (Sec 2.5.4). In conjunction with on-board sensor data processing, it also reduces 
the requirement of large communication bandwidth. The storage devices provide post-
mission analysis of data (Sec 2.5.3). The required attributes of a computing system on-board 
the iVTUAV are the following: (a) Flight control; (b) Data processing/storage; (c) 
Communication; and (d) Survivability. 
 
• Defensive Systems: Defensive mission systems provide active threat countermeasures 
and include warning sensors (radar, laser, and missile), jammers (radar and infrared), and 
chaff and flare dispensers. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) assists in collision avoidance 
(Sec 2.5.4). The required attributes of defensive systems are as follows: (a) Observation & 
detection; (b) Threat countermeasures; and (c) Survivability. 
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• Weapons: Weapons provide the means of destroying selected targets. Weapons may be 
installed internally or externally. Technology advancement has resulted in miniaturisation of 
the lethal warheads. Rules-of-Engagement considerations require final weapon control and 
authorisation to reside off-board the iVTUAV (Sec 2.5.5). The required attribute of weapons 
is as follows: (a) Lethality. 
 
• Data Link: Data link systems include the air terminal and antennas. Data links provide 
two way communications between the iVTUAV and a control station. An up-link allows the 
control station to control the iVTUAV as well as its payload, while a down-link provides 
iVTUAV status and sensor data transmissions. The rate of data transmissions governs the 
communication bandwidth (Sec 2.5.6). A continuous link and dissemination of data to all 
networked systems in a NCW battlefield provides enhanced situational awareness, provides 
higher degrees of synchronisation, and rapid decision making. This enhances survivability 
and lethality. A continuous data link is also necessary for Rules-of-Engagement 
considerations which mandate a man-in-the-loop to analyse and authorise an iVTUAVs 
weapons release (Sec 2.5.5). Thus, the required attributes of the data link systems are the 
following: (a) Flight control; (b) Communication; (c) Survivability; and (d) Lethal 
precision. 
4.2.2.2 Mission System Structure – Level V 
Similar to previous levels, the inputs, outputs, and relationships needs to be identified to 
develop the mission system structure. The environment was adequately analysed – time, 
weather, threat, terrain, and NCW (Sec 3.3.2). The input is the iVTUAV mission 
requirements and the output is iVTUAV mission payload. The relationships remain inter 
and intra – component and component, component and attribute, and attributes and attribute.  
 
The mission system structure based on the identified system elements and the environment 
is presented in Figure 4.5. 
4.3 Payload Design Decision Support System 
An interoperable payload design DSS can be developed from the system structure of the 
mission systems – Level V of the hierarchy. The development of the DSS is based on the 
AHP (Sec 2.1.4).  
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Figure 4.5: Mission System Structure – Level V 
 
A functional hierarchy (Sec 2.1.4) is the composition of a complex system according to its 
essential relationships. In structuring the functional hierarchy, the top level (Level I) 
comprises of ‘Total Mission Contribution’ (TMC), that each mission system category 
provides. The subsequent level (Level II), which hosts the decision criteria that contribute to 
TMC, are specified as the critical attributes that present functional characteristics of the 
mission systems identified from the mission systems analysis (Sec 4.2.2.1). The last level of 
the hierarchy (Level III) is formed by the mission system categories that provide the 
functional characteristics and are linked to the decision criteria on which it will be assessed. 
The functional hierarchy of the decision parameter (Total Mission Contribution) is 
presented in Figure 4.6. 
 
Based on the functional hierarchy (Figure 4.6), the AHP concept then compares the 
importance of design parameter weightings through its pairwise comparison technique using 
a 1-9 scale. Consistency in judgements is ensured through Random Consistency Values that 
are derived as the average consistencies for different order random matrices (Appendix B). 
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Figure 4.6: Functional Hierarchy of Decision Parameter – Total Mission Contribution 
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As an illustration, the relative weights, or local priorities, for each critical attribute are 
assigned equal importance to the TMC (Appendix C.2), considering a general mission only 
(i.e. non-specific NCO). The mission systems are then ranked against each other to 
designate their local priorities in respect to the critical attributes (Appendix C.3). The local 
Vectors-of-Priorities are then synthesised to yield an Overall Vector-of-Priority (Appendix 
C.4) that ranks the mission systems.  An interoperable payload design DSS is developed in 
accordance to the Overall Vector-of-Priority to provide a tool to the designer for optimum 
on-board payload design that enhances interoperable mission capabilities. The DSS is 
presented in Figure 4.7. 
 
The precedence order, denoting the criticality of the mission systems in NCO, provides the 
avenue for trade-off analysis of an iVTUAV. Data link technology is ranked most critical 
(Rank 1) and is considered as the NCW enabler. These systems are imperative in a NCO. 
This is logical, as the data link provides the communication links to other networked 
systems that are critical for NCO. The computer and navigation technology categories 
(Rank 2) are the flight enablers. These systems are critical for iVTUAV flight. Thus, the 
technological categories within Ranks 1 and 2 are imperative and needs to be on-board 
iVTUAVs irrespective of their slated mission requirements. It requires redundancy and 
restricted trade-offs in design. 
 
The sensor technology category (Rank 3) is considered the task enabler. These systems are 
utilised to meet the slated mission requirements of the iVTUAV. To illustrate, the FLIR 
meets the requirements of day/night reconnaissance, and chemical sensors for NBC 
detection. In NCO, the mission systems at this rank may be located off-board the iVTUAV 
and on-board other platforms that are on-call, to enhance flexibility of payload design to 
meet the interoperable mission requirements. The on-board/off-board sensor payload design 
is governed by the stipulated requirements and involves systematic trade-off analysis. Data 
fusion is achieved from Rank 3 systems on-board/off-board the iVTUAV to enhance 
mission capabilities. 
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Figure 4.7: Interoperable Payload Design DSS 
 
The defensive systems technology category (Rank 4-A) is considered supplementary. The 
defensive payload design is flexible and governed by the threat that dictates the degree of 
survivability needed. Similarly, the weapon technology category (Rank 4-B) is also 
considered supplementary, and may be equipped for armed day/night reconnaissance. Rank 
4-B differs to Rank 4-A as some missions will necessitate weapon payloads to meet 
stipulated mission requirements; as in the case of strike requirements. Thus it was 
considered as an additional component of Rank 4. 
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4.4 Results and Discussion 
The mission systems analysis of iVTUAV resulted in the development of the system 
hierarchy, system structure, and a payload decision support system.  
 
• System Hierarchy and Elements: The system hierarchy of an iVTUAV was 
considered as part of a NCW system – total system, which comprised of the sensor/weapon 
and C4I systems. The sensor/weapon system comprised of the unmanned and manned 
components. The unmanned component was categorised as aerial, ground, and marine 
platforms. The iVTUAV formed part of the aerial platform and comprised of the vehicle and 
the mission systems (Figure 4.1). The system structure at Level II (Figure 4.2) thus included 
the manned and unmanned as components, with detailed attributes governed by the required 
functional characteristics. The crew/pilot on-board or off-board was the principle factor that 
stipulated the attributes.  
 
The system structure at Level III (Figure 4.3) included the aerial, ground, and marine 
platforms as the components, with the mission requirements of long endurance, hazardous 
exposure, and hostile action as the attributes. 
 
The Level V and VI of the mission system hierarchy consisted of the mission system sub-
components. The mission systems were categorised as navigation, sensors, computer, 
defensive systems, weapons, and data link at Level V. These were further subcategorised at 
Level VI for the design of the mission payload. The functional characteristics of these 
systems provided the mission capability to the payload. 
 
The network-centric perspective created an additional UGV and UMV segment at the 
hierarchy Levels V and VI (Figure 4.4) to address pre-emptive and situational network-
centric mission requirements. This was to address the data fusion and functional redundancy 
requirements. 
 
The system structure at Level IV (Figure 4.5) identified a total of six components and their 
functional attributes were derived from the mission capability they provide to meet the 
stipulated mission requirements of the iVTUAV. 
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• Payload Design Decision Support: Utilising the AHP, the functional hierarchy (Figure 
4.6) developed an interoperable payload design DSS (Figure 4.7). It identified the critical 
systems of the payload to meet the slated mission requirements from systems on-board. 
Interoperable mission capabilities were provided by on-call systems from off-board. 
 
Since NCW is an emerging theory with limited implementation in actual combat; test and 
assessment of the relationships and contributions of components and attributes requires 
further investigation. To minimise such limitations for future research, NCW training 
exercises need to be conducted more frequently, and NCW needs to be implemented in 
future operations at an accelerated rate, in order to enhance the knowledge base. The AHP 
can then be utilised in accordance to formulated NCW and consultation with UAV 
experienced individuals from engineering and military disciplines. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The mission system analysis has provided the methodology for the development of payload 
design decision support. With the establishment of the system hierarchies and structures, 
and payload design decision support system, the next Chapter develops the interoperability 
architecture required to meet system compliance to NATO standards. Implementation of an 
interoperable architecture at the preliminary design stage of an iVTUAV will provide the 
avenue for synergistic system integration of military platforms. 
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Chapter 5 
 
INTEROPERABILITY ARCHITECTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Present UAVs utilise proprietary software and hardware limiting its capabilities to integrate 
and synchronise activities with other systems in a NCO. Thus, a key enabler of NCO is 
interoperability. Achieving interoperability is complex, but standardisation is critical. Data 
standards ensure that data from on-board sensors and payloads can be processed and 
interpreted by any user. Control standards involve the control of UAV operations. Interface 
standards ensure communications between UAV system components (Sec 2.6).  
 
To ensure interoperability in the iVTUAV design methodology, the NATO standards needs 
consideration during the mission payload design. The iVTUAV system was included as part 
of the NCW total system and comprised of its subsystems in the system hierarchy. In this 
Chapter, the system hierarchy is analysed to develop a NCO interoperability architecture 
that complies with NATO standards. 
5.2 Interoperability System Configuration 
The systems and the subsystems of the NCW total system are configured in accordance to 
the system hierarchy. The iVTUAV platform is initially considered as one system 
comprising of the vehicle and mission subsystems (Figure 4.1). As the interoperability 
standards focus on the mission systems, the vehicle’s subsystems are not considered in 
detail. The mission systems are then analysed from a technological system categories 
perspective (Figure 4.4), with the functional attributes as the focus (Sec 4.2.2.1). This 
includes the following: (a) Data Collecting Mission Systems; (b) Computer; (c) Data Link; 
and (d) Support Mission Systems. 
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With no dedicated ground control system, future iVTUAVs will have its control transferred 
from one control station to another based on its mission, location, and/or situation. The 
iVTUAV will thus need to be connected to a non-specific operator for C4I in a network-
centric environment (Sec 4.2.1). This introduces the C4I system. This system comprises of 
the control component which has an attached man-in-the-loop component, required for 
supervision and authorisation requests, including the devices that acquire iVTUAV data. 
 
Considering the iVTUAV pre-emptive and situational mission requirements (Sec 3.4), other 
systems are introduced. Pre-emptive NCO mission requirements introduce other platforms 
with vehicle and mission systems, similarly to the iVTUAV. As this research is focused on 
the iVTUAV platform, the other platform subsystems are not considered in detail. 
Situational mission requirements introduce the Global Information Grid (GIG) as an 
additional system.  
 
The data link, a critical NCW enabler (Sec 4.3), is additionally considered as an overlapping 
subsystem that fundamentally connects all systems. The data link terminals are considered 
as part of their parent system’s mission systems. All these systems are to be interconnected 
to allow for the interoperability standards to be appropriately applied. 
5.3 Connectivity 
There are three modes of connectivity between systems and subsystems as follows:  
• Control: The capability of one system/subsystem to transmit/receive control commands 
to/from another system/subsystem, for manipulation of its operation; 
• Data: The capability of one system/subsystem to transmit/receive data to/from another 
system/subsystem; and  
• Status: The capability of one system/subsystem to transmit/receive its operational status 
to/from another system/subsystem. 
 
The computer is largely responsible for many of the iVTUAV’s functions (Sec 4.2.2.1). The 
processor and the autopilot provide flight control which may include stability adjustments, 
take-off and landing, climb, cruise, and banking by manipulating the vehicle’s various 
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components. Additionally, the computer has access and control to all on-board mission 
systems. All components report its status to the computer.  
 
Data collecting systems such as navigational equipment and sensors transmit data to the 
computer. The computer may store the raw data or process it for further interpretation to 
acquire intelligence. Increased autonomy has enhanced on-board sensor data processing 
capability resulting in larger, complex, and more expensive processors including an increase 
in power requirements on-board (Sec 2.5.3). The trade-off will be based on the mission 
requirements. 
 
Raw and processed data may be transmitted for recording on an on-board storage device for 
post-mission analyses, or transmitted through the data link (Sec 2.5.6) to another system for 
processing. The data may also be utilised by the computer to operate other components of 
the iVTUAV. To illustrate – weapon release after target acquisition and designation, or 
collision avoidance manoeuvring (controlling the vehicle’s components) using navigational 
coordinate data. 
 
The C4I system acquires status and data from the iVTUAV and transmits control commands 
to the vehicle for the computer to make appropriate control commands to the various 
components. For pre-emptive missions, the control station may also have identical control 
with another unmanned system. The other platform will also have a link to the iVTUAV to 
exchange and fuse data. In circumstances that one platform cannot communicate with the 
control station, transmission may occur via relay through the other platform. To illustrate, a 
control station may not have clear line-of-sight to the UGV and so control commands are 
transmitted through an iVTUAV relay that does have a clear line-of-sight. 
 
To achieve true NCW, future iVTUAVs must be totally autonomous for group collaboration 
and planning (Sec 2.5.3). Thus, based on the pre-emptive CONOPS and level of autonomy, 
the iVTUAV might have autonomous control over other systems or vice versa, might be 
controlled by other unmanned systems; with processed data and control commands 
transmitting between the systems, with no human intervention. 
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All systems will have a direct link to the GIG which allows all assets to post, access, and 
process data to-and-from the network. 
5.4 Standardisation 
The NATO interoperability standards (Sec 2.6.1), are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: NATO Interoperability Standards 
NATO Standards 
STANAG 3809 Digital Terrain Elevation Data 
STANAG 4545 Secondary Imagery 
STANAG 4575 Solid State Storage 
STANAG 4586 Unmanned Control System Architecture 
STANAG 4607 GMTI Radar Data 
STANAG 4609 Motion Imagery 
STANAG 5500 Message Text Formatting System 
STANAG 7023 Primary Imagery 
STANAG 7024 Tape Media Standard 
STANAG 7074 Digital Geographic Information Exchange Standard 
STANAG 7085 Interoperable Data Link 
 
The standards are in various stages of development, amendment, and application. Many 
standards are classified and their implementations are not in public domain. This places 
challenges on the application to an iVTUAV and limits the comprehensiveness of the 
research. Thus, logical assumptions based on limited research (Sec 2.6.1) provide the via-
media for application. Compliance to the standards is dependent on the COTS technological 
development. If the mission systems are non-compliant grade, conversion to the standard 
format is required through a medium, such as the iVTUAV’s computer. 
 
STANAG 7023 is intended for sensory data with limited processing and is applied for 
formatting, while STANAG 4545 is intended for processed sensory data and is intelligence 
applicable. STANAG 4607, 4609, 7074, and 3809 specify its own formats. Information 
regarding STANAG 4607 and 7074 in public domain, states compatibility with 7023 and 
4545, signifying it can additionally be encased as a primary image (STANAG 7023) and/or 
processed secondary image (STANAG 4545). The STANAGs 4609 and 3809, not in public 
domain, are assumed to be compatible with 7023 and/or 4545 as the standards must 
interface with each other to achieve true interoperability (Sec 2.6.1). 
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 Data transmitted to a storage device may be recorded on a tape media or a solid state 
recorder. Both devices must adhere to STANAG 7024 and STANAG 4575 respectively for 
any C4I system to obtain data post-mission from the iVTUAV. STANAG 5500 is 
mandatory for all tactical message text being exchanged between NATO ‘Automated Data 
Processor’ (ADP) systems, including the iVTUAV’s computer (Sec 2.6.1). 
 
The data link air terminal will need to adhere to STANAG 7085 for interoperable 
communications of control commands, data, and status reports with the C4I system and 
other systems. As the air terminal is the link between the iVTUAV’s mission system & 
vehicle components, and the C4I‘s control component, it needs to be interfaced and 
compatible with the control station to allow a human operator to control the iVTUAV and 
its payloads. This is achieved through STANAG 4586. To access the GIG, the data link 
terminals of the iVTUAV and all systems will need to comply with Internet Protocol (IP) 
based network architecture (Sec 2.6.1).  
 
STANAG 4586 will apply to the control station and define the levels of interoperable 
control. This standard needs consideration during iVTUAV design being the interface that 
connects the iVTUAV and its functions to human operators. Complying with this standard 
and being compatible with STANAG 7085 will ensure accomplishment of the authorised 
level of interoperable control of the iVTUAV and its payload by any service or allied force; 
provided permission is granted. Evaluation of STANAG 4586 compliant control stations is 
underway for the purpose of controlling other USs (such as UUVs, USVs, etc.) and being 
able to control the vehicles from several platforms (carriers, submarines, manned aircrafts, 
etc., Sec 2.6.1). 
5.5 Interoperability Architecture 
With the systems investigations on configuration, and connectivity and application of 
NATO interoperable standards considered, the interoperable architecture of the iVTUAV 
system compliant to the STANAGs is presented in Figure 5.1. 
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5.6 Results and Discussion 
The payload design requires consideration of NATO STANAGs to achieve interoperable 
command and control, and interoperable formatting and dissemination of payload data. To 
achieve interoperability, system integration and software development, compliant to NATO 
standards (Table 5.1) is critical. Thus, the hardware and software in respect of platforms and 
its mission systems need attention at the design phase. The iVTUAV architecture for 
interoperability (Figure 5.1) comprises of the following key features: 
• System Configuration: System of systems - the iVTUAV was viewed from a system 
hierarchal perspective and included the following: 
o Upper hierarchy systems: GIG, C4I, iVTUAV, and other platform systems; 
o Lower hierarchy subsystems: Vehicle systems, mission systems, human 
components; and 
o iVTUAV sub-subsystems: Navigation, sensors, computer, etc. 
• Inter and Intra Connectivity: It needs to comprise of control, data, and status links 
between systems and subsystems; and 
• Interoperability Standardisation: Encompassing the stipulated NATO standards is the 
key to interoperability benchmarks. 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
The system hierarchy (Figure 4.1) identified two subsystems of the iVTUAV – mission 
systems and vehicle. Analysis of the mission system components and attributes provided the 
avenue to develop an interoperable architecture compliant to NATO standards. The next 
Chapter investigates the vehicle component of the iVTUAV from a NCO perspective to 
address synergy and compatibility of design requirement and constraints with other 
platforms, in the preliminary vehicle design process.   
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Chapter 6 
 
VEHICLE SYSTEM DESIGN 
6.1 Introduction 
The NCW total system hierarchy was developed in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.1). The aerial 
platform at hierarchy Level III included the subsystems of vehicle and mission systems 
(Level IV). The mission system hierarchy was further developed (Figure 4.4) for detailed 
analysis to identify payloads that address the requirements of an interoperable VTUAV. 
This Chapter focuses on the vehicle subsystem hierarchy to address the stipulated mission 
requirements and design constraints in the vehicle design.  Since the focus of the research is 
on mission systems governing interoperable capabilities, the detailed vehicle design is 
limited. 
6.2 Vehicle System 
The vehicle system addresses the flight characteristics of the iVTUAV platform. The 
vehicle provides the characteristics utilising rotating wing (rotors) for lift, similar to the 
helicopter platform but with no crew component on-board. 
6.2.1 Vehicle System Hierarchy 
The vehicle system is at hierarchy Level IV. The subsystems at hierarchy Level V include 
the following: (a) Airframe; (b) Powerplant; (c) Main rotor; (d) Mechanical systems; and (e) 
Tail rotor (Sec 2.8.1 & 2.8.2). 
 
The vehicle subsystems are further investigated for its components at hierarchy Level VI, to 
identify the associated functional characteristics. To illustrate, the airframe subsystem 
comprises of the following components: (a) Main fuselage; (b) Tail boom; (c) Stabilisers; 
(d) Landing gears/skids; (e) Fuel tanks; and (f) Stub wings. In the design process, these 
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components provide the performance requirements and comply to design constraints. The 
vehicle system hierarchy of Levels V and VI is presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Vehicle Level IV
Figure 6.1: Vehicle System Hierarchy – Level V & VI 
6.2.1.1 Vehicle System Elements – Level V 
A total of five components of the vehicle system were identified from a technology 
perspective. The functional characteristics (attributes) of the components need to be slated 
in accordance with the mission requirements of the iVTUAV. The vehicle system analysis 
to identify the attributes is as follows. 
• Airframe: It is the structure of the vehicle system and provides integration links 
between the components. It stores systems internally and externally including the mission 
payload. Its design impacts the vehicle’s dynamic stability. Its shape and size govern 
parameters such as parasite drag and signature. Thus, the attributes of the airframe are the 
following: (a) Integration Links; (b) Storage; (c) Stability; (d) Drag; and (e) Signature. 
 
• Powerplant: It consumes fuel and the chemical process generates power, which is 
transmitted to operate various vehicle components. Thus, the attributes of the powerplant 
are the following: (a) Fuel consumption; (b) Power; and (c) Chemical processes. 
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 • Main Rotor: The blades generate aerodynamic forces to produce thrust for vehicle 
flight. The rotation pattern and orientation of the main rotor controls the flight profile from 
hover to climb to cruise. The rotor profile contributes to profile drag and its rotation 
produces noise at the blade tip. Thus, the attributes of the main rotor are the following: (a) 
Thrust; (b) Control; (c) Drag; and (d) Noise. 
 
• Mechanical Systems: The mechanical systems support the control of various 
components through hydraulics and electrical control. Thus, the only attribute of the 
mechanical systems is – Supportive control. 
 
• Tail Rotor: It generates counter-force to the torque reaction of the main rotor on the 
fuselage, and provides yaw stability and directional control. It contributes to profile drag 
and generates noise similar to the main rotor. Thus, the attributes of the tail rotor are the 
following: (a) Stability; (b) Control; (c) Drag; and (d) Noise. 
6.2.1.2 Vehicle System Structure – Level V 
The inputs, outputs, and relationships needs to be identified to develop the vehicle system 
structure. The environment was adequately analysed – time, weather, threat, terrain, and 
NCW (Sec 3.3.2). As the Vehicle and Mission Systems are located at the same hierarchy 
level (Figure 4.1), the common input is the iVTUAV mission requirements but the output of 
the vehicle system is iVTUAV vehicle design. The relationships are inter and intra – 
component & component, component & attribute, and attributes & attribute. 
 
The system structure based on the identified system elements and the environment is 
presented in Figure 6.2. 
6.2.2 Mission Requirements 
The iVTUAV mission requirements investigated in Chapter 3 resulted in commonality 
studies of the operational needs (long endurance, hazardous, and hostile action) in a 
network-centric environment (Table 3.3). Meeting the slated mission and interoperability 
requirements is accomplished through the mission payload (Chapter 4 & 5) and vehicle 
design of the iVTUAV. 
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Figure 6.2: Vehicle System Structure – Level V 
 
Requirements are derived from the operational needs and confirmed by the potential 
customer for the vehicle design. With increasing stakeholders, the potential requirements 
broaden. Thus, the vehicle design process requires weighting and prioritising of these 
requirements for trade-off study to attain an optimal design. The design parameters that 
govern the preliminary vehicle design process are presented in Table 6.1. 
 
The mission requirements govern the design of vehicle components. As an illustration, a 
mission requirement of strike requires stealth characteristics (input) to reduce the vehicle’s 
susceptibility to detection, which involves reducing vehicle emissions. The emissions 
include acoustic, thermal, electronic, and visual/radar (Table 6.1). Based on the vehicle 
systems structure (Figure 6.2), acoustic emission is an attribute of main and tail rotor 
(noise), thermal emission is an attribute of powerplant (chemical processes), and 
visual/radar signature is an attribute of airframe (signature). Thus, these components need to 
be designed (output) accordingly to meet the mission requirement of stealth. Certain 
parameters (weight and cost) are attributes of all components. 
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Table 6.1: Design Requirement Parameters 
Design Requirement Parameters 
• Empty weight 
Weight 
• Maximum take-off weight 
• Maximum speed 
Speed 
• Cruise speed 
• Rate of climb 
• G load Manoeuvring 
• Bank angles/roll rates 
• Range 
• Endurance Performance 
• Altitude 
• Maximum continuous 
Power 
• Failure mode 
• Mission time 
• Survivability Mission 
• Safety 
• Acoustic 
• Thermal 
• Electronic 
Vehicle Emissions 
• Visual/radar signature 
• Materials (light, strong, radar transparent) 
• Stealth shape Structure 
• Ballistic protection 
• Production 
• Operating Cost 
• Maintenance 
• Maintainability 
Utilisation 
• Reliability 
 
Trade-off analysis will require prioritisation of parameters. To illustrate – weight and cost 
are universally important parameters in iVTUAV design, but the trade-off focus may vary 
based on the mission requirements (Table 3.3) as follows: (a) Long endurance – 
performance (endurance), power, and mission time; (b) Hazardous – structure material, 
survivability, and utilisation (reliability); and (c) Hostile – speed, manoeuvring, 
survivability, vehicle emissions, and utilisation (reliability). 
 
In a NCO environment, some of the requirements placed on the vehicle design may be 
derived from other USs. The design parameters (Table 6.1) need to consider the design 
parameters of platforms that the iVTUAV will be operating with, for synergistic operations. 
To illustrate, in the case of pre-emptive iVTUAV/UUV operations for ASW, an iVTUAV’s 
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endurance will need to be compatible with the UUV’s endurance. Selection of a UUV with 
a suitable endurance may be needed, or may involve deployment of UUV from the 
iVTUAV, to reduce UUV transit time. 
6.2.3 Design Constraints 
Design constraints are placed to meet operational and safety standards. As the iVTUAV is 
an unmanned helicopter, the design benchmarks, regulations, and past design data of 
helicopters are applicable to establish the constraints (Sec 2.8.1 & 2.8.2).  
 
The key variance with manned helicopters in iVTUAV design standards and safety 
regulations is with respect to crew comfort and crash survivability. The iVTUAV will need 
to focus only on providing safety to personnel (such as operators) on the ground (Sec 2.8.3). 
Technological/operational thresholds will cover several parameters like disc loading, top 
speed, etc (Sec 2.8.1 & 2.8.2). Technological developments in engines and composite 
materials will also govern design limits. The iVTUAV design constraints on the 
components, identified in the vehicle system hierarchy (Figure 6.1), are presented in Table 
6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Design Constraint Parameters 
Design Constraint Parameters 
• Fuselage length, width, & height 
• Stub wing length Airframe System 
• Airframe drag 
• Main/tail rotor diameter 
• Disc loading 
• Tip speed 
• Tip speed ratio 
• Blade radius-to-chord ratio 
• Blade chord 
• Coefficient of thrust-to-solidity ratio 
• Rotor inertia 
Rotor System 
• Flap frequency 
• Engines (e.g. power-to-weight ratio & specific fuel consumption) 
• Systems Technology 
• Material (e.g. strength-to-weight ratio) 
Safety Regulation • CASR Part 101 
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6.2.4 Preliminary Vehicle Design Process 
The preliminary vehicle design process involves a series of computational stages with 
feedback loops (Sec 2.8.1 & 2.8.2). The stages are sequential but require iterative 
computations for optimisation. The results at each stage are recorded as an output. This 
recorded output is the input in sequential stages. In addition, at various stages of the process, 
design requirements/constraints parametric values are required as inputs. In NCO for 
interoperability, the process is modified to include additional design requirement and 
constraint inputs of other systems. 
 
The modified interoperable vehicle design process is presented in Figure 6.3. 
6.3 Results and Discussion 
The analysis of vehicle system design resulted in the development of the vehicle system 
hierarchy & structure, design requirements & constraints, and an updated preliminary 
vehicle design process to include interoperability capabilities. 
 
• Vehicle System Hierarchy: The Level V and VI of the vehicle system hierarchy 
(Figure 6.1) were developed. Level V comprised of the vehicle’s subsystems – airframe, 
powerplant, main rotor, mechanical systems, and tail rotor. These were further 
subcategorised at Level VI to include main fuselage, hydraulic systems, rotor blades, etc. for 
the design of the vehicle. The functional characteristics (attributes) of these components, 
identified by the development of the system structure (Figure 6.2), covered aerodynamics, 
performance, and aspects that address the flight characteristics of the iVTUAV platform. 
 
• Mission Requirements & Constraints: The systems perspective of the vehicle system 
enables the components to be designed to meet the stipulated mission requirements (Table 
6.1) based on parameter prioritisation. Interoperability was achieved through inter-platform 
design parameter analysis. This optimised the design from a NCW operational perspective. 
In addition, design constraints (Table 6.2) were imposed on the components to address 
operational limitations, technological thresholds, and safety standards.  
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Figure 6.3: Interoperable Vehicle Design Process 
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 • Preliminary Vehicle Design Process: An updated vehicle design process was 
established with feedback loops for design optimisation and trade-off (Figure 6.3). Design 
requirements and constraints at various stages governed the design benchmarks to be 
achieved by the design process. The design process update included inputs from other 
systems to address interoperability. The impact of the updated process provides 
compatibility of parameters between the iVTUAV and other systems in the network-centric 
environment. The output of the design process is an interoperable VTUAV. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The development of the vehicle system hierarchy at Levels V and VI identified the 
components and attributes of the system for interoperability studies. Mission requirements 
and design constraints governed the inputs into the vehicle design process. The updated 
design process to include additional inputs of other system performance (speed, endurance, 
mission time, etc.) and design (weight, size, etc.) parameter values provides a base for an 
iVTUAV design exercise in the next chapter; including an illustration of an iVTUAV for 
operations with UGVs in a network-centric environment. 
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Chapter 7 
 
METHODOLOGY VERIFICATION: 
CASE STUDY 
7.1 Introduction 
The iVTUAV design methodology was developed to include network-centric operations in 
the mission analysis stage of the design. The mission system analysis covered the NCW 
total system hierarchy for identification of the mission payload components of an iVTUAV 
and an interoperable architecture to comply with NATO standards. The vehicle subsystem 
hierarchy was developed for the vehicle design to meet the mission requirements and 
comply with the design constraints from an interoperability perspective. This Chapter 
verifies the iVTUAV design methodology through a conceptual design exercise, and 
illustrates the interoperability with UGVs by a case study. 
7.2 Counter-IED Operations – An Interoperability Case Study 
Traditional countermine operations are conducted in open, simple, and predictable terrain by 
qualified military personnel and combat engineers [69]. Recent global military operations 
and present army research have placed emphasis to address future conflict environments 
from a complex terrain/urban perspective [2] [29], including threats from ‘Improvised 
Explosive Devices’ (IEDs) [70, 71]. The complex urban environment is not a straight 
forward transition of the present countermine techniques and doctrines to futuristic 
requirements [69]. IEDs place additional challenges due to the threat diversity, adaptive 
tactics, and technology flexibility [70, 71]. Conventional countermine equipments and 
doctrines needs to be re-considered for the development of a new operational philosophy to 
include unmanned technology. 
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7.3 Mission Analysis 
The mission analysis is addressed considering the operational environment and the 
operational need for urban Counter-IED operations. 
7.3.1 Operational Environment 
The urban operational environment (Sec 3.3.2) will comprise of the following:  
• Terrain: The future requirements will shift from desert and jungle terrain towards 
urban. The adversary will be disguised amongst civilians, using unconventional tactics 
against coalition forces. The Counter-IED operation will be conducted by coalition forces in 
an urban battlefield. 
• Weather: The deployment and operations will need to be conducted during various 
weather conditions. The Counter-IED operation will be conducted from hot, rain, wind, to 
fog conditions. 
• Time: The operations will be conducted round-the-clock to address early response-time 
requirements. The response-time will govern the degree-of-success. 
• Threats: The threats will be multi-fold from manmade to natural. It includes telephone 
poles, electric pylons, cabling/wires, and buildings. The threats from adversaries will be 
weapon based and include shoulder launched IR missiles and machine gun fire. Mid-air 
collisions are also potential threats for aircrafts operating in the area. 
• Network-Centric: The future requirements of NCW will include platforms of coalition 
forces within the Counter-IED operating theatre forming part of an integrated network 
environment. It will act as nodes and will access and post data on the global information 
network. 
7.3.2 Operational Need 
The operational need will comprise of pre-emptive and situational missions (Sec 3.3.1 & 
3.4). 
7.3.2.1 Pre-Emptive 
An iVTUAV will need to be designed from a pre-emptive perspective to enable operation 
with UGVs for Counter-IED missions. The iVTUAV will be capable to aerial transit the 
UGVs from base to target area. The recovery of the UGV will be operation governed. 
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 Detection for IEDs is critical along roads. It includes ditches, curbs, and bridges; and also 
comprises of objects on the roads such as parked cars, trash, or pieces of concrete debris 
[72]. Inspection of buildings, points-of-entry, and surroundings is needed prior to the 
occupation by forces. Structural damage to buildings needs to be avoided and buildings 
must not be accessed by the force unless security cleared [69]. 
 
The airborne sensors will provide wide area coverage that is less affected by urban terrain 
obstructions. The ground systems provide precise detection, target tracking and inspection 
capabilities, including the flexibility to traverse to the target locations and building 
inspection capabilities [29, 73]. 
7.3.2.2 Situational 
The situational mission requirements will require the iVTUAV to acknowledge re-allocation 
of mission mid-flight based on new information/priorities/requirements. This additional 
requirement will need to be addressed via the GIG (Sec 2.5.6). The iVTUAV will be 
required to ‘plug in’ to the GIG to access data. The grid will identify available platforms 
within operational range with complimentary payloads to address re-allocated missions for 
interoperability. 
 
The situational mission requirements in an urban Counter-IED operation include the 
following: 
• UXO detection: Detection and neutralisation of unexploded ordinance; 
• Urban intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance: Conduct ISR of the urban 
battlefield; 
• Communication  relay: Enhance communication range of forces in the urban 
battlefield; 
• Nuclear/biological/chemical detection: Detection of NBC agents in urban battlefield; 
and 
• Precision target location and designation: Locate, designate, and cue targets in the 
urban battlefield for strike. 
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To ensure interoperability in ‘handover’ phase of situational missions, the appropriate level 
of interoperable control will need to be determined (Sec 5.4). The Unmanned Control 
System Architecture (STANAG 4586), defines five levels of interoperable control in this 
regard. Considering the battlespace that may comprise of inter-service and/or coalition 
forces; the following levels of interoperability will need to be incorporated in the iVTUAV 
design and the authorisation of control handover will need to be provided by the 
nation/service owner as follows: 
• Owner Base Station (Level 5): Nation and service provider will have full control to 
include launch & recovery, payload & vehicle control, and direct & secondary receipt of 
imagery and/or data; 
• Owner C4I node (Level 4): Nation and service provider of C4I node beyond base 
station will have full control excluding launch and recovery; 
• Allied Service (Level 4): Allied service within nation provider will have full control 
excluding launch and recovery; and 
• Allied Nation (Level 2): Allied nation will have direct and secondary receipt of imagery 
and/or data. 
7.3.3 Mission Profile 
Mission profiles provide an illustrative breakdown of the Counter-IED mission phases in a 
platform-centric design of a VTUAV. To include network-centric environment, the 
iVTUAV design methodology requires an overlay of the communication architecture to 
incorporate additional mission phases that address interoperability capabilities. The mission 
phases include the following: (a) Typical take-off, landing, and transit sub-missions of 
rotary wing aircraft; (b) Sub-missions for UGV deployment/recovery; and (c) Key sub-
mission of Counter-IED. The detailed descriptions of various phases and mission profile for 
an urban Counter-IED mission are presented at Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 respectively. 
7.4 Mission Payload Analysis 
The mission systems structure (Figure 4.5) provides the base to identify the mission systems 
for the design of an optimised payload – one that draws the mission capabilities from 
systems on-board, and through on-call systems off-board. The analysis of Counter-IED 
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mission identifies the requirements for the iVTUAV and UGV; in-line with the DSS (Figure 
4.7) for interoperable payload design. 
 
Table 7.1: Phase-Wise Mission Description – Counter-IED 
Phase Sub-Mission Description Autonomy Flight Mode 
Time 
(mins) 
0 On Stand-By 
The iVTUAV is on stand-by on ground station or 
on mobile base. UGVs are pre-loaded in the 
iVTUAV 
N/A N/A N/A 
1 Take-Off iVTUAV takes-off from base with UGVs on-board Semi-autonomous 
Nap of 
Earth 5 
2 Transit iVTUAV transits to urban target area Semi-autonomous Contour 25 
3 Safe Zone Reconnaissance 
iVTUAV makes quick reconnaissance of target 
area. Suitable zones for UGV deployment are 
transmitted to ground operators for tactical 
assessment that includes: Obstacles (trees, 
powerlines, & poles), & ground condition.  
Operator 
Controlled Low Level 10 
4 UGV Deployment UGVs are inducted in identified safe zone by the iVTUAV 
Operator 
Controlled N/A 10 
5 Counter-IED 
iVTUAV and UGV commence Counter-IED 
missions. 
iVTUAV:  
o Fly at a set altitude & speed above UGVs 
(direct LOS). 
o Conduct wide area search.  
o Generate battlefield picture.  
o Locate obstacles (ditches, rocks, etc.) & 
transmit to UGVs for avoidance.  
o Detect potential IEDs, & cue UGVs for further 
inspection & verification.  
UGVs: 
o Operate at maximum endurance speed but 
utilise high burst speed when required. 
o Conduct narrow area search & 
building/vehicle/object inspection. 
o Close range inspection of iVTUAV cued 
targets. 
o Manipulate and/or neutralise detected & 
confirmed IEDs.  
 
Situational mission requirement changes may 
occur resulting in control handover.  
iVTUAV acts as a communication relay between 
UGVs and operator. 
iVTUAV 
(Semi-
autonomous) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UGV 
(Operator 
Controlled) 
 
 
 
Low Level 80 
6 Safe Zone Transit iVTUAV & UGVs transit back to safe zone Operator Controlled Low Level 10 
7 UGV Recovery UGVs are loaded in the iVTUAV. Operator Controlled N/A 10 
8 Transit iVTUAV transits back to base Semi-autonomous Contour 25 
9 Landing iVTUAV lands in base with UGVs on-board Semi-autonomous 
Nap of 
Earth 5 
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Phase 2
Phase 3 
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Figure 7.1: Mission Profile – Counter-IED 
7.4.1 iVTUAV Payload 
The iVTUAV payload is to be considered from an interoperable perspective. To illustrate, a 
Counter-IED mission is considered for the design of the interoperable payload. 
7.4.1.1 Data Link 
The iVTUAV will require a data link on a continuous basis to provide full operator control 
of the vehicle and payloads, and to serve as a communication relay for the UGVs, during 
Phases 3 to 7 of the mission profile. To provide uninterrupted communication, the data link 
needs to be secure, safe from jamming by adversaries, and with ‘electromagnetic 
interference’ (EMI) and ‘electromagnetic compatibility’ (EMC) characteristics. A 
VHF/UHF/SHF data link meets these requirements, with an additional capability of wide 
bandwidth to transmit large data from the UGV to the iVTUAV and then on to the base. 
This will require direct line-of-sight between the systems. 
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7.4.1.2 Computer 
The computer will provide semi-autonomous flight (Phases 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9) via user 
defined waypoint navigation to reduce operator workload. This will require an autopilot to 
provide mid-level autonomous control with mid-flight manual control flexibility. As Phases 
3, 4, 6, and 7 require high degree of flight precision, manual control by ground operators is 
preferable. Development of customised autonomous control algorithms to address 
communication losses during the various mission phases will be required (default holding 
behaviours, etc.). The iVTUAV will additionally require a storage device to record and to 
transmit in near real-time the payload data. 
7.4.1.3 Navigation 
Precision navigation is required to maintain safe flight in the urban environment, provide 
accurate target location data of potential mines, and ensure accurate operations and recovery 
of the UGVs. A GPS is required to provide high accuracy position data with an all weather 
capability.  Due to GPS jamming and/or interference susceptibility, a combination of laser 
gyro based INS is required. To enhance take-off, landing, and low level flight capabilities, 
an altimeter is additionally required. 
7.4.1.4 Sensors 
The first requirement is of a sensor that provides near-real time imagery round-the-clock in 
all weather conditions. This will assist in navigation through urban environment detecting, 
locating, identifying objects & obstacles, and safe zone reconnaissance in Phases 3 and 6. A 
FLIR and colour TV camera sensor suite with accurate geographical pointing and target 
locating will provide the stated capabilities. 
 
The second requirement is of a sensor that detects IEDs. The nature of IEDs and their 
deployment in a cluttered urban environment makes detection a challenging task. The 
“Change Detection” system, presently in the technology demonstration phase, has shown 
excellent potential in detecting IEDs. The system automatically detects changes in the 
environment by comparing two high resolution images, pixel by pixel, and flagging these 
changes. The change detection analysis can be done in near real-time while the iVTUAV is 
still in the air; provided there is a continuous data link to transfer the imagery. This 
capability enables the system to be used to locate IEDs and other objects instantly & 
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accurately, generate high-resolution 3D maps of the urban battlefield, and provide enhanced 
intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance for mission planning and tasking [74-76]. 
 
Recent demonstrations [77] have shown that a multi-sensor change detection system can 
mitigate the shortfalls of single sensor change detection systems via data fusion and thus, 
the iVTUAV will require a ‘Multi-Sensor Change Detection System’ (MSCDS). 
 
Mission capability is enhanced via interoperable iVTUAV-UGV sensor data fusion. IEDs 
and suspicious objects detected by the iVTUAV’s sensors can be cued to the UGV for 
close-quarter inspection and confirmation. Additionally, UGV navigation is enhanced by 
relaying 3D urban images from the iVTUAV’s sensors. 
7.4.1.5 Defensive Systems 
Operational environment analysis identified mid-air collisions with other aircraft operating 
in the same airspace, as a potential threat to the iVTUAV. To maintain safe operations of 
the iVTUAV and friendly aircraft, the iVTUAV will be required to have an on-board 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system. 
 
The analysis of the operational environment further identified hostile action as potential 
threats to the iVTUAV. ‘Infra-red’ (IR) missiles will be acquired by adversaries, and in 
recent conflicts, IR missiles fired from insurgents have accounted for up to 90% of loss [78]. 
Thus, to enhance survivability, the iVTUAV is required to have a missile warning system, 
and an IR countermeasures system (jammer) on-board. 
7.4.2 Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
Mission analysis identified the need of a UGV to interoperate with the iVTUAV to enhance 
its mission capabilities in Counter-IED mission. The UGV will be air-lifted to the target 
area by the iVTUAV for deployment and condition/threat based recovery on mission 
accomplishment. 
 
The analysis of Counter-IED mission identified the following requirements of the UGV 
payload:  
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• Data Link: A continuous and wireless radio frequency data link with the iVTUAV is 
required during Phases 4-7 to enable operator control operations of the UGV and imagery 
data transmission; 
• Computer: A processor is required to enable semi-autonomous operation to enhance 
performance and reduce operator workload; 
• Navigation: A GPS system is required to provide accurate positioning data for 
navigation, target location of confirmed IEDs, and recovery of UGV by iVTUAV; 
• Sensors: An enhanced camera with zoom and night capability is needed for the 
following: (a) imagery to enable navigation through the urban environment; (b) detecting, 
locating, and identifying objects; and (c) close inspection of iVTUAV cued targets. 
Additionally, a laser range finder is required for target acquisition and designation; 
• Defensive Systems: A disrupter to enable EOD and neutralisation; and 
• Miscellaneous: A gripper/manipulator attached to a long arm for greater accessibility 
and close-inspection of objects. 
 
The investigations of the operational need and operational environment of Counter-IED 
missions identified the importance of air-to-ground collaboration between sensors to 
enhance mission capabilities. To maintain effectiveness and compatibility between the 
systems, the functional and design requirements of the UGV are as follows: 
• Operate in all weather, round-the-clock, and over wet and dry surfaces; 
• Manoeuvrability to traverse complex urban terrain including rocks and rubble, narrow 
passageways, and stairs; 
• Self correcting capability;  
• An endurance of at least 110 minutes for Phase 4-7 operations to match the mission 
requirement of Counter-IED; and 
• Lightweight and compact (for transportation) to minimise size and weight of iVTUAV. 
 
Investigations of lightweight COTS UGVs [2, 79-93] presented at Appendix D.1, identified 
the iRobot PackBot as a suitable UGV for illustration as it meets the requirements. The 
PackBot provides additional benefits such as low weight (24 kg) and compact size 
(787x508x381 mm - arm stowed), exceptionally long arm (2m) reach for greater 
accessibility, and moderate operating speed (up to 1.53m/s). 
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The PackBot has radio communication capability with an approximate range of 800m. To 
enable communication relay, the iVTUAV will be required to operate in direct line-of-sight 
at an altitude/distance within this range. This is to ensure continuous data link between 
UGV and ground operators. 
7.4.3 Payload Design 
The payload design requires consideration of NATO STANAGs to achieve interoperable 
command and control, and interoperable formatting and dissemination of payload data. To 
achieve interoperability, system integration and software development, compliant to NATO 
standards is critical. Thus, the hardware and software of the UGV and its payload needs to 
be accordingly considered as an ‘other platform’ in the iVTUAV architecture, to address 
interoperability (Figure 5.1)  
 
The Counter-IED mission analysis assists in identifying the iVTUAV and UGV payload. 
The payload design thus involves an analysis of COTS mission systems in accordance to the 
established mission system components and their functional characteristics (Figure 4.5). The 
IED mission analysis and COTS payload functional analysis [2, 44, 84, 94-103] presented at 
Appendix D.2, provides an avenue to designate the mission systems as; on-board systems 
(iVTUAV) or off-board systems (UGV). The iVTUAV and UGV payload is presented at 
Table 7.2 and comprises of the following key features: 
• Data Link: Comparable radio frequency links to enable communications between 
UGV-iVTUAV-control station; 
• Computer: Low to mid level autonomy to reduce operator workload of the vehicles; 
• Navigation: Homogenous aerial and ground GPS systems for compatibility and precise 
operations; 
• Sensors: Synergistic data fusion from imaging and target tracking to air and ground 
sensors for enhanced IED detection; and 
• Defensive Systems: Multi-dimensional (air and ground) force protection. 
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Table 7.2: iVTUAV/UGV Payload 
Components iVTUAV Payload UGV Payload 
Data Link Tactical Common Data Link Radio Frequency 
Micro Pilot MP2028 Mobile Pentium PC 
Computer 
ToughDisk 3500 - 
KN-4073 Digital GPS/INS GPS 
Navigation 
MRA Mk V Altimeter - 
Raven Eye I EO/IR Enhanced Camera 
Sensors 
BuckEye Change Detection System Laser Range Finder/Targeter 
- UV Sensors AN/AAR-54(V) Missile 
Warning System 
- Electronics Unit 
Disrupter 
Mini-Pointer/Tracker (Jammer) - 
Defensive Systems 
UAV IFF Transponder - 
Arm System 
Miscellaneous N/A 
Gripper 
7.5 Preliminary Vehicle Design 
The preliminary design methodology comprises of an iterative process with nine stages of 
computations (Sec 2.8.1). These computations provide an estimate of the weight and power, 
and initial sizing of the iVTUAV based on stipulated design requirements and constraints. 
7.5.1 Design Requirements 
The key requirements include minimum size & weight of the vehicle, endurance to meet the 
mission time identified in the mission profile, maximum speed, and power requirements. 
Due to operations in the urban environment, low noise emissions and enhanced safety are 
additional requirements. The set of critical design requirements of the iVTUAV for 
preliminary design is presented in Figure 7.2. 
7.5.2 Design Constraints 
The key constraints include the size of the iVTUAV, for the UGV as an internal-load, for 
transportation with arms stowed. Other constraints include technological/operational 
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thresholds of several parameters of the vehicle (disc loading, tip speed, aspect ratio, rotor 
coefficient, etc.), present technology ready status, and applicable safety regulations. The set 
of critical design constraints on the iVTUAV components were presented previously (Table 
6.2). 
 
 
Design Requirements 
Speed Performance Power Emissions Mission Weight 
- Maximum: 110 
knots 
- Minimum 
Endurance: ≈ 
180 minutes at 
variable 
engine rating 
- Meet speed 
requirements 
- Low acoustic 
emissions 
- Safety for 
ground 
personnel 
- Minimise 
MTOW 
- Cruise: 100 
knots 
- Meet 
performance 
requirements 
 (At Sea Level) 
Figure 7.2: Design Requirements of iVTUAV 
7.5.3 Vehicle Design Process 
The design of the vehicle system is based on the vehicle design process (Figure 6.3). The 
design requirements and constraints stipulate the inputs of the process. The iterative vehicle 
design process is as follows: 
 
• Weight & power estimates: The iVTUAV’s design requirements are compared with 
that of existing unmanned and manned rotary wing aircraft performance characteristics 
[104-110], presented at Appendix D.3 & D.4 respectively, to establish a first estimate of the 
weight and power requirements. This establishes a bench mark for subsequent design 
computations. 
 
• Fuel weight: The fuel is governed by the time required to accomplish the mission 
presented in the mission profile (Figure 7.1), the ‘specific fuel consumption’ rate (sfc), and 
the installed power. Initial iterations assume sfc and installed power based on benchmark 
values. On engine selection, the appropriate values as provided by the engine manufacturer 
are used for design computations.  
 
• Disc loading: The disc loading is selected based on the requirements of the iVTUAV 
and appropriate trade-off studies. In this case, a high disc loading is ideal to minimise size 
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and weight. Due to operations in an urban environment, a trade-off is required for safety, as 
a high disk loading (generally above 48.82kg/m2) induces high velocities under the rotor 
that can ‘blow over’ debris and ground equipment when in close proximity to the ground. It 
can endanger ground personnel, the UGVs, and the vehicle itself [12]. To compromise 
between the operational and design requirements; a value of 45 kg/m2 is designated. 
 
• Main rotor: While a large diameter provides good hover and vertical climb 
performance, a small diameter is preferred to reduce weight and size of the iVTUAV, and to 
ensure safe operations in the clustered urban environment.  
 
A low tip speed is ideal to minimise noise. In order to minimise tip speed, the tip speed ratio 
must be large and must not exceed 0.5 to avoid retreating blade stall. Hence, a tip speed 
ratio of 0.45 is selected. The tip speed is then evaluated for stipulated maximum forward 
speed of 110 knots derived from the operational requirements. 
 
A high blade number is preferred to reduce vibration, and noise and visual signatures. The 
aspect ratio of the blade governs the chord of the blades and has a direct influence on the 
number of blades. Thus, the aspect ratio is accordingly selected, within acceptable Reynolds 
constraints, to evaluate a blade number that meets the requirements. 
 
• Tail rotor: The tail rotor diameter is evaluated from the main rotor diameter and disk 
loading. To protect the rotor and provide safety to ground personnel from accidental blade 
strikes, critical in an urban environment, the Fenestron design (ducted fan) is utilised. 
 
• Drag: The parasite drag produced by external loads is minimised via drag reduction 
schemes, including:  
o Streamlined skids that are lightweight, simple, and easy to maintain; and 
o Mission systems are located internally where viable. Uni-directional sensors, such as 
the BuckEye change detection system and missile warning system sensors, are located 
internally with only the view window protruding, to reduce drag. Imaging sensors that 
require full field of view/rotation, such as the Raven Eye FLIR and laser turret portion 
of the mini-pointer system are placed externally. 
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• Power: The power required to sustain forward flight is evaluated to meet the design 
requirement of maximum speed with allowances of 10-20%, in the form of miscellaneous 
power, for tail rotor power requirements, auxiliary and accessory power of mission systems, 
and mechanical losses. 
 
Once the power requirement is estimated, a suitable power plant is selected. Installed power 
and sfc values as provided by the engine manufacturer are used in subsequent iterations to 
evaluate new values of fuel & gross weight, drag, and subsequently, new power requirement 
values. The power plant is re-assessed to confirm suitability of new power requirement 
values. 
 
• Refined weight: The weights of each section/component of the iVTUAV are more 
accurately evaluated using expressions derived from statistical data [16] to further refine the 
gross weight.  
 
• Weight-and-balance: The longitudinal (x-axis) centre-of-gravity (c.g.) is evaluated 
from the static moments about a ‘datum line’ ahead of the iVTUAV nose; for all 
components including mission systems, fuel, and group weights. 
 
Additional considerations are taken in positioning the fuel tank and UGV within the 
iVTUAV to ensure ideal c.g. positioning to account for fuel consumption and UGV 
deployment/recovery. 
7.5.4 Design Results 
The iterative computational design process is executed in Microsoft Excel® (Appendix 
E.1). The iVTUAV plan view profile is created based on the dimensions and positioning of 
the useful load for minimum shift in the c.g., short and direct load paths, compactness and 
overall synergistic integration of these systems. An analysis of the longitudinal c.g. at 
various mission phases illustrates suitable c.g. positioning with respect to main rotor 
location during all phases of flight. A three-dimensional CAD Model of the iVTUAV is 
created using Catia® software. Figure 7.3 presents the design results and design 
specifications achieved. 
 
Design Parameter Specification   
Payload Weight 128.4 kg 
Fuel Weight 156.6 kg 
MTOW 609.1 kg 
Max. Power Required 202 kW 
Powerplant 
Zoche ZO02A 
123 kg, 220 kW,  
0.21 kg/kW-hr 
Disc Loading 45 kg/m2 
Main Rotor Radius 2.18 m 
Tip Speed 125.7 m/s 
Aspect Ratio 12 
Number of Blades 5 
Tail Rotor Radius 0.33 m                              
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Figure 7.3: Vehicle Design Results 
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7.6 Results and Discussion 
The investigations covered Counter-IED operations, mission and payload analysis for 
preliminary design of the iVTUAV. 
 
• Counter-IED Operations: IEDs in an urban environment pose threats to operations. 
Unmanned technology was found to be a critical platform for Counter-IED missions to 
address this threat in a complex urban environment. 
 
• Mission Analysis: The mission analysis resulted in stipulating the operational 
environment and operational need. The operational environment was identified as urban 
terrain, all weather round-the-clock operations, with manmade and natural threats, within an 
integrated NCW environment. The operational need, both pre-emptive and situational 
mission requirements, for Counter-IED in an urban battlefield was ascertained for an 
airborne (iVTUAV) and ground (UGV) collaborative team. The mission profile (Figure 7.1 
& Table 7.1) illustrated the breakdown of the Counter-IED mission phases and incorporated 
the communication architecture to address interoperability. 
 
• Mission Payload Analysis: The mission payload analysis identified various missions 
systems for both the iVTUAV (on-board) and UGV (off-board) for synergistic 
interoperation (Table 7.2) which included; radio data links, GPS navigation systems, 
FLIR/TV cameras, change detection sensors, missile countermeasures and IED 
manipulation systems. Additionally, the interoperable architecture was accordingly 
considered for NATO standards compliance.  
 
• Preliminary Vehicle Design: The design analysis involved comparative analysis with 
other VTUAVs and manned helicopters in service to slate the design benchmarks. An 
iterative computational design process was then executed in Microsoft Excel®. A total of 
three iterations were performed to optimise the design for minimum weight and to meet the 
mission requirements (Figure 7.2) which included trade-offs for various design parameters 
such as disc loading, rotor size, tip speed, etc (Figure 7.3). The results obtained at each stage 
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of the design was compared against the design benchmarks and re-iterated to meet the 
stipulated requirements. 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
The iVTUAV design methodology was successfully utilised for the conceptual design of a 
VTUAV, with interoperable capabilities, for Counter-IED missions/operations. This 
included a mission profile that addressed interoperable operations, with an optimal on-
board/off-board mission payload, and a vehicle design based on compatible design 
requirements and constraints. The next Chapter evaluates overall mission effectiveness of 
this design, utilising the AHP via a comparative analysis of operational concepts. 
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Chapter 8 
 
DESIGN EVALUATION 
8.1 Introduction 
Operational doctrines & tactics for NCO are still in the development and trial stages. Under 
these circumstances, the type, number, and mode of manned and unmanned systems jointly 
operating for mission accomplishment is yet to be established. Additionally, the type and 
number is to be optimised for system-effectiveness to include mission and cost (Sec 2.4.3). 
An optimised System-of-Systems joint setup, with the iVTUAV inclusive, is the critical 
output of the design methodology. This involves comparative analysis of alternative designs 
resulting from different network-centric Operational Concepts (Figure 3.4). 
 
In this Chapter, the design of a VTUAV from two perspectives is considered – platform-
centric and network-centric. To illustrate, the network-centric design of an iVTUAV 
collaborating with two UGVs is considered for joint Counter-IED operations. The network-
centric system design is evaluated for its mission and cost effectiveness vis-à-vis a platform-
centric system, by the Analytical Hierarchy Process, for analysing system effectiveness.  
8.2 Analytical Hierarchy Process 
The AHP addresses multi-criteria decision making problems by explicit logical analysis to 
select the most optimum solution. It comprises of structuring a functional hierarchy, setting 
priorities, and analysing logical consistency in assessments (Sec 2.1.4).  
 
To illustrate, the AHP evaluation compares two alternatives – a network-centric system and 
a platform-centric system for a Counter-IED operation as follows: 
• Operational Concept 1 (OC1): It is a network-centric system designed (Chapter 7) by 
the interoperable design methodology (Chapter 3-6). The system consists of an iVTUAV 
capable of transporting two UGVs to the target area. The iVTUAV and UGV conduct joint 
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Counter-IED operations. The iVTUAV provides wide area coverage while the UGVs 
provides precise detection, and target manipulation and inspection capabilities. 
 
• Operational Concept 2 (OC2): It is a platform-centric system designed (Appendix E.2) 
by the traditional design methodology (Figure 1.1). The system consists of a VTUAV 
conducting a section of the Counter-IED operations independently, covering only the aerial 
component, with no precision detection and inspection capabilities.  
 
The ‘operational concept’ and ‘VTUAV design parameters’ (either stipulated or evaluated 
based on the vehicle design process – Figure 6.3), are presented in Figure 8.1 & Table 8.1 
respectively. 
 
 
Confirm & neutralise IEDs 
Investigate suspicious 
target 
Ground Control 
Station 
Wide area search 
  
 
Report potential IEDs 
Report suspicious 
target 
Ground Control 
Station 
Wide area search
 
Figure 8.1: Operational Concepts 
 
Table 8.1: VTUAV Design Parameters 
Design Parameters 
 OC1 OC2 
Mission Time 180 min 140 min 
Maximum Speed 110 knots 110 knots 
Size (LxWxH) 7.78 x 1.20 x 2.20 m 5.35 x 1.00 x 2.20 m 
MTOW 609.12 kg 347.66 kg 
Fuel Weight 156.6 kg 60.91 kg 
Payload Weight 128.4 kg 80.38 kg 
Powerplant Zoche ZO02A: 123 kg, 220 kW Zoche ZO01A: 84 kg, 110 kW 
Max. Power Required 202 kW 107 kW 
Disc Loading 45 kg/m2 50 kg/m2 
Main Rotor Radius 2.18 m 1.57 m 
Tip Speed 125.7 m/s 125.7 m/s 
Number of Blades 5 6 
Tail Rotor Radius 0.33 m 0.25 m 
OC1 OC2
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8.3 Functional Hierarchy – Decision Criteria 
The AHP evaluation compares two alternatives (Sec 8.2) against various decision criteria. 
This evaluates the ‘Total Mission Effectiveness’ (TME) of the systems for the stipulated 
requirement of Counter-IED. To evaluate helicopter system effectiveness holistically [20], 
the design parameters that need to be considered are: (a) Mission capability; (b) Flight 
performance; (c) System reliability; (d) System maintainability; and (e) Cost.  
 
The slated parameters are for a traditional platform-centric helicopter system [20]. 
Additional parameters need to be considered for the system-of-systems concept of NCW – 
OC1. The parameters include ‘Counter-IED effectiveness’ and ‘Survivability’ for further 
identification of sub-parameters. ‘Mission capability’ is considered as Counter-IED 
effectiveness, being the focus. Survivability is now considered separately to address the 
specific requirements for Counter-IED in a hostile environment. ‘Flight performance’, being 
a base system performance parameter, is not included when comparing system-of-systems 
performances. Cost, not being an applicable measure of Total Mission Effectiveness, is 
subsequently considered for ‘Cost Effectiveness’ (CE). A comparative analysis of CE with 
the mission effectiveness will provide the avenue to evaluate the ‘Total System 
Effectiveness’ (TSE). 
 
The parameters considered to evaluate Counter-IED effectiveness, to cover detection and 
neutralisation, are as follows: (a) Mission area coverage; (b) Localisation accuracy; (c) 
Confirmation capability; and (d) Neutralisation capability. 
 
Survivability is defined as a balance of CONOPS & tactics, and technology for a given 
threat. Some of the key parameters (Sec 2.5.4) that contribute to survivability are as follows: 
(a) Situational awareness; (b) Stand-off range; (c) Signature reduction; and (d) 
Countermeasures. Due to a range of signature types being emitted by a system, the signature 
sub-criterion needs to be further investigated to provide a rigorous comparative analysis for 
signature reduction to enhance survivability. The signature parameters based on adversary 
technology covers the following: (a) Visual; (b) Acoustic; and (c) Thermal to counter IR 
missiles. 
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The functional hierarchy of the decision process is presented in Figure 8.2. At the top level 
(Level I) is the TME of the systems. Subsequent levels (Levels II, III, & IV) cover the 
decision criteria and sub-criteria. The last level (Level V) presents the alternative 
operational concept solutions, which are used for comparative analysis to evaluate TME, 
based on the criteria and sub-criteria. 
8.4 Total Mission Effectiveness – Parametric Analysis 
The parameters to evaluate the TME are the decision criteria presented in its functional 
hierarchy (Figure 8.2) and include Counter-IED, Survivability, Reliability, and 
Maintainability Effectiveness. These are to be quantitatively evaluated for comparative 
analysis of the alternative operational concepts to support operational and design decisions. 
8.4.1 Counter-IED Effectiveness 
The decision sub-criteria identified for evaluating Counter-IED effectiveness are as follows: 
(a) Mission area coverage; (b) Localisation accuracy; (c) Confirmation capability; and (d) 
Neutralisation capability. 
8.4.1.1 Mission Area Coverage 
The mission area coverage is the degree to which the area-of-interest a system is capable to 
survey. This is governed by the velocity of the system, time, and sensor swath of the system. 
Mathematically, it is evaluated [111] as follows: 
 
tWVA ××=  (1) 
 
where,  
A = area coverage;  V = velocity of system;  
t = search time; and  W = sensor swath. 
 
The velocity of the airborne platforms is mission requirements and design governed, while 
the velocity of the ground off-the-shelf platforms is obtained from the proprietary data. 
Search time for both platforms is in accordance to the mission. As the proprietary data on 
sensor swath is not in public domain, it is mathematically estimated [112] as follows for 
illustration: 
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Figure 8.2: Functional Hierarchy of Decision Parameter – Total Mission Effectiveness 
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DW ×= 68.0  (2) 
 
where,  
W = sensor swath; and D = distance 
 
Distance for the airborne platform (VTUAV) is its operational design altitude. The ground 
platform’s sensor range is considered as 50 metres for illustration. 
 
Being an urban environment, the search area of the airborne platform is limited by 
buildings, vehicles, and other obstructions (Figure 8.3). The area coverage of a ground 
platform is assumed unaffected due to its ground manoeuvrability. 
 
A1
A2 A4
A3
Area Coverage, A
In Mission Search Time, t
An
Observation Width, W
Velocity, V
 
Figure 8.3: Area Coverage in an Urban Environment 
 
The obstructed area is evaluated from the following equation: 
∑
=
=
n
i
iO AA
1
 (3) 
where, 
AO = total obstructed area; Ai = obstructive areas 
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A system-of-systems (network-centric) total area coverage is the aggregate of all area 
covered by all platforms, with no re-coverage of areas. Thus, for OC1, the total area covered 
by iVTUAV and UGV is evaluated from the following: 
 
UAVATAC =                           when UAVUGVO AAA <≤  (4) 
UGVOUAV AAATAC +−=      when UAVOUGV AAA <<  (5) 
UGVATAC =                           when OUAVUGV AAA ≤<  (6) 
 
where,  
TAC = total area coverage;   AUAV = area coverage of VTUAV; 
AUGV = area coverage of UGVs; and  AO = total obstructed area. 
 
Since OC2 is a platform-centric design, total area coverage is only the area covered by the 
VTUAV as follows: 
 
OUAV AATAC −=       when UAVO AA <  (7) 
0=TAC                      when OUAV AA ≤  (8) 
 
where,  
TAC = total area coverage;  AUAV = area coverage of VTUAV; and 
AO = total obstructed area. 
 
The total area coverage of OC1 and OC2 are plotted as a function of total obstructed area 
(Figure 8.4) for comparative analysis to evaluate local vector of priorities for the AHP. 
8.4.1.2 Localisation Accuracy 
Localisation accuracy measures the degree-of-accuracy of a sensor in determining target 
location, in a cluttered environment. Gaussian distribution provides a probabilistic 
representation of sensor uncertainty [113]. Multi-sensor data fusion (e.g. fused IR, laser 
range finder, EO, LIDAR, etc.) enhances the degree-of-accuracy, and fusion of multi-sensor 
based measurements is achieved by adopting occupancy grid Bayesian framework based on 
Independent Opinion Pool [113]. 
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Figure 8.4: Mission Area Coverage 
 
The Independent Opinion method does not provide any decision support on disparate 
measurements [113]. Thus, taking into account all sensors’ certainty and reliability (i.e. 
level of confidence in accuracy of target location) in a Bayesian framework, the Gaussian 
distribution of data fusion measurements is expressed as follows [113]: 
 
( )
( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−
= 2
2
2
1 2
1,| σπσ
Fuszx
Fus
n ezzxp …  (9) 
 
where,  
p(x|z1,…zn) = fused probability;    σFus = measure of fused data uncertainty; 
zFus = fused expected target location; and x = variable location points 
 
where, 
 
( ) 1
1
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−
=
− ⎥⎦
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i
iFus σσ  (10) 
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A case study is considered for the purpose of comparative analysis. OC1 is considered as 
the Fused Probability of Airborne and Ground Sensor Probabilities, and OC2 is considered 
as only the Airborne Sensor Probability. Since real models of sensor uncertainties are 
commercial-in-confidence, to illustrate, it is assumed that the airborne sensor (for both OC1 
and OC2) has a certain degree-of-uncertainty (i.e. σ2 = 2) while the ground sensors (for 
OC1) are with higher grades of uncertainties (i.e. σ2 = 3). Using the expression above (Eqn 
10), the fused sensor uncertainty is evaluated as σ2 = 0.8571.  
 
The location point (x) for the real target location is considered as x = 0m. Using Microsoft 
Excel®, a sample size of 100 localisation measurements for each sensor is randomly 
generated (Appendix F.1) based on each sensor’s probability distributions where the 
sensor’s expected target location, ‘z’ = 0. The real target location is assumed unknown for 
each sample measurement, and thus, the generated location points (x) are the sensor’s 
expected target location (z) and the distributions plotted accordingly (Appendix F.2). The 
fused expected locations are evaluated (Appendix F.1) and distributions plotted similarly 
(Appendix F.2) using the Bayesian Theorem expressions (Eqns 9 – 11) for each sample 
measurement. As an illustration, one distribution of the sample is presented in Figure 8.5. 
 
The ‘Root Mean Square Errors’ (RMSE) of OC1 and OC2 total sample of measurements of 
expected target location (z) to the real target location (x = 0m) is evaluated as 1.4955m and 
2.0011m respectively. The distribution plots and RMSE of OC1 and OC2 are compared to 
evaluate local vector of priorities for the AHP. 
8.4.1.3 Confirmation Capability 
Suspected objects detected by sensors need to be confirmed as IEDs. A cluttered 
environment leads to false alarms which hinders the effectiveness of an operation [114]. The 
performance of present technologies are limited and not very effective in all settings [115], 
hence are field tested to establish performances in detecting and confirming targets [114]. 
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Figure 8.5: Localisation Accuracy 
 
As the alternative designs are still in their preliminary phases, premature measurement of 
the confirmation capability is estimated based on an assessment matrix where confirmation 
is dependent on the following: (a) False alarm rate of the sensor; (b) Systems inspection 
distance; and (c) Capability to probe/manipulate the area/object of interest. The system in 
consideration is allocated scores based on these parameters. The total score is a measure of 
the confirmation capability. Real values of sensor false-alarm rates are proprietary data. 
Thus, in the payload design, it is assumed equal for both OC1 and OC2. The confirmation 
capability scores of OC1 and OC2 were evaluated (Appendix G.1) as 14 (‘High’) and 6 
(‘Low’) respectively, and are compared to evaluate local vector of priorities for the AHP.  
8.4.1.4 Neutralisation Capability 
Once detected and confirmed, an IED is to be neutralised. This requires ‘Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal’ (EOD) tools which include various defensive systems such as disrupters 
and breaching tools, and miscellaneous mission systems such as manipulators and grippers 
(Sec 2.5.7). Based on the number of defensive systems and miscellaneous systems in the 
payload design that contribute to EOD, the neutralisation capabilities of OC1 and OC2 were 
estimated as ‘High’ and ‘No Capability’ respectively, and are compared to evaluate local 
vector of priorities for AHP. 
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8.4.2 Survivability 
The decision sub-criteria identified for evaluating survivability effectiveness are as follows: 
(a) Situational awareness; (b) Stand-off range; (c) Signature reduction; and (d) 
Countermeasures. 
8.4.2.1 Situational Awareness 
Information sharing and situational awareness amongst systems in a network enables 
collaboration and self-synchronisation, to enhance survivability (Sec 2.5.4). The degree of 
situational awareness is estimated by an assessment matrix which includes the following: (a) 
Systems integrated in the network; (b) Degree-of-communication across systems; and (c) 
Criticality of the data in enhancing survivability. The system in consideration is allocated 
scores based on these parameters. The total score is a measure of the degree-of-situational 
awareness. Since the parameters vary from one sortie to the next, a typical sortie is 
considered for a system. The degree-of-situational awareness scores of OC1 and OC2 were 
evaluated (Appendix G.2) as 14 (‘High’) and 6 (‘Low’) respectively, and are compared to 
evaluate local vector of priorities for the AHP. 
8.4.2.2 Stand-Off Range 
Stand-off range is the distance that a system can effectively operate while still being beyond 
the effective range of hostile threats. Greater standoff ranges provide increased survivability 
(Sec 2.5.4). In this case study, since OC1 and OC2 will operate in the same threat 
environment, the stand-off range is simply measured as the operating altitude of the 
VTUAVs, where a higher altitude provides greater survivability. 
 
UAV operating altitudes are classified [6] as low (below 10,000 ft), medium (10,000-30,000 
ft), and high (above 25,000 ft). Since threat from shoulder launched IR missiles is capable 
of reaching medium altitudes [6], comparison of altitudes is more significant based on 
altitude classification, rather than marginal differences within each classification. The 
operating altitudes of OC1 and OC2 are considered as both ‘Low’, based on the design 
requirements (Figure 7.2), and are compared to evaluate local vector of priorities for the 
AHP. 
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8.4.2.3 Signature 
Signature reduction enhances survivability by limiting the capability of the adversary to 
detect the system and follow offensive action (Sec 2.5.4). The type of signatures and the 
mode adopted to address survivability is as follows: 
• Visual: This signature is governed by physical size of the system (VTUAV), where 
survivability is enhanced by smaller designs. UAVs are classified [6, 47] as micro, small, 
medium, and large based on its maximum take-off weight, wingspan, operating altitude, and 
speed (Table 8.2). The size difference is significant between the variant classifications, but 
does vary within the classifications. The sizes and thus visual signature of the VTUAVs in 
OC1 and OC2 are considered as both ‘Medium’, based on the design parameters (Table 
8.1), and are compared to evaluate local vector of priorities for the AHP. 
 
Table 8.2: UAV Size Classification 
Size MTOW (lbs) Wingspan (ft) Operating Altitude (ft) Speed (knots) 
Micro <0.22 <1 - <40 
Small <500 <20 <10,000 <100 
Medium 500-5000 20-60 10,000-30,000 <250 
Large >5000 >60 >25,000 >250 
 
• Acoustic: The main contributors to noise [6, 11, 116] are the powerplant, and rotors. 
The acoustic signature is estimated based on an assessment matrix which includes the 
following: (a) Type of powerplant – electric, turbine, diesel, solar-powered and futuristic 
technologies; (b) Location – external or internal; (c) Tip shape and speed – lower tip speeds 
and non-squared tip shapes provides low acoustic signatures; and (d) Tail rotor 
configuration – NOTAR anti-torque system reduces acoustic signature. The system in 
consideration is allocated scores based on these parameters. The total score is a measure of 
the acoustic signature. The acoustic signature scores of the VTUAVs in OC1 and OC2 were 
evaluated (Appendix G.3) as both 20 (‘Medium’), and compared to evaluate local vector of 
priorities for the AHP. 
 
• Thermal: The major source of heat [117, 118] is the propulsion subsystem of the 
VTUAV. The thermal signature is estimated based on an assessment matrix which includes 
the following: (a) Mufflers that reduce heat from engine exhaust; (b) Heat-absorbing 
materials; and (c) Cold air mixing that reduces heat from the engine exhaust. Air friction 
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creates heat on the leading edges of an aircraft. As significant thermal signature occurs only 
at very high speeds [118], it is neglected for this case study. The system in consideration is 
allocated scores based on these parameters. The total score is a measure of the thermal 
signature. The thermal signature scores of the VTUAVs in OC1 and OC2 were evaluated 
(Appendix G.4) as both 14 (‘Medium’), and are compared to evaluate local vector of 
priorities for the AHP. 
8.4.2.4 Countermeasures 
Active countermeasures such as warning sensors (radar, laser, and missile), jammers (radar 
and infrared), and chaff and flare dispensers enhance survivability by countering the threat 
of missile fire (Sec 2.5.4). Contribution to survivability from a system’s countermeasures is 
measured by the number of defensive systems in the payload design and their effectiveness 
in countering the threat identified in the operational environment. As the key threat includes 
adversary IR missiles, the survivability contribution from the countermeasures of the 
VTUAVs in OC1 and OC2 was estimated (Appendix G.5) as both ‘High’. The estimates are 
compared to evaluate local vector of priorities for the AHP. 
8.4.3 Reliability 
Reliability is the probability that a system will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given 
period of time when used under specified operating conditions. It can be measured [20, 111] 
by the failure rate of the system from the following: 
 
( ) tetR λ−=  (12) 
 
where,  
R(t) = reliability function; λ = failure rate; and t = possible down-time 
 
Assuming exponential distribution, reliability can be defined as the system ‘Mean Time 
Between Failure’ (MTBF): 
 
λ
1=MTBF  (13) 
 
The reliability of the total system is governed by the individual subsystem reliabilities in its 
operational set-up that comprises of the following: (a) Series in which all components in the 
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system operate for the operational effectiveness of the whole system; (b) Parallel if only one 
component needs to operate for the operational effectiveness of the whole/partial system; 
and (c) Combined in which the components are in series and in parallel. The operational set-
up is represented by developing a reliability block diagram comprising of the systems in 
series/parallel. The system is operationally effective by an uninterrupted path between input 
and output of the system. The mathematical expressions to evaluate reliability of systems in 
series and parallel are as follows [20, 111]: 
 
( ) ∏
=
=
n
i
iSeriesS RR
1
 (14) 
( ) ( )∏
=
−−=
n
i
iParallelS RR
1
11  (15) 
 
where,  
RS(Series) = total system reliability of systems operating in series;  
RS(Parallel) = total system reliability of systems operating in parallel; and  
Ri = component reliability. 
 
Systems in parallel provide higher operational redundancies, enhancing the total system’s 
reliability. 
 
The subsystems/mission systems presented in the structural hierarchy (Figure 4.4) were 
categorised into six components (Chapter 4) – Navigation, Sensors, Computer, Defensive 
Systems, Weapons, and Data Link. The total system reliability of OC1 and OC2 is evaluated 
by integrating the six mission system components in an operational sequence, to develop the 
reliability block diagram. The VTUAV mission systems reliability values for illustration are 
assumed to be of similar helicopter mission systems (Appendix H.1), which were evaluated 
[20] from manufacturer data. The expressions above (Eqns 14 – 15) are applied to evaluate 
the MTBF.  
 
As an illustration, the reliability block diagram of OC1 is presented in Figure 8.6. The block 
diagram details the operational sequence as follows: 
• Ingress: The iVTUAV transports the UGVs and thus is iVTUAV mission systems 
dependent in a series network; 
 108
• Counter-IED: Navigation and sensor mission systems are used from the iVTUAV or 
UGV in parallel, provided the data link of the UGV is functioning in series to enable 
communication of data; 
• Threat: The iVTUAV uses its defensive systems, sensors, or data link (in the form of 
situational awareness) to detect threats in a parallel set-up, and its defensive systems is to 
function in series to counter a missile threat; and 
• Egress: The iVTUAV transports the UGVs and relies entirely on its mission systems. It 
may return to base autonomously in case of communication loss or manually. Thus, the 
computer and data link are in parallel. 
 
The MTBF of OC1 and OC2 were evaluated (Appendix H.2) as 249 Hours and 205 Hours 
respectively, using Microsoft Excel®, and are compared to evaluate local vector of priorities 
for the AHP. 
8.4.4 Maintainability 
Maintainability is a measure of the ability of a system to be retained or restored to a state in 
which it can perform its required functions. It is measured in terms of a combination of 
elapse times, personnel labour hour rates, maintenance frequencies, maintenance cost, and 
related logistic support factors. It is measured by the repair rate of the system as follows [20, 
111]:  
 
( ) tetM μ−=  (16) 
 
where,  
M(t) = maintainability function; μ = repair rate; and  
t = possible repair-time 
 
Maintainability is defined in terms of ‘Mean Time To Repair’ (MTTR): 
 
μ
1=MTTR  (17) 
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Figure 8.6: OC1 Reliability Block Diagram 
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The maintainability analysis involves the identification of subsystem/mission system 
(Figure 4.4) combinations for maintenance. The maintainability of the combination is 
determined based on the maximum maintainability of the component in the combination. 
The VTUAV mission systems maintainability values for illustration are assumed to be of 
similar helicopter mission systems (Appendix I.1), which were evaluated [20] from 
manufacturer data. 
 
The total maintainability (MTTR) of OC1 and OC2 is evaluated as the mean MTTR of all 
the combinations as follows [20]: 
 
( )
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∑
=
=
×
= n
i
n
n
i
nn
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1
1  (18) 
 
where,  
MS = total system maintainability;  Mcn = maintainability of combination; and 
Ncn = number of combinations. 
 
The maintainability table of failure combinations is populated (Appendix I.2) using 
Matlab® and imported into Microsoft Excel® to evaluate MTTR. The MTTR of OC1 and 
OC2 were evaluated (Appendix I.2) as 48.85 Minutes and 45.83 Minutes respectively, and 
are compared to evaluate local vector of priorities for the AHP.  
8.5 Prioritisation Assessment 
The AHP concept compares the importance of design parameter weightings through a 
pairwise comparison technique using a 1-9 scale.  
 
The relative weights, or local priorities, are assigned to each decision criterion (Appendix 
J.2 – J.4) to reflect the degree-of-contribution of the criterion to the ‘Total Mission 
Effectiveness’. The alternative solutions are then ranked similarly. The results of the various 
parametric analyses (Sec 8.4) inter-compare the alternatives to designate its local priorities 
(Appendix J.5) for the decision criterion in consideration. The local vectors of priorities 
were then synthesised to yield global vectors of priorities and an Overall Vector of Priority 
 111
(Appendix J.6) that ranks the alternatives. The Overall Vector of Priority of OC1 and OC2 
were evaluated as 0.6727 and 0.3273 respectively, ranking OC1 higher than OC2. 
8.6 Cost Effectiveness 
The TME provides an evaluation of which operational concept is more effective in a 
specific operation – Counter-IED operations was considered for illustration. 
 
The cost parameter is now considered to evaluate the CE of the two operational concepts, 
OC1 and OC2 (Sec 8.3). The TME and the CE are subsequently compared to provide a 
pragmatic decision support tool for decision trade-offs. 
 
The ‘Life Cycle Cost’ (LCC) is the total cost of a system through its entire life cycle and 
covers concept design (1%), development (7%), demonstration (1%), production (15%), 
operations (75%), and disposal (1%) [119].  
 
The total system cost of OC1 consists of the LCC of the iVTUAV, UGVs, and Ground 
Equipment. The total system cost of OC2 consists of the LCC of the VTUAV, and Ground 
Equipment. 
 
The VTUAV production costs are estimated (Appendix K) as the average of two 
methodologies. 
 
• Methodology 1 
It utilises the VTUAV empty weight [6] in cost evaluation as follows: 
( ) Eo WUSFYCostUAV ×= 1500$.02. Pr  (19) 
where, 
UAV CostPro = UAV production cost; and  
WE = empty weight in pounds. 
 
• Methodology 2 
It utilises the VTUAV gross weight [120] in cost evaluation as follows: 
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( ) 371.0749.0Pr 12550$.03. −××= eWUSFYCostUAV go  (20) 
where, 
UAV CostPro = UAV production cost; and  Wg = gross weight in pounds. 
 
The Ground Equipment production costs are estimated [120] from the following: 
( ) 398.0507.0Pr 433400$.03. eRUSFYCostGE o ××=  (21) 
where, 
GE CostPro = ground equipment production cost; and  
R = range of UAV from ground equipment in nautical miles. 
 
The production cost (unit price) of the PackBot UGV is FY02.US$45,000 [83]. The LCC 
breakdown of all systems and total system LCC of OC1 and OC2 is presented in Table 8.3, 
where the concept design, development, demonstration, operations, and disposal costs are 
evaluated based on a percentage of production cost, as identified above [119]. Since the 
UGVs are commercial off-the-shelf systems, and since the Ground Equipment is assumed to 
utilise commercial off-the-shelf subsystems, the concept design, development, and 
demonstration costs are not considered. The total system LCC of OC1 and OC2 were 
evaluated as FY07 US$ 41.73 million and FY07 US$ 37.16 million respectively. 
 
Table 8.3: Total System Life Cycle Costs 
 Life Cycle   
 Acquisition Phase Utilisation Phase   
  
Concept 
Design Cost 
(1%) 
Development 
Cost (7%) 
Demonstration 
Cost (1%) 
Production 
Cost (15%) 
Operation 
Cost (75%) 
Disposal 
Cost (1%) Sub-Total 
Total 
System Life 
Cycle Cost 
OC1 iVTUAV 122,130 854,910 122,130 1,831,949 9,159,745 122,130 12,212,993 
OC1 UGV1¥ N/A N/A N/A 51,431 257,153 3,429 312,012 
OC1 UGV2¥ N/A N/A N/A 51,431 257,153 3,429 312,012 
Ground 
Equipment^ N/A N/A N/A 4,762,520 23,812,601 317,501 28,892,622 
41,729,639 
Sub-Total 122,130 854,910 122,130 6,697,330 33,486,650 446,489   
OC2 VTUAV 82,659 578,615 82,659 1,239,889 6,199,445 82,659 8,265,927 
Ground 
Equipment^ N/A N/A N/A 4,762,520 23,812,601 317,501 28,892,622 
37,158,549 
Sub-Total 82,659 578,615 82,659 6,002,409 30,012,046 400,161   
(All values in FY07 US$)        
¥  FY07 price calculated using a US Consumer Price Index (CPI) / Inflation Rate of 14.29% from Jan 2002 - Jan 2007 (CPI 
found from www.InflationData.com)  
^ FY07 price calculated using a US Consumer Price Index (CPI) / Inflation Rate of 11.40% from Jan 2003 - Jan 2007 (CPI found from 
www.InflationData.com) 
^ Based on range of 41.663 nautical miles (51.44 m/s cruise speed for transit time of 25 minutes = 77.16 km)   
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8.7 Total System Effectiveness 
The TME and normalised LCC of OC1 and OC2 are plotted (Figure 8.7) to analyse the TSE 
of the two operational concepts. The TSE is the ratio of TME to normalised LCC. The TSE 
of OC1 and OC2 were evaluated as 1.2717 and 0.6949 respectively. This indicates 
significant gain in TME for a marginal gain in cost, for OC1; as compared to OC2. 
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Figure 8.7: Total System Effectiveness 
8.8 Results and Discussion 
• Functional Hierarchy & Operational Concepts: The methodology to evaluate the 
effectiveness was developed based on the AHP. The two alternatives/operational concepts 
to be compared included OC1 – network-centric system, and OC2 – platform-centric system 
(Figure 8.1). The decision criteria to evaluate TME were stipulated based on the design 
parameters of Counter-IED Effectiveness, Survivability, Reliability, and Maintainability, 
with additional sub-criteria, and sub-sub-criteria, in a functional hierarchy format (Figure 
8.2). 
 
The functional hierarchy format thus provides the avenue to effectively analyse operational 
and design parameters for prioritisation assessment of the operational concepts. 
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 • Parametric Analysis & Prioritisation Assessment: The results of the parametric 
analyses (Sec 8.4) quantitatively evaluated the operational concepts effectiveness for 
comparative analysis. Through a pairwise comparison technique, the concepts were 
weighted against each other to designate the local priorities in regards to the decision 
criteria in consideration. The vector of priorities were synthesised to rank the concepts in 
terms of TME. This analysis resulted in OC1 (network-centric system) being ranked at 
0.6727, higher than OC2 (platform-centric system) at 0.3273 for Counter-IED operations. 
 
The case study (OC1 and OC2) illustrates the merits of operating a network-centric system 
over a platform-centric system from a mission effectiveness perspective. 
 
• Cost Effectiveness: Costs for OC1 and OC2 were evaluated based on the estimated 
LCC of the total system (Table 8.3) for illustration. The evaluation resulted in the OC1 
concept with a higher life cycle cost of FY07 US$ 41.73 million compared to OC2 at FY07 
US$ 37.16 million.  
 
• Total System Effectiveness: The TME is assessed against an independent parameter, 
cost, to provide a pragmatic design decision support tool. The comparative analysis of the 
TME and CE was investigated by evaluating the TSE. The TSE plot (Figure 8.7) illustrates 
significant gain in TME for a marginal gain in cost for OC1; as compared to OC2. Thus, the 
total system effectiveness of OC1 outpaces that of OC2. 
 
The TSE is thus a pragmatic design decision support tool. It illustrates the enhancements in 
the degree-of-mission effectiveness for each unit increase in cost. 
8.9 Concluding Remarks 
The AHP provides an avenue for developing methodologies to evaluate system operational 
and design parameters in quantitative terms. The methodology developed captures all the 
disparate parameters required to evaluate the total system effectiveness of network-centric 
designed system against a platform-centric designed system from an operational and cost 
perspective.  
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 The interoperable design (network-centric) provided a significant degree of total system 
effectiveness (mission and cost effective solution) over the platform-centric design in 
Counter-IED operations. The comparative process, using AHP, is flexible to incorporate 
additional network-centric operational concepts for comparative analysis. This provides 
optimisation of the total system design for interoperability by stipulating the optimum 
integration of number and type of systems in the total system. 
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Chapter 9 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The development of the conceptual design methodology for iVTUAVs and its design 
verification was based on the traditional helicopter design methodology – platform-centric 
design. A systems approach was adopted to address holistically the design of an 
interoperable VTUAV system in the conceptual phase. This chapter summarises the results 
and discussions of each chapter of the thesis. It provides a synopsis of the outcomes of the 
research on VTUAV design for interoperability. 
9.1 Methodology Development 
The design methodology development, adopted a systems approach to holistically capture 
the functional and design requirements. It further developed the iVTUAV system hierarchy 
to address the payload & vehicle design, and the interoperability architecture. 
9.1.1 Holistic Analysis 
The design methodology for the iVTUAV system was considered holistically in an input-
process-output configuration (Figure 3.1). It covered the spectrum of inputs to be addressed 
for interoperability of the VTUAV. This provided the additional inputs to develop the 
VTUAV design framework at the mission analysis stage for VTUAV interoperable 
capabilities. 
 
The inputs covered the operational needs and the operational environment of the iVTUAV, 
from an interoperability perspective. The operational needs included the present and future 
military mission requirements of a traditional platform-centric design. NCO was an 
additional input dimension for the analysis of mission commonality (Table 3.3) with other 
manned and unmanned (UGV/UMV) systems. This was to provide synergistic integration of 
mission capabilities in future operations. The operational environment analysis resulted in 
NCW as another iVTUAV dimension, in addition to terrain, weather, and threats (Table 
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3.4). The iVTUAV was thus holistically part of the integrated network that links all systems 
in a NCO. 
 
The design framework was developed (Figure 3.4) to include VTUAV concept of operations 
in coordination with other manned and unmanned systems to meet the slated mission 
requirements from a NCW perspective. The additional network-centric mission 
requirements were categorised as pre-emptive and situational and further investigated to 
address the payload design with interoperability capabilities. 
9.1.2 System Hierarchy and Structures Development 
To provide VTUAVs with interoperability capabilities in a design methodology, the 
VTUAV system needed to be considered as part of a network-centric system – Total system. 
The total NCW system was the top level of the system hierarchy (Level 0) with the 
sensor/weapon system and C4I system as subsystems for further development of the 
hierarchy (Figure 4.1). The hierarchy further included manned and unmanned systems, with 
aerial/ground/marine systems as components. The iVTUAV formed part of the aerial 
platform and comprised of the vehicle and the mission systems. The system hierarchy 
provided the avenue to develop the system structure (components, attributes, and 
relationships) for identifying the mission requirements to address interoperability in the 
design of the following:  
• Payload Design: On-board payload that integrates with off-board payload for enhanced 
mission capabilities; 
• Architecture Design: Architecture that complies with interoperability standards; and  
• Vehicle Design: Vehicle system design process from an interoperability perspective. 
9.1.2.1 Payload Design 
The pre-emptive and situational network-centric mission requirements, identified from the 
holistic analysis, established the integration need of mission systems on other platforms to 
achieve data fusion for enhanced situational awareness and mission effectiveness. Thus, the 
developed iVTUAV mission system hierarchy, with additional UGV and UMV segments 
(Figure 4.4), provided synergistic payload design by considering mission systems on-board 
other unmanned systems to enhance its mission capability. This included the data fusion and 
functional redundancy requirements. A Payload Design Decision Support (Figure 4.7) was 
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developed as a tool for the designer to identify requirements of systems on-board, and on-
call from other systems for mission capability enhancement through interoperability. 
9.1.2.2 Interoperability Architecture 
The development of the mission system hierarchy and system structure provided the avenue 
to develop an interoperable architecture (Figure 5.1) of a Total NCW system. The 
components of the Total NCW system were configured from a System-of-Systems 
perspective. This provided the base to apply inter and intra connectivity between the 
components, and apply the NATO interoperability standards. 
 
The design of hardware and software of the platforms are to be in accordance to the 
architecture to achieve interoperable command & control, and interoperable formatting & 
dissemination of payload data. This will provide integration of VTUAV systems, through 
standardisation, for future allied operations. 
9.1.2.3 Vehicle Design 
The development of the total system hierarchy addressed the vehicle component of an 
iVTUAV in addition to the mission systems. An analysis of the vehicle system hierarchy 
(Figure 6.1) covered the vehicle components – airframe, powerplant, rotors, etc. The system 
structure (Figure 6.2) covered the attributes of the components – stability, control, drag, etc. 
 
The systems perspective of the vehicle system resulted in the functional characteristics of 
the components to be designed. Optimisation of the vehicle system was by prioritisation of 
the design parameters. Inter-platform design parameter analysis provided the avenue to 
achieve interoperability. The vehicle design process was updated (Figure 6.3) to include 
inputs from other systems to address interoperability. It provided compatibility of 
parameters between the iVTUAV and other systems in the network-centric environment. 
Design constraints were imposed on the components to address operational limitations, 
technological thresholds, and safety standards. 
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9.2 Methodology Verification 
The methodology was verified through a conceptual design exercise, illustrating the 
interoperability with UGVs as a case study. It also evaluated the iVTUAV design for total 
mission effectiveness compared to a traditional platform-centric system. 
9.2.1 Case Study – Counter-IED Operations 
The case study demonstrated the design of an iVTUAV from a pre-emptive perspective for 
operations with UGVs on Counter-IED missions. The case study comprised of the mission 
analysis, and preliminary design of mission payload & vehicle. 
  
The mission analysis covered the following: (a) Stipulating the operational environment and 
operational need, to include pre-emptive and situational mission requirements, and 
operational concept; (b) Designation of interoperability control levels; and (c) Mission 
profile (Figure 7.1) incorporating the communication architecture to address 
interoperability. 
 
The mission systems analysis included the following: (a) COTS UGV as a component of 
payload; (b) Payload design on-board the iVTUAV, and off-board on the UGV for 
synergistic operations (Table 7.2). This was in-line with the interoperable payload design 
DSS for optimisation. 
 
The preliminary vehicle design addressed the following: (a) Stipulating the design 
requirements & constraints; (b) Maintaining design compatibility between the iVTUAV and 
UGVs; and (c) Estimating and evaluating initial weight, size, and performance (Figure 7.3).  
 
The iVTUAV design was further investigated for its degree-of-effectiveness. 
9.2.2 Total System Effectiveness 
The iVTUAV, as part of a network-centric system was evaluated to measure its ‘Total 
System Effectiveness’ compared to a traditional platform-centric system. The methodology 
to evaluate the effectiveness was based on the AHP. The decision criteria to evaluate the 
alternate operational concepts were identified as Counter-IED effectiveness, survivability, 
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reliability, and maintainability, with additional sub-criteria, and sub-sub-criteria in a 
functional hierarchy format. A comparative analysis of cost effectiveness and mission 
effectiveness resulted in a pragmatic decision support tool. The analysis indicated that the 
total system effectiveness of the network-centric system outpaced (Figure 8.7) that of the 
platform-centric system for Counter-IED operations. This verifies the iVTUAV design. 
9.3 Overall iVTUAV Design Methodology 
The iVTUAV design methodology developed in the research considering the futuristic 
network-centric environment provides a pragmatic way-forward in the design of iVTUAVs. 
The iVTUAV design methodology is presented at Figure 9.1 for further detailed 
investigation and application. Thus, the VTUAV design methodology (Figure 1.1) was 
updated through the research to integrate other systems of NCW in the design stages for 
iVTUAV. 
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Figure 9.1: iVTUAV Preliminary Design Methodology 
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Chapter 10 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Unmanned Systems, including Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicles technology has 
demonstrated high operational effectiveness on military missions. With the emerging 
concept of Network Centric Warfare and the increase in unmanned missions, the 
technological challenge is the issue of interoperability for effective Network Centric 
Operations. Recent projects have demonstrated interoperability by modified software and 
hardware to existing UAVs and USs as a short gap solution. Interoperability needs to be 
addressed in the conceptual design process of the UAV for an effective in-service induction 
with low life-cycle costs. 
 
This research addressed the requirement of interoperability, with VTUAVs as the prime 
focus. The traditional design methodology was re-visited to encompass interoperability 
design issues in the conceptual phase, by adopting a systems approach. The research 
resulted in an iVTUAV design methodology. The methodology was verified by a case study 
of an iVTUAV in operation with UGVs for Counter-IED missions. 
 
The key contributions of the research are as follows: 
• Mission Commonality Analysis: Identification of pre-emptive and situational mission 
requirements for various Operational Concepts investigation at the mission analysis stage. It 
comprised of multi-platform systems, to maximise mission effectiveness for a stipulated 
operational need and environment; 
• Mission Systems Hierarchy: Identification of an enhanced mission payload that meets 
mission requirements through synergistic integration of on-board and off-board mission 
systems; 
• Interoperability Architecture: Implementation of NATO interoperability standards; 
and 
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• Vehicle System Hierarchy: Design of vehicle components to meet design constraints, 
and the stipulated mission requirements. This was based on parameter prioritisation and 
through inter-platform design parameter analysis for interoperability. 
 
This research merits application by operators and industry through further investigation as it 
addresses the key defence requirement of interoperability in accordance with NCW. The 
results provide a generic base framework for customisation to specific mission requirements 
of the unmanned spectrum of vehicles. The modified design methodology provides the 
architecture to achieve an optimal interoperable conceptual design, critical for mission 
effectiveness and integration of systems, including VTUAVS, in the NCW. 
 
The limitation of the methodology is primarily attributable to its implementation in the 
conceptual VTUAV design phase only, and thus requires further investigation for detailed 
design phase of VTUAVs. Recommendations to this effect are presented in the next 
Chapter. 
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Chapter 11 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The iVTUAV conceptual design methodology developed by adopting a systems approach 
provides a holistic solution for further investigation towards application. The following is 
recommended for further investigations: 
 
• Mission Analysis: The commonality analysis presented in this research provides an 
avenue for further investigation on joint platform operations. This includes detailed analysis 
of manned-unmanned operations. Doctrines and tactics for NCO need to be established and 
updated to address the critical issues of NCW. 
 
• Mission Systems Analysis: The total NCW system was considered as the top level of 
the hierarchy. As the research focus was on the unmanned system, a partial system 
hierarchy was developed only for the sensor/weapon – unmanned systems. The C4I and 
manned sections of the hierarchy need to be investigated for further analysis of the total 
NCW system. This will provide additional inputs to the mission systems analysis; for the 
development of system structures and identifying additional attributes & relationships of 
NCW components, to enhance mission capabilities. 
 
To minimise limitations of the payload DSS for interoperability in future investigations, 
NCW training exercises are needed for implementation in future operations. This will 
enhance the knowledge base of UAV operators and designers. 
 
• Interoperability Architecture Development: The interoperability architecture needs to 
be updated in follow-on investigations in accordance to the NATO standards developed for 
implementation. Developers of UAV platforms and mission systems need to apply the 
architecture to ensure systems are NATO interoperable. 
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• Vehicle System Design: Since the focus of the research was on mission systems 
governing interoperable capabilities, the detailed vehicle design was limited. Thus, the 
vehicle system will need investigations to further analyse the vehicle design process in 
detail. This will address the vehicle design parameter values, and performance capabilities, 
to establish compatibility with other platforms. 
 
• Case Study: The iVTUAV design methodology was applied for the conceptual design 
of a VTUAV, with interoperable capabilities, for Counter-IED missions/operations. The 
preliminary design exercise provides a base for detailed design of the iVTUAV with a low 
weight and compact design. This computational format provides the flexibility for follow-on 
investigation to optimise the vehicle design. 
 
• Design Evaluation: To optimise the System-of-Systems design presented in the case 
study, multiple NCO CONOPs designs need to be evaluated to maximise Counter-IED 
mission effectiveness. As the detail designs develop, additional decision criteria will need to 
be considered for the AHP. This will further enhance mission effectiveness results. Detailed 
investigations on cost effectiveness are needed to re-evaluate the total system effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 126
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Anon. 2002, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap: 2002 - 2027, Report from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, USA. 
[2] Anon. 2005, Joint Robotics Program: Master Plan 2005, Report from the Defense 
Systems/Land Warfare and Munitions, Washington, USA. 
[3] Anon. 2004, The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan, Report 
from the Department of the Navy, Washington, USA. 
[4] Anon. 2005, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, Report from the 
Office of Force Transformation, Secretary of Defense, Washington, USA. 
[5] Anon. 2005, Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations, Report from the 
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, USA. 
[6] Anon. 2005, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005 - 2030, Report from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, USA. 
[7] Berner, R.A. 2004, 'The Effective Use of Multiple Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in 
Surface Search and Control', MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
USA. 
[8] Roberts, F. 2005, A Unified Vision, C4ISR Journal, viewed 19 April 2005, 
<http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=594807>. 
[9] Roberts, F. & Ferrazano, T. 2004, 'Multiple Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
Experimentation: Forward Look', Proceedings of the 3rd AIAA "Unmanned 
Unlimited" Technical Conference, Workshop and Exhibit, 20-23 September, 
Chicago, Illinois,  
[10] Anon. 2004, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles, 
Report from the Defense Science Board, Washington, USA. 
[11] Sinha, K.A. 2002, Introduction to Preliminary Helicopter Design, Department of 
Aerospace Engineering, RMIT, Melbourne, Australia. 
[12] Prouty, R.W. 1985, Helicopter Aerodynamics, PJS Publications, Peoria. 
[13] Prouty, R.W. 1998, Military Helicopter Design Technology, Krieger Publishing 
Company, Florida. 
[14] Prouty, R.W. 1988, More Helicopter Aerodynamics, PJS Publications, Peoria. 
 127
[15] Prouty, R.W. 1993, Even More Helicopter Aerodynamics, Philips Business 
Information, Potomac. 
[16] Prouty, R.W. 1995, Helicopter Performance, Stability, and Control, Krieger 
Publishing Company, Florida. 
[17] Blanchard, B.S. & Fabrycky, W.J. 1990, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 2nd 
edn, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, USA. 
[18] Sinha, A.K. 1998, 'A Systems Approach to the Conceptual Design of Helicopter 
Multi-Role Capabilities', PhD thesis, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. 
[19] Lacy, J.A. 1992, Systems Engineering Management: Achieving Total Quality, 
McGraw-Hill Inc., USA. 
[20] Kusumo, R. 2002, 'An Integrated Decision Support System for Mid-Life Upgrade of 
Maritime Helicopters', PhD thesis, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. 
[21] Saaty, T.L. 2001, Decision Making for Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy Process for 
Decisions in a Complex World, RWS Publications, USA. 
[22] Jaiswal, N.K. 1997, Military Operations Research: Quantitative Decision Making, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, USA. 
[23] Anon. 2002, Force 2020, Report from the Department of Defence, Australia. 
[24] Krock, L. 2002, Time Line of UAVs, Nova: Science Programming on Air and Online, 
viewed 4 October 2005, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spiesfly/uavs.html>. 
[25] Anon. 1999, QH-50 Evolution, Gyrodyne: Helicopter Historical Foundation, viewed 
4 October 2005, <http://www.gyrodynehelicopters.com/qh-50_evolution.htm>. 
[26] Voelling, P.A. & Houle Caruso, A. 1998, 'US Government Tactical UAV'S and 
Common Systems - An Approach to Interoperability', Proceedings of the 13th 
RPVs/UAVs International Conference, 30 March-1 April, Bristol, UK, pp.1.1-1.10. 
[27] Meyer, P.K. 2003, 'Realizing UAV's Transformational Potential: The Emerging 
Technology Agenda', Proceedings of the AIAA/ICAS International Air and Space 
Symposium and Exposition: The Next 100 Years, 14-17 July, Dayton, Ohio,  
[28] Williams, R.M. 2005, 'Recent Developments in Intelligent Autonomy for VTOL 
UAVS', Proceedings of the 31st European Rotorcraft Forum, 13-15 September, 
Florence, Italy, pp.8.1-8.4. 
[29] Eshel, D. 2005, 'Future Roles for UAVs', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 31, no. 
6, pp.38-40. 
 128
[30] Rathore, A. & Sinha, K.A. 2005, 'A System Approach to the Conceptual Design of 
VTUAV - Requirement Analysis', Proceedings of the 31st European Rotorcraft 
Forum, 13-15 September, Florence, Italy, pp.20.1-20.9. 
[31] Bamberger, B., et al. 2003, 'An Architecture for Multi-Vehicle Autonomy with 
Small UAVs', Proceedings of the 59th Annual AHS Forum, 6-8 May, Phoenix, 
Arizona,  
[32] Stentz, T., et al. 2002, 'Integrated Air/Ground Vehicle System for Semi-Autonomous 
Off-Road Navigation', Proceedings of the 29th Annual Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International Symposium and Exhibition, 9-11 July, Orlando, 
Florida,  
[33] Gerla, M., Yi, Y. & Xu, K. 2003, 'Team Communication among Airborne Agents', 
Proceedings of the 59th Annual AHS Forum, 6-8 May, Phoenix, Arizona,  
[34] Kolding, J. & Pouliot, M. 1997, 'Bird Dog: Coupling the Longbow Apache Attack 
Helicopter with an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle', Proceedings of the 53rd Annual AHS 
Forum, 29 April-1 May, Virginia Beach, Virginia, pp.281-287. 
[35] Torun, E. c. 1999, UAV Payloads and Data Dissemination, viewed 5 October 2005, 
<http://www.afcea.org.tr/afceatr/makaleler/AFCEA99_Bildiri_Session3.pdf>. 
[36] Cameron, K. 1995, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Technology, Report from the DSTO 
Aeronautical & Maritime Research Lab, Melbourne, Australia. 
[37] Saeedipour, H.R., Said, A. & Sathyanarayana, P. c. 2005, Data Link Functions and 
Attributes of an UAV System using both Ground Station and Small Satellite, viewed 
4 November 2005, 
<http://www.dlr.de/iaa.symp/archive_5/pdf/1305P_Saeedipour.pdf>. 
[38] Anon. 2005, Global Positioning System, Wikipedia, viewed 9 November 2005, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Positioning_System>. 
[39] Vidmar, M. 2005, Design Improves 4.3 GHz Radio Altimeter Accuracy, Microwaves 
& RF, viewed 2 November 2005, 
<http://www.mwrf.com/Articles/ArticleID/10583/10583.html>. 
[40] Anon. 2005, Mineseeker Mine Detection System, Airforce Technology.com, viewed 
14 November 2005, <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mineseeker/>. 
[41] Stratford, J. 2005, 'Airborne-Laser Mine-Detection System Reaches Milestone', The 
Integrator, vol. 7, no. 13, pp.1. 
 129
[42] Anon. 2004, STANAG 7023 - Air Reconnaissance Primary Image Data Standard, 
ed. 3, Report from the NATO Standarization Agency, Brussels, Belgium. 
[43] Anon. 2002, Autopilot Design, Unmanned Dynamics, viewed 8 November 2005, 
<http://www.u-dynamics.com/autopilot/autopilot.htm>. 
[44] Anon. 2005, MP2028, Micropilot, viewed 8 November 2005, 
<http://www.micropilot.com/>. 
[45] Anon. 2004, Autopilot Solutions, UAV Navigation, viewed 8 November 2005, 
<http://www.uavnavigation.com/htm/op2_0.html>. 
[46] Anon. 2004, First Flight - True UAV Autonomy At Last, viewed 8 November 2005, 
<http://www.agent-software.com/shared/resources/pressReleases/Avatar-JACK-
F040706USb.pdf>. 
[47] Bil, C., et al. 2002, Introduction to Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Technology, 
Department of Aerospace Engineering, RMIT, Melbourne, Australia. 
[48] Harrison, P.G., et al. 1985, Military Helicopters, Brassey's Defence Publishers, UK. 
[49] Anon. 2005, Collision Avoidance: Small Vehicles Present Big Challenges, Center 
for Advanced Aviation System Development, viewed 10 November 2005, 
<http://www.mitrecaasd.org/comm/news_details.cfm?item_id=440>. 
[50] Reynish, W. 2004, UAVs Entering the NAS, Aviation Today, viewed 10 November 
2005, 
<http://www.aviationtoday.com/cgi/av/show_mag.cgi?pub=av&mon=1004&file=ua
vsenteringthe.htm>. 
[51] Sweetman, B. 2005, 'USAF Deploys Predator B Long-Endurance UAV Prototypes 
for Initial Operational Use', Jane's International Defence Review, vol. 38, no. pp.4. 
[52] Anon. 2005, Very High Frequency, Wikipedia, viewed 4 November 2005, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VHF>. 
[53] Bynham, P., et al. c. 2000, UAVs and HAPs - Potential Convergence for Military 
Communications, viewed 7 November 2005, 
<http://www.elec.york.ac.uk/comms/papers/tozer00_ieecol.pdf>. 
[54] Anon. 2005, Ultra High Frequency, Wikipedia, viewed 4 November 2005, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UHF>. 
[55] Anon. 2005, Australian Communication and Media Authority, viewed 4 November 
2005, <http://www.acma.gov.au/acmainter>. 
 130
[56] Anon. 2005, TALON Small Mobile Robot, Global Security, viewed 8 March 2006, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/talon.htm>. 
[57] Weatherington, D. & Wilson, A. 2003, 'The Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Common Mission Planning Architecture - an Overview', 
Proceedings of the 2nd AIAA "Unmanned Unlimited" Systems, Technologies, and 
Operations, 15-18 September, San Diego, California,  
[58] Cooke, C., Haynes, B. & Pattison, M. 1998, 'Interoperable digital data links for 
maritime Unmanned Air Vehicles', Proceedings of the 13th RPVs/UAVs 
International Conference, 30 March-1 April, Bristol, UK, pp.15.1-15.8. 
[59] Wall, R. 2002, 'New NATO Standards Target UAV Interoperability', Aviation Week 
& Space Technology, vol. 157, no. 15, pp.41. 
[60] Houle Caruso, A. 2002, 'Tactical Control System (TCS) for Unmanned Air Vehicles 
(UAVs)', Proceedings of the SPIE Airborne Reconnaissance XXVI, 10-11 July, 
pp.118-124. 
[61] Anon. 2004, U.S. Navy Tactical Control System, Raytheon Systems Company, 
viewed 25 August 2005, 
<http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/legacy_site/c
ms01_035286.pdf>. 
[62] Pike, J. c. 1997, Tactical Common Data Link, Federation of American Scientists, 
viewed 20 December 2005, <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/tcdl.htm>. 
[63] Daniel, S. c. 2004, Standards Based UAV Interoperability, NATO & STANAG 4586, 
viewed 21 December 2005, 
<http://www.auvsipathfinder.com/2004_Symposium_Files/NATO%20UAV%20Inte
roperability%20-%20Mr.%20Steve%20Daniel.ppt>. 
[64] Anon. 2005, High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Ground Segment 
Product Brochure, Raytheon Systems Company, viewed 16 August 2004, 
<http://www.raytheon.com/products/ha_euav/>. 
[65] Anon. 2005, Department of Defense Handbook: Ground Control Systems, viewed 22 
November 2005, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/pm/currentpolicy/wbs/MIL_HDBK-
881A/MILHDBK881A/WebHelp3/MILHDBK881A.htm>. 
[66] Anon. 2002, System Description, Pioneer UAV Inc., viewed 22 November 2005, 
<http://www.puav.com/pioneer_system.asp#ground>. 
 131
[67] Rathore, A. 2006, 'A Systems Approach to Model the Conceptual Design Process of 
Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle', PhD thesis, RMIT University, 
Melbourne, Australia. 
[68] Anon. 2002, CASR Part 101: Unmanned Aircraft and Rocket Operations, Civil 
Aviation Safety Regulations, viewed 12 April 2006, 
<http://www.casa.gov.au/rules/1998casr/101/index.htm>. 
[69] Anon. 2005, Field Manual 20-32: Mine/Countermine Operations, Report from the 
Department of the Army, Washington, USA. 
[70] King, C. 2006, 'Countering the IED Threat', Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 43, no. 25, 
pp.21. 
[71] Lok, J.J. 2006, 'IED Threat is Here to Stay, Says Top US/NATO Chief', Jane's 
Defence Weekly, vol. 43, no. 21, pp.7. 
[72] Chisholm, P. (n.d.), Clearing the Roads, Special Operations Technology, viewed 22 
August 2006, <http://www.special-operations-
technology.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=1129>. 
[73] MacArthur, E.Z., MacArthur, D. & Crane, C. 2005, 'Use of Cooperative Unmanned 
Air and Ground Vehicles for Detection and Disposal of Mines', Proceedings of the 
SPIE Intelligent Systems in Design and Manufacturing VI, 24-26 October, Boston, 
Massachusetts, pp.94-101. 
[74] Kauchak, M. 2006, New Eye in the Sky, Military Geospatial Technology, viewed 21 
September 2006, <http://www.military-geospatial-
technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1545>. 
[75] Anon. 2005, Marine Corps War Lab to Test UAV Mounted IED Detection 
Technology, viewed 21 September 2006, 
<http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/media/articles/UAV%20IED.pdf#search=%22IED%20
change%20detection%20systems%22>. 
[76] Anon. 2006, Blueye TUAV and photogrammetric applications, BlueBird Aero 
Systems, viewed 21 September 2006, <http://www.bluebird-
uav.com/apage/5439.php>. 
[77] Anon. 2006, Counter-IED Multi-Sensor Change Detection, The Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory, viewed 21 September 2006, 
<http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/mcp/Initiatives/GWOT%20Support/2-MCP-
Change%20Detection%2010%20Jul%2006.pdf>. 
 132
[78] Anon. 2006, AN/AAQ-24(V) NEMESIS, Northrop Grumman Defensive Systems, 
viewed 21 September 2006, <http://www.dsd.es.northropgrumman.com/DSD-
Brochures/dircm/AAQ24.pdf>. 
[79] Anon. 2005, TALON Robots - The Soldier's Choice, Foster-Miller, viewed 8 August 
2006, <http://www.foster-miller.com/lemming.htm>. 
[80] Grabianowski, E. 2006, How Military Robots Work, HowStuffWorks, viewed 8 
August 2006, <http://www.howstuffworks.com/military-robot.htm>. 
[81] Anon. (n.d.), Tech Database, Joint Robotics Program, viewed 8 August 2006, 
<https://robot.spawar.navy.mil/>. 
[82] Pike, J. 2005, Small Mobile Robot, GlobalSecurity.org, viewed 9 August 2006, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/smr.htm>. 
[83] Robertson, N. 2002, Meet Packbot: The Newest Recruit, CNN.com/SCI-TECH, 
viewed 9 August 2006, 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/TECH/science/08/01/packbot/>. 
[84] Anon. 2006, iRobot Packbot EOD, iRobot, viewed 9 August 2006, 
<http://www.irobot.com/sp.cfm?pageid=138>. 
[85] Anon. 2006, MATILDA Robotic Platform, Mesa Robotics, viewed 9 August 2006, 
<http://www.mesa-robotics.com/matilda.html>. 
[86] Pike, J. 2005, MATILDA, GlobalSecurity.org, viewed 9 August 2006, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/matilda.htm>. 
[87] Anon. 2004, I, Robot: Rugged Dragon Runner Helps Troops 'See Around the 
Corner', Military.com, viewed 16 August 2006, 
<http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_DragonRobot,,00.html>. 
[88] Anon. 2005, Dragon Runner Fact Sheet, viewed 16 August 2006, 
<http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:6SuIUXl-
s0MJ:www.defenselink.mil/transformation/factsheets/Dragon%2520Runner.pdf+dra
gon+runner&hl=en&gl=au&ct=clnk&cd=5>. 
[89] Spice, B. 2004, CMU's Snooping Robot Going to Iraq, Post-Gazette: Health, Science 
& Environment, viewed 16 August 2006, <http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/04142/319740.stm>. 
[90] Anon. 2004, Remote Robotic Reconnaissance Vehicles, viewed 17 August 2006, 
<http://www.spawar.navy.mil/robots/land/r3v/r3v.html>. 
 133
[91] Ciccimaro, D., et al. c. 2003, MPRS (URBOT) Commercialization, viewed 17 
August 2006, <http://www.nosc.mil/robots/pubs/spie5083.pdf>. 
[92] Anon. (n.d.), Mini-ANDROS II, Northrop Grumman, viewed 18 August 2006, 
<http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/remotec/miniandros2.htm>. 
[93] Anon. (n.d.), Vanguard Mk II, RoboProbe Technologies, viewed 18 August 2006, 
<http://www.roboprobe.com/PRODUCTS/P82-EO_MK2.html>. 
[94] Anon. (n.d.), Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) Airborne Data Terminal, L3 
Communications, viewed 18 September 2006, <http://www.l-
3com.com/csw/product/specs/Airborne/TCDLAirSpecs.asp>. 
[95] Anon. 2006, ToughDisk 3500 Rugged Hard Disk, Formation, viewed 18 September 
2006, <http://www.formation.com/specs.html>. 
[96] Anon. 2006, Fire Scout Digital GPS/INS, Kearfott Guidance & Navigation 
Corporation, viewed 18 September 2006, 
<http://www.kearfott.com/products/air/KN-4073_Fire_Scout_Digital_GPS-
INS.pdf>. 
[97] Anon. 2006, Miniature Radar Altimeter Mk V, Roke Manor Research Ltd., viewed 
28 September 2006, <http://www.roke.co.uk/download/datasheets/MRA_Mk5.pdf>. 
[98] Anon. 2003, UAV IFF Transponder, BAE Systems, viewed 3 November 2003, 
<http://www.as.na.baesystems.com/html/uav_iff_transponder.html>. 
[99] Anon. 2006, Raven Eye I, Northrop Grumman Defensive Systems, viewed 19 
September 2006, <http://www.dsd.es.northropgrumman.com/DSD-
Brochures/litening/RAVEN_EYE_I.pdf>. 
[100] Anon. 2006, “BuckEye” Fact Sheet An Airborne High Resolution Digital Imaging 
System, US Army Corps of Engineers, viewed 21 September 2006, 
<http://www.tec.army.mil/fact_sheet/Buckeye_pub21Jul.pdf>. 
[101] Anon. 2006, AN/AAR-54(V) Missile Warning System, Northrop Grumman Defensive 
Systems, viewed 21 September 2006, 
<http://www.dsd.es.northropgrumman.com/DSD-Brochures/dircm/AAR54.pdf>. 
[102] Anon. 2006, Mini-Pointer/Tracker, Northrop Grumman Defensive Systems, viewed 
21 September 2006, <http://www.dsd.es.northropgrumman.com/DSD-
Brochures/dircm/Mini_Pointer_Tracker.pdf>. 
 134
[103] Grabianowski, E. 2006, How Military Robots Work - Small Bots: Packbot, 
HowStuffWorks, viewed 8 August 2006, <http://www.howstuffworks.com/military-
robot3.htm>. 
[104] Anon. 2006, Shephard Unmanned Vehicles: Handbook 2006, The Shephard Press, 
UK. 
[105] Anon. 2006, UAV Datasource, Shephard UVOnline, viewed 2 Octoboer 2006, 
<http://www.shephard.co.uk/UVonline/UVSpecs.aspx>. 
[106] Anon. 2006, UAV Vehicle Capabilities, UAV Forum, viewed 6 October 2006, 
<http://www.uavforum.com/vehicles/capabilities.htm>. 
[107] Golightly, G. 2005, Boeing's Concept Exploration Pioneers New UAV Development 
with the Hummingbird and the Maverick, Boeing Frontiers, viewed 6 October 2006, 
<http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2004/december/ts_sf04.html>. 
[108] Koichi, I. & Hiroaki, N. 2002, 'Developing Autonomous Flight Control Systems for 
Unmanned Helicopter by Use of Neural Network Training', Proceedings of the 
CSM'02: 16th JISR-IIASA Workshop on Methodologies and Tools for Complex 
System Modeling and Integrated Policy Assessment, 15-17 July, Laxenburg, Austria,  
[109] Anon. 2006, Jane's all the World's Aircraft 2006-2007, Jane's Information Group 
Limited, USA. 
[110] Anon. 2006, CH-54 Tarhe, Wikipedia, viewed 26 July 2006, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CH-54_Tarhe>. 
[111] Przemieniecki, J.S. 2000, Mathematical Methods in Defense Analyses, 3rd edn, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Viginia, USA. 
[112] Steinvall, O., et al. 2003, Laser Based 3-D Imaging: New Capabilities for Optical 
Sensing, Report from the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Linkoping, Sweden. 
[113] Kumar, M., Garg, D.P. & Zachery, R. 2005, 'Multi-Sensor Fusion Strategy to Obtain 
3-D Occupancy Profile', Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of IEEE 
Industrial Electronics, 6-10 November, Raleigh, NC, pp.2083-2088. 
[114] Altshuler, T.W., Andrews, A.M. & Sparrow, D.A. 1997, 'Mine and UXO Detection: 
Measures of Performance and Their Implication in Real-World Scenarios', 
Proceedings of the SPIE Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and 
Minelike Targets II, Orlando, USA, pp.281-292. 
[115] MacDonald, J., et al. 2003, Alternatives for Landmine Detection, Report from the 
RAND Institution, USA. 
 135
[116] Anon. 2007, NOTAR, Wikipedia, viewed 28 June 2007, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOTAR>. 
[117] Day, D.A. (n.d.), Stealth Aircraft, U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, viewed 28 
June 2007, 
<http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Evolution_of_Technology/Stealth_aircraft
/Tech31.htm>. 
[118] Anon. 2003, Designing for Stealth, Nova: Science Programming on Air and Online, 
viewed 28 June 2007, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/xplanes/stea-nf.html>. 
[119] Clark, G., Piperias, P. & Traill, R. 1999, 'Life-Cycle Cost/Capability Analysis for 
Defence Systems', Proceedings of the Simulation Technology and Training 
Conference, Melbourne, Australia,  
[120] Anon. 2004, 'Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System Acquisition Cost Estimating 
Methodology', Proceedings of the 37th DoD Cost Analysis Symposium, 11-13 
February,  
 
 
 
 136
Appendix A 
 
HELICOPTER DESIGN EQUATIONS 
 
mif TPsfcW ××=   
where, 
Wf = fuel weight;    sfc = specific fuel consumption; 
Pi = installed power; and   Tm = mission time. 
 
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ++++= fp(ext) ms(int) mscu WWWWWW   
where, 
Wu = useful weight;   Wms(int) = internal mission system weight; 
Wc = crew weight;   Wms(ext) = external mission system weight;  
Wp = personnel weight; and  Wf = fuel weight. 
 
g
u
u
g
W
W
W
W =  
 
Wg = gross weight;   Wu = useful weight; 
 
pv ADL0.3D ××=   
where, 
Dv = vertical drag;    DL = disk loading; and 
Ap = projected area of all components in the remote wake. 
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A
DW
DL
+=   
where, 
DL = disk loading;    Wg = gross weight;  
Dv = vertical drag; and  AD = disk area. 
 
ΩR
V
μ f=   
ΩRVT =   
where, 
μ = tip speed ratio;    VF = Forward speed; 
R = rotor radius;     Ω = rotational speed; and 
VT = tip speed. 
 
( ) ( )2D
vg
2
D
T
ΩRρσA
DW
ΩRρσA
T
σ
C +==   
πR
bc
A
A
σ
D
b ==   
where,  
CT = coefficient of thrust;    σ = solidity;  
T = thrust;     Wg = gross weight; 
Dv = vertical drag;    ρ = air density; 
AD = disc area;    ΩR = tip speed; 
b = blade;     c = chord; and 
R = rotor radius.  
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MM
T DL
DD
27.015.7 −=   
where, 
DT = tail rotor diameter;  DM = main rotor diameter; and 
DLM = main rotor disk loading. 
 
( ) (extdpcleandpdp CCC += )   
where, 
Cdp = coefficient of parasite drag;  
Cdp(ext) = coefficient of parasite drag external; and 
Cdp(clean) = coefficient of parasite drag of clean helicopter with internal useful load. 
 
3
2
)(
)( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
g
extmsg
cleandp W
WW
kC   
where, 
Cdp(clean) = coefficient of parasite drag of clean helicopter with internal useful load;  
Wg = gross weight of helicopter;     
Wms(ext) = mission system weight external; and 
k = parasite drag-gross weight constant = 8.18 x 10-3. 
 
fdp(ext) C15.1C fλ×=   
where, 
Cdp(ext) = coefficient of parasite drag external;  λf = form factor; and   
Cf = coefficient of friction. 
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⎛+=
l
d
l
d
fλ   
5.0Re3.1 −=fC  for Re<105  
( ) 5.2Relog45.0 −=fC  for Re>105  
where, 
d = diameter of external load; and  l = length of external load. 
 
( ) a
RM ×
Ω××=
60
75.02
75.0
π   
where, 
M(0.75) = Mach number at 75% rotor station;  R = rotor radius; 
a = speed of sound; and    Ω = rotational speed. 
 
a
CT
av
σα 6=   
where, 
αav = average angle of attack;  CT/σ = thrust coefficient-to-solidity ratio; and 
a = lift curve slope. 
 
2
210 avavdoC αδαδδ ++=   
where δ0, δ1, and δ2 are 0.0087, 0.0126, and 0.400 respectively for conventional airfoils. 
 
2
avdoC αδ Σ+=   
where Σ and δ are 0.3 and 0.01 respectively. 
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3
fDdp
22
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fD
2
g
f P2
VAρC
8
4.65μ1ΩRρAσC
ρV2A
W
P ++++=   
where, 
Wg = gross weight ;    AD = area of disk; 
ρ = air density at specific altitude;   Vf = forward velocity; 
σ = solidity of main rotor;   Cdo = coefficient of profile drag; 
Cdp = coefficient of parasite drag;  Ω = angular velocity;     
R = main rotor radius;    μ = tip speed ratio; and     
Pm = miscellaneous power. 
 
( ) 67.03.166.0026.0 RcRbWbM Ω=   
where, 
WbM = main rotor blade weight;  b = number of blades; 
c = chord length;    R = main rotor radius; and 
Ω = rotational speed. 
 
( ) 55.0243.05.128.0 67.00037.0 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +Ω=
R
gJWRRbW bMhM   
where, 
WhM = main rotor hub & hinge weight; b = number of blades; 
R = main rotor radius;    Ω = rotational speed;  
WbM = main rotor blade weight;   g = gravitational acceleration; and 
J = polar moment of inertia. 
 
32.02.172.0 HHH ARAW =   
where, 
WH = horizontal stabiliser weight;  AH = horizontal stabiliser area; and 
ARH = horizontal stabiliser aspect ratio. 
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71.053.094.005.1 tgbVVV NARAW =   
where, 
WV = vertical stabiliser weight;  AV = vertical stabiliser area; 
ARV = vertical stabiliser aspect ratio; and Ntgb = Number of tail rotor gearboxes. 
 
90.0
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⎛
Ω= M
T
TT
PRW   
where, 
WT = tail rotor weight;   RT = tail rotor radius; 
PT = transmission hp rating; and  ΩM = main rotor rotational speed. 
 
( ) 25.061.0
49.0
1000
9.6 FF
g
F SwetL
W
W ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=   
where, 
WF = fuselage weight;  Wg = gross weight; 
LF = fuselage length; and  SwetF = fuselage wetted area. 
 
( ) 54.0
67.0
1000
40 wl
g
LG N
W
W ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=   
where, 
WLG = landing gear weight;  Wg = gross weight; and 
Nwl = number of wheel legs. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 3.124.01.1 33.0041.0 NengengN SwetNWW +=   
where, 
WN = nacelle weight;   Weng = engine dry weight;  
Neng = number of engines; and SwetN = nacelle wetted area. 
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( ) ( 59.077.0...43.0 tFS NgalincapW = )   
where, 
WFS = fuel system weight; and Nt = number of tanks. 
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where, 
WDS = drive system weight;   PT = transmission hp rating; 
RPMeng = engine revolution per minute; ΩM = main rotor rotational speed; 
ΩT = tail rotor rotational speed; and  Ngb = number of gear boxes. 
 
( ) ( ) 79.059.02 engengPSS NWW =   
where, 
WPSS = propulsion subsystem weight; Weng = engine dry weight; and 
Neng = number of engines. 
 
1.2
3.163.0
1000
37 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω= RcbWhyd   
where, 
Whyd = hydraulic system weight; b = number of blades; 
c = chord length;   Ω = rotational speed; and 
R = main rotor radius. 
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g
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⎛
= 40.0
65.0
1000
6.9  
 
where, 
WEL = electrical system weight; PT = transmission hp rating; 
Wg = gross weight; and  Whyd = hydraulic system weight. 
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⎛= gI
W
W   
where, 
WI = instruments weight; and  Wg = gross weight. 
 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
+
+=
compgp
compgp
WW
MM
cg   
where, 
cg = centre-of-gravity;  Wgp = group weight;  
Mgp = moment of group weights;  Wcomp = missions systems and crew weight; and 
Mcomp = moment of crew and mission systems. 
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Appendix B 
 
RANDOM CONSISTENCY VALUES 
 
Size of Matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Random Consistency Value 
 
0.00 0.00 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 
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Appendix C 
 
PAYLOAD DESIGN DSS 
C.1 Total Mission Contribution Functional Hierarchy 
 
Level I
Level II
Level III
(CP) (DL)(DS) (W)
Data LinkWeaponsDefensive SystemComputer
Survivability
(FC) (DP) (C) (LP) (L) (OD) (TC) (S)
Flight Control
Data 
Processing/ 
Storage
Commun-ication Lethal Precision Lethality Observation & Detection
Threat Counter-
measures
SensorNavigation
(N) (SR)
Total Mission Contribution
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C.2 Functional Level II Pairwise Comparison 
 
Level II Pairwise Comparison - Number of Matrices: 1; Number of Elements: 8
Mission Contribution (FC) (DP) (C) (LP) (L) (OD) (TC) (S)
(FC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(DP) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(C) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(LP) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(L) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(OD) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(TC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(S) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Column Total 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
Normalized Matrix
Mission Contribution (FC) (DP) (C) (LP) (L) (OD) (TC) (S) Priority Vector
(FC) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(DP) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(C) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(LP) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(L) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(OD) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(TC) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(S) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13  
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C.3 Functional Level III Pairwise Comparison 
 
Level III Pairwise Comparison - Number of Matrices: 8; Number of Elements: Variable
Flight Control
Number of Elements 3
(Normalized Matrix)
(FC) (N) (CP) (DL) (FC) (N) (CP) (DL) Priority Vector
(N) 1.00 5.00 3.00 (N) 0.65 0.56 0.69 0.63
(CP) 0.20 1.00 0.33 (CP) 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.11
(DL) 0.33 3.00 1.00 (DL) 0.22 0.33 0.23 0.26
Column Total 1.53 9.00 4.33
(FC) (N) (CP) (DL) Row Sum
(N) 0.63 0.53 0.78 1.95
(CP) 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.32
(DL) 0.21 0.32 0.26 0.79
1.95 0.63 3.07 3.07 + 3.01 + 3.03 9.11
0.32 / 0.11 = 3.01 3.00
0.79 0.26 3.03
λmax - n 3.04 - 3.00 0.04
n - 1 3.00 - 1.00 2.00
The random value of the CI for n = 3 is 0.52
0.02
0.52
=
CR =
3.00
λmax == ≈ 3.04
=
CIConsistency Index =
Consistency Ratio =
= = 0.02
0.0367 = 3.7%
=
 
Data Processing/ Storage
Number of Elements 1
(Normalized Matrix)
(DP) (CP) (DP) (CP) Priority Vector
(CP) 1.00 (CP) 1.00 1.00
Column Total 1.00
 
Commun-ication
Number of Elements 3
(Normalized Matrix)
(C) (SR) (CP) (DL) (C) (SR) (CP) (DL) Priority Vector
(SR) 1.00 0.33 0.11 (SR) 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.07
(CP) 3.00 1.00 0.20 (CP) 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.18
(DL) 9.00 5.00 1.00 (DL) 0.69 0.79 0.76 0.75
Column Total 13.00 6.33 1.31
(C) (SR) (CP) (DL) Row Sum
(SR) 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.21
(CP) 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.54
(DL) 0.64 0.90 0.75 2.29
0.21 0.07 3.00 3.00 + 3.02 + 3.06 9.09
0.54 / 0.18 = 3.02 3.00
2.29 0.75 3.06
λmax - n 3.03 - 3.00 0.03
n - 1 3.00 - 1.00 2.00
The random value of the CI for n = 3 is 0.52
0.01
0.52
Consistency Ratio = CR = 0.0275 = 2.7%=
3.03
Consistency Index = CI = = = = 0.01
λmax = =
3.00
≈
 
Lethality
Number of Elements 1
(Normalized Matrix)
(L) (W) (L) (W) Priority Vector
(W) 1.00 (W) 1.00 1.00
Column Total 1.00
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Lethal Precision
Number of Elements 3
(Normalized Matrix)
(LP) (N) (SR) (DL) (LP) (N) (SR) (DL) Priority Vector
(N) 1.00 3.00 3.00 (N) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
(SR) 0.33 1.00 1.00 (SR) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
(DL) 0.33 1.00 1.00 (DL) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Column Total 1.67 5.00 5.00
(LP) (N) (SR) (DL) Row Sum
(N) 0.60 0.60 0.60 1.80
(SR) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.60
(DL) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.60
1.80 0.60 3.00 3.00 + 3.00 + 3.00 9.00
0.60 / 0.20 = 3.00 3.00
0.60 0.20 3.00
λmax - n 3.00 - 3.00 0.00
n - 1 3.00 - 1.00 2.00
The random value of the CI for n = 3 is 0.52
0.00
0.52
0 = 0.0%Consistency Ratio = CR = =
3.00
Consistency Index = CI = = = = 0.00
λmax =
3.00
= ≈
 
Observation & Detection
Number of Elements 2
(Normalized Matrix)
(OD) (SR) (DS) (OD) (SR) (DS) Priority Vector
(SR) 1.00 9.00 (SR) 0.90 0.90 0.90
(DS) 0.11 1.00 (DS) 0.10 0.10 0.10
Column Total 1.11 10.00
 
Threat Counter-measures
Number of Elements 1
(Normalized Matrix)
(TC) (DS) (TC) (DS) Priority Vector
(DS) 1.00 (DS) 1.00 1.00
Column Total 1.00
 
Survivability
Number of Elements 5
(Normalized Matrix)
(S) (N) (SR) (CP) (DS) (DL) (S) (N) (SR) (CP) (DS) (DL) Priority Vector
(N) 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 (N) 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.22
(SR) 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.20 (SR) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
(CP) 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 (CP) 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.22
(DS) 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.20 (DS) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
(DL) 2.00 5.00 2.00 5.00 1.00 (DL) 0.43 0.38 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.41
Column Total 4.67 13.00 4.67 13.00 2.40
(S) (N) (SR) (CP) (DS) (DL) Row Sum
(N) 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.20 1.10
(SR) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.38
(CP) 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.20 1.10
(DS) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.38
(DL) 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.41 2.05
1.10 0.22 5.01 5.01 + 5.00 + 5.01 + 5.00 + 5.01 25.02
0.38 0.08 5.00 5.00
1.10 0.22 5.01
0.38 0.08 5.00
2.05 0.41 5.01
λmax - n 5.00 - 5.00 0.00
n - 1 5.00 - 1.00 4.00
The random value of the CI for n = 5 is 1.11
0.00
1.11
0 = 0.0%
5.00
Consistency Ratio = CR = =
5.00
Consistency Index = CI = = = = 0.00
/ =
λmax = =
≈
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C.4 Overall Priority Synthesising 
 
Overall Priorities
(FC) (DP) (C) (LP) (L) (OD) (TC) (S)
Priority Vectors 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
x x x x x x x x
(N) 0.63 0.60 0.22
(SR) 0.07 0.20 0.90 0.08
(CP) 0.11 1.00 0.18 0.22
(DS) 0.10 1.00 0.08
(W) 1.00
(DL) 0.26 0.75 0.20 0.41
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(FC) (DP) (C) (LP) (L) (OD) (TC) (S) Overall Priority Vector
(N) 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.182
(SR) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.156
(CP) 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.188
(DS) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.147
(W) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.125
(DL) 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.202
1.000  
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Appendix D 
 
COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF DATA 
D.1 COTS UGV Data 
Image Manufacturer Model Features Communications Standard Weight (kg)
Length 
(mm)
Width 
(mm)
Height - Arm 
Stowed (mm)
Height - Arm 
Extended (mm) 
Max Speed 
(m/s)
Maximum Active 
Endurance (Hr) Cost (US$)
Foster-Miller TALON
Operates in all weather, 
conditions, & terrain. Rugged. 
Manoeuvrable. Self correcting
Fibre Optic: 300-500m cable; Radio Control: 
Standard - 500-800m LOS; Optional - High 
gain antenna 1200m LOS
w/o arm - 27; w 
arm - 45 864 572 279 1500 2.30
Standard - lead acid 
battery 2hr; Optional - 
1 lithium ion 4 hr
59,220
iRobot Packbot EOD
Operates in all weather, 
conditions, & terrain. 
Manoeuvrable. Self correcting
Fibre Optic: 200m; Radio Control: 800m w/o arm - 18; w arm - 24 787 508 381 2381 1.53 2 45,000
Mesa Robotics MATILDA Operates in all weather & terrain Fibre Optic: Varying length options approx. 300-900m); Radio Control: Unknown
w/o arm - 28; w 
arm - 48 762 533 483 1270 1.00 6 55,000
Carnegie Mellon 
University's 
Robotics Institute
Dragon Runner Operates day/night. Rugged. Fully invertible – w/o arm - 7.26 394 286 127 N/A 8.94 – 46,000
CSOIS Utah State 
University ODIS – Teleoperation: 400m; Radio Control: 4828m w/o arm - 18.14 660 610 102 N/A – 2 - 4 50,000
SPAWAR Systems 
Center URBOT Fully invertible – w/o arm - 29.50 864 533 – N/A – – –
EOD Performance 
Inc. Vanguard Mk II Rugged. Manoeuvrable. – w arm - 52 915 435 405 1320 – 2 - 3 –
REMOTEC/ 
Northrop Grumman Mini Andros II
Operates in all weather, 
conditions, & terrain. – w arm - 102 1346 622 686 2000 – – 10,000  
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D.2 COTS Payload Data 
Image Manufacturer Name Functional Characteristics (Attributes) Length (mm)
Width/D 
(mm)
Height 
(mm) Weight (kg) Power (W) Image Name Functional Characteristics (Attributes)
Data Link L3 Communications
Tactical Common 
Data Link
Secure voice & data. Operates in Ku-
band. Antennas can be modified to 
improve range and data rate.
254 305 152 7.030 165 – Radio Frequency Up to 800m wireless control.
MicroPilot MP2028
Provides full independent flight 
operations. Integrates with user-friendly 
interfaces.
100 40 20 0.028 – – Mobile Pentium PC
Assisting behaviours. Designed for rough 
operations.
Formation ToughDisk 3500
Large disk drive capacity. Resistant to 
vibration & shock. Operates in cold or hot 
conditions.
146 102 25 0.590 5.2 – – –
Kearfott KN-4073 Digital GPS/INS
Enhanced position, velocity, attitude, & 
pointing performance. Anti-jam capability. 231 137 152 3.700 35 – GPS
Features in-built electronic compass and 
temperature sensors
Roke Manor 
Research MRA Mk V Accurate height positioning to within 2 cm. 100 75 70 0.400 6 – – –
Northrop 
Grumman Raven Eye I
Lightweight. FLIR & zoom colour tv 
camera. Target tracking & accurate 
pointing. 
– 260 380 16.000 – Enhanced Camera
Fully rotatable high powered zoom 
camera. Features super bright LED 
illumination
Flight Landata / 
US Army Corps 
of Engineers
BuckEye Change 
Detection System
Integrates EO & LIDAR sensors. Provides 
high-resolution imagery – – – 13.608 –
Laser Range 
Finder/Targeter Enhances disrupter accuracy.
AN/AAR-54(V) 
Missile Warning 
System
Clutter rejection. Long and short range 
missile detection. Rapid & automatic 
cuing to  countermeasures system.
UV Sensor Each 112 87 87 1.750 8
Electronics Unit 216 160 97 4.800 34
Northrop 
Grumman
Mini-
Pointer/Tracker
Agile pointing system. Rapid acquisition 
of missiles. Tracks & jams missiles with 
laser energy.
– 330 345 25.800 800 – – –
BAE Systems UAV IFF Transponder
Identification Modes 1-4. Lightweight & 
compact design. 64 244 274 3.175 – – – –
Arm System
Long reach 3-link arm with wide range of 
motion. Extends to 2m. Internal cabling 
for all-weather operations.
Gripper Fully rotatable. Wide grip for different sized objects.
Sensors
Miscellaneous
iVTUAV Payload
Disrupter
Defensive 
Systems
Computer
Navigation
Components
N/A
N/A
Assists in EOD
UGV Payload
Northrop 
Grumman –
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D.3 COTS VTUAV Data 
Production VTUAVs
Image Manufacturer Model Missions Length (m) Height (m)
Speed 
(m/s)
Service 
Ceiling (km)
Max Endurance 
(Hrs)
Gross Weight, 
Wg (kg)
Empty Weight, 
We (kg)
Payload Weight 
(kg)
Power Rating 
(kW)
Rotor Diameter 
(m)
# 
Blades
CybAero APID 55 Surveillance & recon., EW, target designation, comms relay, civil surveys 3.10 1.20 27.78 3.00 6 150 95 55.00 41.01 3.30 2
Yamaha Autonomous RMAX
Surveillance & recon., observation, law 
enforcement 3.63 1.22 27.78 2.00 1.5 95.00 64.00 30.00 15.66 3.11 2
Schiebel Camcopter S-100
Surveillance & recon., target acquisition, 
comms relay, precision delivery, minefield 
& surface ordnance survey
3.09 1.07 – 5.49 6 199.58 99.79 49.90 – 3.40 2
Northrop 
Grumman
RQ-8A/B Fire 
Scout Surveillance & recon., precision targeting 6.99 2.87 64.31 6.10 6 1428.82 660.88 272.16 313.19 8.38 3
– Channon AIS Nitro Hawk Surveillance & recon. – – 55.56 – – 10.00 4.20 2.27 2.98 – 5
– Fuji Heavy Industries RPH 2A Observation 5.30 1.80 – 2.00 1 330.00 – 100.00 62.27 – –
Rotomotion LLC SR 200 Surveillance 3.05 0.78 – – 4 – 22.00 22.68 – 3.00 2
SAIC Vigilante 502 Recon., target acquisition, self protection, comms relay 6.07 2.44 60.19 3.66 7 498.95 294.84 104.33 85.76 7.01 2  
 
 153 
Development VTUAVs
Image Manufacturer Model Missions Length (m) Height (m)
Speed 
(m/s)
Service 
Ceiling (km)
Max Endurance 
(Hrs)
Gross Weight, 
Wg (kg)
Empty Weight, 
We (kg)
Payload Weight 
(kg)
Power Rating 
(kW)
Rotor Diameter 
(m)
# 
Blades
Boeing A-160 Hummingbird
ISR, comms relay, precision supply, remote 
delivery 10.67 2.96 72.02 9.14 24 2267.96 1814.37 450.00 290.82 10.97 3
Bombardier 
Aerospace CL-327 Guardian
Recon., target acquisition, EW, comms 
relay – 1.83 43.73 5.49 6.25 349.27 149.69 99.79 74.57 3.99 6
Sikorsky Cypher II Surveillance & recon., target acquisition 1.83 0.61 64.31 3.66 3 99.79 – 11.34 – – –
– Naval Research Laboratory Dragon Warrior Surveillance & recon. 2.13 – 51.44 – 5 113.00 – 16.00 – 2.44 –
Kawada Industries Robocopter 300 Industrial 7.37 2.65 – – 1.4 794.00 500.00 294.00 124.00 8.18 –
– EADS Scorpio 30 Urban, maritime, day/night intelligence 2.00 0.75 13.89 – – 38.00 – – – 2.20 –
Dornier Seamos Maritime surveillance, target acquisition/designation 3.20 2.50 46.30 3.00 4 1125.00 595.00 180.00 313.19 6.10 4
– Steadicopter STD-5 Surveillance 1.50 0.56 – – 2 – 8.00 8.00 – 1.80 2
Tactical 
Aerospace Group TAG M65 Surveillance 1.82 0.92 30.56 4.00 4.5 – 11.00 14.00 3.88 2.50 2
TGR Helicorp Snark Recon., protection, submarine hunting, insertion, medivac, comms relay 7.50 3.70 75.28 4.18 24 1136.00 – 682.00 – 8.80 –  
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D.4 COTS Helicopter Data 
Type Model
Gross Weight, 
Wg (kg)
Empty Weight, 
We (kg)
Payload Weight 
(kg)
Power Rating 
(kW)
Heavy Lift Mil Mi-26 56000 29000 20000 17000
Erickson CH-54 
Tarhe 21319 – – 6712
Boeing CH-47 
Chinook 24494 11550 12944 4474
Kamov Ka-29/Ka-
31 11500 5520 2000 3266
Kazan/MII Mi-17 13000 7468 4000 3530
Mil Mi-38 15600 – 5000 3676
AgustaWestland 
EH101 14600 9350 3120 4182
Bell 412 5397 3113 2285 1193
Eurocopter MK1 9000 4330 4500 2368
Kamov Ka-32 11000 6610 3700 3266
Mil Mi-17 13000 7200 4000 2794
NH Industries 
NH90 10600 5945 2500 3324
Sikorsky S-70A 7708 5118 1197 2326
Sikorsky S-76 5307 2545 1616 1184
Light Utility Kamov Ka-226A 3400 1952 1300 670
Medium Transport
Multi-Role Medium 
Helicopter
Medium Lift
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Appendix E 
 
VEHICLE DESIGN COMPUTATIONS 
E.1 Network-Centric – iVTUAV Design Process:  
Computational Format 
• Iteration 1 
Mission Systems Weight Estimate
Internal External
Weight (kg) Weight (kg)
Data Link 7.030
0.028
0.590
3.700
0.400
16.000
13.608
Electronics Unit 4.800
UV Sensor 1 1.750
UV Sensor 2 1.750
UV Sensor 3 1.750
25.800
3.175
24.000
24.000
112.381
16.000
Computer
Navigation
Sensors
Mission Systems
Tactical Common Data Link
MicroPilot MP2028
ToughDisk 3500
KN-4073 Digital GPS/INS
MRA Mk V
Raven Eye I
128.381
Total Internal Weight, Wms(int)
Total External Weight, Wms(ext)
Total Mission System Weight, Wms
BuckEye Change Detection System
AN/AAR-54(V) 
Missile 
Warning 
System
Mini-Pointer/Tracker
UAV IFF Transponder
Defensive 
Systems
PackBot EOD 1
UGVs
PackBot EOD 2
 
 
Stage I: Weight and Power
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 128.38 kg
First Gross Weight Estimate, Wg 533.68 kg
First Installed Power Estimate, Pi 123.49 kW  
 
Stage II: Fuel
Reserve Fuel 10 % of Wf
Pipeline Fuel 3 % of Wf
Flight Stages Time (mins) Power (kW) sfc (kg/kW-hr) Fuel Used (kg)
Take-Off 5 123.49 0.24 2.47
Transit 25 123.49 0.24 12.35
Safe Zone Recon. 10 123.49 0.24 4.94
UGV Deployment 10 123.49 0.24 4.94
Counter-IED 80 123.49 0.24 39.52
Safe Zone Transit 10 123.49 0.24 4.94
UGV Recovery 10 123.49 0.24 4.94
Transit 25 123.49 0.24 12.35
Landing 5 123.49 0.24 2.47
Reserve Fuel 8.89
Pipeline Fuel 2.67
SUB TOTAL 180 88.92
TOTAL FUEL WEIGHT, Wf 100.47  
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 Stage III: Weight
Fuel Weight, Wf 100.47 kg
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 128.38 kg
Crew Weight, Wc 0.00 kg
Personnel Weight, Wp 0.00 kg
Total Useful Weight, Wu 228.86 kg
Chronological Ratio of Useful Weight 
to Gross Weight, Wu/Wg
0.44
Gross Weight Based on 
Chronological Data, Wg
520.13 kg
Stage 1 Weight Estimate 533.68 kg
Difference of Gross Weight to Stage 
1 Weight Estimate -13.55 kg
% Difference -2.61 %    
Stage IV: Vertical Drag
Sector Area (m2)
A 0.480
B 3.404
C 0.686
D 0.803
E Not In Remote Wake
F Not In Remote Wake
Total Projected Area, Ap 5.373
Drag Coefficient, CD 0.3
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Vertical Drag, DV 711.57 N
Vertical Drag, DV 72.54 kg  
 
Stage V: Main Rotor System
Rotor Size
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Gross Weight, Wg 520.13 kg
Vertical Drag, DV 72.54 kg
Disk Area, AD 13.17 m2
Main Rotor Radius, RM 2.05 m
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 4.09 m
Tip Speed
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Forward Speed, VF 110.00 knots
56.58 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 412.56 ft/s
Rotational Speed, Ω 61.41 rad/sec
586.55 RPM
Solidity And Number Of Blades
Apect Ratio, AR 12
Chord, c 0.171 m
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Coefficient Of Thrust, CT 0.0228
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Number Of Blades, b 5.05
Number Of Blades (Actual), b 5
Tail Rotor
Disk Loading, DL 9.22 lb/ft2
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 13.43 ft
Tail Rotor Diameter, DT 2.88 ft
0.88 m
Tail Rotor Radius RT 0.44 m
Tail Rotor Tip Speed 125.74 m/s *Assumed approximately equal to Main Rotor Tip Speed
Tail Rotor Rotational Speed, ΩT 286.27 rad/sec
2734.21 RPM  
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Stage VI: Drag In Forward Flight
Parasite Drag
Gross Weight, Wg 520.13 kg
External Mission System Weight, Wms(ext) 16 kg
Parasite Drag-Gross Weight Constant, k 8.18E-03
Clean Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(clean) 0.00801
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Viscosity (Sea Level) 1.79E-05 kg/m.s
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
External System Diameter, d (m) Length, l (m)
Form Factor, 
λf
Reynold's 
Number, Re
Friction 
Coefficient, Cf
System Parasite Drag 
Coefficient, Cdp(sys)
Raven Eye I (Portion In Airstream) 0.26 0.26 9.50000 1.007E+06 5.097E-03 0.05568
Mini-Pointer/Tracker Turret Ball 0.14 0.14 9.50000 5.412E+05 1.767E-03 0.01931
EACH Landing Gear Skid 0.05 2.50 1.00430 9.684E+06 3.488E-03 0.00403
0.08304
Total Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09106
Profile Drag
Method 1
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Slope Of Lift Curve, a 6
Average Angle Of Attack, αav 0.17 rad-1
9.74 deg-1
Speed Of Sound, a 340 m/s
Rotor Radius, R 2.05 m
Rotational Speed, Ω 586.55 RPM
Mach At 75% Chord, M(0.75) 0.28
Check 'NACA 0012 Aerofoil' Figure
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01900
Method 2
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02240
Method 3
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01867
Average Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Total External Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(ext)
 
 
Stage VII: Power Required
In Forward Flight For Maximum Speed
Gross Weight, Wg 520.13 kg
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Disk Area, AD 13.17 m2
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09106
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Power Required, Pf 147498 W
147 kW
Miscellaneous Power Required, Pm 20.0 % of Pf
29 kW
Total Power Required, Pf 177 kW  
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• Iteration 2 
 
Stage I: Weight and Power
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 128.38 kg
Gross Weight Estimate, Wg 520.13 kg *Taken from Iteration 1 Stage 3 Weight
Installed Power Estimate, Pi 220.00 kW *Zoche ZO 02A installed power  
 
Stage II: Fuel
Reserve Fuel 10 % of Wf
Pipeline Fuel 3 % of Wf
*Zoche ZO 02A installed power & sfc
Flight Stages Time (mins) Power (kW) sfc (kg/kW-hr) Fuel Used (kg)
Take-Off 5 220.00 0.21 3.85
Transit 25 220.00 0.21 19.25
Safe Zone Recon. 10 220.00 0.21 7.70
UGV Deployment 10 220.00 0.21 7.70
Counter-IED 80 220.00 0.21 61.60
Safe Zone Transit 10 220.00 0.21 7.70
UGV Recovery 10 220.00 0.21 7.70
Transit 25 220.00 0.21 19.25
Landing 5 220.00 0.21 3.85
Reserve Fuel 13.86
Pipeline Fuel 4.16
SUB TOTAL 180 138.60
TOTAL FUEL WEIGHT, Wf 156.62  
 
Stage III: Weight
Fuel Weight, Wf 156.62 kg
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 128.38 kg
Crew Weight, Wc 0.00 kg
Personnel Weight, Wp 0.00 kg
Total Useful Weight, Wu 285.00 kg
Chronological Ratio of Useful Weight 
to Gross Weight, Wu/Wg
0.44
Gross Weight Based on 
Chronological Data, Wg
647.73 kg
Iteration 1 Weight Estimate 520.13 kg
Difference of Gross Weight to 
Iteration 1 Weight Estimate 127.60 kg
% Difference 19.70 %  
 
Stage IV: Vertical Drag
Sector Area (m2) *Based on Iteration 1 Rotor Radius
A Not In Remote Wake
B 3.404
C 0.686
D 0.248
E Not In Remote Wake
F Not In Remote Wake
Total Projected Area, Ap 4.338
Drag Coefficient, CD 0.3
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Vertical Drag, DV 574.50 N
Vertical Drag, DV 58.56 kg
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Stage V: Main Rotor System
Rotor Size
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Gross Weight, Wg 647.73 kg
Vertical Drag, DV 58.56 kg
Disk Area, AD 15.70 m2
Main Rotor Radius, RM 2.24 m
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 4.47 m
Tip Speed
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Forward Speed, VF 110.00 knots
56.58 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 412.56 ft/s
Rotational Speed, Ω 56.26 rad/sec
537.30 RPM
Solidity And Number Of Blades
Apect Ratio, AR 12
Chord, c 0.186 m
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Coefficient Of Thrust, CT 0.0228
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Number Of Blades, b 5.05
Number Of Blades (Actual), b 5
Tail Rotor
Disk Loading, DL 9.22 lb/ft2
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 14.67 ft
Tail Rotor Diameter, DT 2.22 ft *Fenestron design: ≈ DT/√2
0.68 m
Tail Rotor Radius RT 0.34 m
Tail Rotor Tip Speed 125.74 m/s *Assumed approximately equal to Main Rotor Tip Speed
Tail Rotor Rotational Speed, ΩT 370.86 rad/sec
3542.09 RPM  
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Stage VI: Drag In Forward Flight
Parasite Drag
Gross Weight, Wg 647.73 kg
External Mission System Weight, Wms(ext) 16 kg
Parasite Drag-Gross Weight Constant, k 8.18E-03
Clean Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(clean) 0.00804
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Viscosity (Sea Level) 1.79E-05 kg/m.s
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
External System Diameter, d (m) Length, l (m)
Form Factor, 
λf
Reynold's 
Number, Re
Friction 
Coefficient, Cf
System Parasite Drag 
Coefficient, Cdp(sys)
Raven Eye I (Portion In Airstream) 0.26 0.26 9.50000 1.007E+06 5.097E-03 0.05568
Mini-Pointer/Tracker Turret Ball 0.14 0.14 9.50000 5.412E+05 1.767E-03 0.01931
EACH Landing Gear Skid 0.05 2.50 1.00430 9.684E+06 3.488E-03 0.00403
0.08304
Total Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09109
Profile Drag
Method 1
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Slope Of Lift Curve, a 6
Average Angle Of Attack, αav 0.17 rad-1
9.74 deg-1
Speed Of Sound, a 340 m/s
Rotor Radius, R 2.24 m
Rotational Speed, Ω 537.30 RPM
Mach At 75% Chord, M(0.75) 0.28
Check 'NACA 0012 Aerofoil' Figure
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01900
Method 2
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02240
Method 3
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01867
Average Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Total External Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(ext)
 
 
Stage VII: Power Required
In Forward Flight For Maximum Speed
Gross Weight, Wg 647.73 kg
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Disk Area, AD 15.70 m2
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09109
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Power Required, Pf 177397 W
177 kW
Miscellaneous Power Required, Pm 20.0 % of Pf
35 kW
Total Power Required, Pf 213 kW  
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Stage VIII: Refinement Of Gross Weight
*Assumed that the use of composite materials and advanced technology reduces structural weights by approximately 25%
Number Of Blades, b 5 5 Horizontal Stabiliser Area, AH 0.26 m2 2.82 ft2
Chord, c 0.186 m 0.61 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARH 5.67 5.67
Main Rotor Radius, RM 2.24 m 7.33 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 3.27 lbs
Rotational Speed, Ω 56.26 rad/sec Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 1.48 kg
Tip Speed, VT or (ΩR) 125.74 m/s 412.54 ft/s
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 51.97 lbs Vertical Stabiliser Area, AV 0.40 m
2 4.32 ft2
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 23.57 kg Vertical Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARV 1.33 1.33
Number Of Tail Rotor Gear Boxes, Ntgb 1 1
Gravitational Acceleration, g 9.81 m/s2 32.19 ft/s2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 3.62 lbs
Polar Moment Of Inertia, J 58.88 kg.m2 43.43 slug.ft2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 1.64 kg
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 22.07 lbs
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 10.01 kg Tail Rotor Radius, RT 0.34 m 1.11 ft
Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.60 lbs
Gross Weight, Wg 647.73 kg 1427.99 lbs Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.27 kg
Fuselage Length, LF 7.78 m 25.52 ft
Fuselage Wetted Area, SwetF 4.34 m2 46.69 ft2 Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 40.90 lbs
Fuselage Weight, WF 116.22 lbs Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 18.55 kg
Fuselage Weight, WF 52.72 kg
Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 8.37 lbs
Number Of Wheel Legs, Nwl 0 0 Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 3.80 kg
Landing Gear Weight, WLG 0.00 lbs
Landing Skids Weight, WLG 5.00 kg Electrical System Weight, WEL 67.57 lbs
*Assumed landing skid weight Electrical System Weight, WEL 30.65 kg
Engine Dry Weight, Weng 123 kg 271.17 lbs
Instruments Weight, WI 5.56 lbs
Number Of Engines, Neng 1 1 Instruments Weight, WI 2.52 kg
Nacelle Wetted Area, SwetN 4.34 m2 46.69 ft2
Nacelle Weight, WN 51.21 lbs Total Weight Estimate 325.84 kg
Nacelle Weight, WN 23.23 kg Mission Systems Weight, Wms 128.38 kg
Fuel Weight, Wf 156.62 kg
Capacity In Gallons 156.62 kg 345.28 lbs Refined Gross Weight, Wg 610.84 kg
Number Of Tanks, Nt 1 1 Stage 3 Weight Estimate 647.73 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 38.71 lbs
Difference of Refined Gross Weight to 
Stage 3 Weight Estimate -36.89 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 17.56 kg % Difference -6.04 %
Transmission h.p rating, PT 30 h.p *Assumed 10% of power
Engine Revolution Per Minute, RPMeng 2500
Tail Rotor h.p rating 48 h.p
Main Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩM 56.26 rad/sec
Tail Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩT 370.86 rad/sec
Number Of Gear Boxes, Ngb 1
Drive System Weight, WDS 11.83 kg 26.07 lbs  
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• Iteration 3 
Stage IV: Vertical Drag
Sector Area (m2) *Based on Iteration 2 Rotor Radius
A Not In Remote Wake
B 0.253
C 3.404
D 0.686
E 0.353
F Not In Remote Wake
G Not In Remote Wake
Total Projected Area, Ap 4.696
Drag Coefficient, CD 0.3
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Vertical Drag, DV 621.91 N
Vertical Drag, DV 63.40 kg  
 
Stage V: Main Rotor System
Rotor Size
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Gross Weight, Wg 610.84 kg
Vertical Drag, DV 63.40 kg
Disk Area, AD 14.98 m2
Main Rotor Radius, RM 2.18 m
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 4.37 m
Tip Speed
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Forward Speed, VF 110.00 knots
56.58 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 412.56 ft/s
Rotational Speed, Ω 57.58 rad/sec
549.93 RPM
Solidity And Number Of Blades
Apect Ratio, AR 12
Chord, c 0.182 m
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Coefficient Of Thrust, CT 0.0228
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Number Of Blades, b 5.05
Number Of Blades (Actual), b 5
Tail Rotor
Disk Loading, DL 9.22 lb/ft2
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 14.33 ft
Tail Rotor Diameter, DT 2.17 ft *Fenestron design: ≈ DT/√2
0.66 m
Tail Rotor Radius RT 0.33 m
Tail Rotor Tip Speed 125.74 m/s *Assumed approximately equal to Main Rotor Tip Speed
Tail Rotor Rotational Speed, ΩT 379.57 rad/sec
3625.30 RPM  
 
 163
Stage VI: Drag In Forward Flight
Parasite Drag
Gross Weight, Wg 610.84 kg
External Mission System Weight, Wms(ext) 16 kg
Parasite Drag-Gross Weight Constant, k 8.18E-03
Clean Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(clean) 0.00804
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Viscosity (Sea Level) 1.79E-05 kg/m.s
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
External System Diameter, d (m) Length, l (m)
Form Factor, 
λf
Reynold's 
Number, Re
Friction 
Coefficient, Cf
System Parasite Drag 
Coefficient, Cdp(sys)
Raven Eye I (Portion In Airstream) 0.26 0.26 9.50000 1.007E+06 5.097E-03 0.05568
Mini-Pointer/Tracker Turret Ball 0.14 0.14 9.50000 5.412E+05 1.767E-03 0.01931
EACH Landing Gear Skid 0.05 2.50 1.00430 9.684E+06 3.488E-03 0.00403
0.08304
Total Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09108
Profile Drag
Method 1
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Slope Of Lift Curve, a 6
Average Angle Of Attack, αav 0.17 rad-1
9.74 deg-1
Speed Of Sound, a 340 m/s
Rotor Radius, R 2.18 m
Rotational Speed, Ω 549.93 RPM
Mach At 75% Chord, M(0.75) 0.28
Check 'NACA 0012 Aerofoil' Figure
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01900
Method 2
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02240
Method 3
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01867
Average Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Total External Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(ext)
 
 
Stage VII: Power Required
In Forward Flight For Maximum Speed
Gross Weight, Wg 610.84 kg
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Disk Area, AD 14.98 m2
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09108
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Power Required, Pf 168907 W
169 kW
Miscellaneous Power Required, Pm 20.0 % of Pf
34 kW
Total Power Required, Pf 203 kW  
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Stage VIII: Refinement Of Gross Weight
*Assumed that the use of composite materials and advanced technology reduces structural weights by approximately 25%
Number Of Blades, b 5 5 Horizontal Stabiliser Area, AH 0.26 m2 2.82 ft2
Chord, c 0.182 m 0.60 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARH 5.67 5.67
Main Rotor Radius, RM 2.18 m 7.16 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 3.27 lbs
Rotational Speed, Ω 57.58 rad/sec Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 1.48 kg
Tip Speed, VT or (ΩR) 125.74 m/s 412.54 ft/s
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 49.27 lbs Vertical Stabiliser Area, AV 0.40 m2 4.32 ft2
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 22.35 kg Vertical Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARV 1.33 1.33
Number Of Tail Rotor Gear Boxes, Ntgb 1 1
Gravitational Acceleration, g 9.81 m/s2 32.19 ft/s2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 3.62 lbs
Polar Moment Of Inertia, J 53.29 kg.m2 39.30 slug.ft2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 1.64 kg
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 20.70 lbs
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 9.39 kg Tail Rotor Radius, RT 0.33 m 1.09 ft
Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.59 lbs
Gross Weight, Wg 610.84 kg 1346.67 lbs Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.27 kg
Fuselage Length, LF 7.78 m 25.52 ft
Fuselage Wetted Area, SwetF 4.70 m2 50.55 ft2 Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 40.90 lbs
Fuselage Weight, WF 115.19 lbs Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 18.55 kg
Fuselage Weight, WF 52.25 kg
Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 8.13 lbs
Number Of Wheel Legs, Nwl 0 0 Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 3.69 kg
Landing Gear Weight, WLG 0.00 lbs
Landing Skids Weight, WLG 5.00 kg Electrical System Weight, WEL 69.62 lbs
*Assumed landing skid weight Electrical System Weight, WEL 31.58 kg
Engine Dry Weight, Weng 123 kg 271.17 lbs
Instruments Weight, WI 5.15 lbs
Number Of Engines, Neng 1 1 Instruments Weight, WI 2.34 kg
Nacelle Wetted Area, SwetN 4.70 m2 50.55 ft2
Nacelle Weight, WN 55.19 lbs Total Weight Estimate 325.74 kg
Nacelle Weight, WN 25.03 kg Mission Systems Weight, Wms 128.38 kg
Fuel Weight, Wf 156.62 kg
Capacity In Gallons 156.62 kg 345.28 lbs Refined Gross Weight, Wg 610.74 kg
Number Of Tanks, Nt 1 1 Iteration 2 - Stage 8 Weight Estimate 610.84 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 38.71 lbs
Difference of Refined Gross Weight to 
Iteration 2 - Stage 8 Weight Estimate -0.10 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 17.56 kg % Difference -0.02 %
Transmission h.p rating, PT 30 h.p *Assumed 10% of power
Engine Revolution Per Minute, RPMeng 2500
Tail Rotor h.p rating 46 h.p
Main Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩM 57.58 rad/sec
Tail Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩT 379.57 rad/sec
Number Of Gear Boxes, Ngb 1
Drive System Weight, WDS 11.61 kg 25.60 lbs  
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Stage VIII: Refinement Of Gross Weight
(Centre Of Gravity Balancing)
Componenets Weight Location From x Datum (mm)
Moment, My 
(Nmm)
Location From y 
Datum (mm)
Moment, Mx 
(Nmm)
Tactical Common Data Link 7.03 1627 11437.81 1500 10545.00
MicroPilot MP2028 0.03 1955 54.74 1657 46.40
ToughDisk 3500 0.59 1930 1138.70 1540 908.60
KN-4073 Digital GPS/INS 3.70 1987 7351.90 1369 5065.30
MRA Mk V 0.40 2197 878.80 1338 535.20
Raven Eye I 16.00 1475 23600.00 1500 24000.00
BuckEye Change Detection 13.61 3140 42729.12 1500 20412.00
AN/AAR-54(V) - Electronics Unit 4.80 2408 11558.40 1500 7200.00
AN/AAR-54(V) - UV Sensor 1 1.75 1844 3227.00 1682 2943.50
AN/AAR-54(V) - UV Sensor 2 1.75 1844 3227.00 1319 2308.25
AN/AAR-54(V) - UV Sensor 3 1.75 3835 6711.25 1500 2625.00
Mini-Pointer/Tracker 25.80 2408 62126.40 1500 38700.00
UAV IFF Transponder 3.18 2070 6572.25 1599 5076.83
PackBot EOD 1 24.00 1404 33696.00 1500 36000.00
PackBot EOD 2 24.00 2309 55416.00 1500 36000.00
Fuel 156.62 3925 614725.65 1500 234927.00
Main Rotor Blade 22.35 3100 69274.42 1500 33519.88
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge 9.39 3100 29102.71 1500 14081.96
Horizontal Stabiliser 1.48 8025 11903.40 1500 2224.94
Vertical Stabiliser 1.64 7600 12484.40 1500 2464.03
Tail Rotor 0.27 7542 2012.68 1500 400.29
Fuselage 52.25 2500 130625.00 1500 78375.00
Landing Gear 5.00 2487 12435.00 1500 7500.00
Engine 123.00 3135 385605.00 1500 184500.00
Nacelle 25.03 3135 78478.66 1500 37549.60
Fuel System 17.56 3352 58861.77 1500 26340.29
Drive System 11.61 3135 36407.74 1500 17419.97
Propulsion Subsystem 18.55 2918 54131.90 1500 27826.54
Hydraulic System 3.69 2500 9214.53 1500 5528.72
Electrical System 31.58 2500 78951.51 1500 47370.91
Instruments Weight 2.34 1255 2933.71 1500 3506.43
Total Weight 610.74 Total Moment, My 1856873.45 Total Moment, Mx 915901.61
x C.G Location 3040.38 y C.G Location 1499.66
Mission 
Systems
Vehicle
 
 
 
 
• Centre-of-Gravity Analysis 
Weight (kg) x C.G Location (m)
Phase 0 - Empty Weight WE 406.12 2.84
Phase 0 - Add UGVs WE+UGV 454.12 2.74
Phase 0 - Add Fuel
Phase 1 - Take-Off Weight
Phase 4 - Pre-UGV Deployment WPre-Dep 571.58 2.98
Phase 4 - UGV Deployment WDep 523.58 3.08
Phase 5 - Mid Counter-IED WMid 484.43 3.02
Phase 7 - Pre-UGV Recovery WPre-Rec 436.57 2.92
Phase 7 - UGV Recovery WRec 484.57 2.81
Phase 9 - Landing Weight (No 
Reserve Fuel)
WE+UGV 454.12 2.74
Phase 9 - Remove UGVs WE 406.12 2.84
WTO 610.74 3.04
Mission Phase
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E.2 Platform-Centric – VTUAV Design Process:  
Computational Format 
• Iteration 1 
Mission Systems Weight Estimate
Internal External
Weight (kg) Weight (kg)
Data Link 7.030
0.028
0.590
3.700
0.400
16.000
13.608
Electronics Unit 4.800
UV Sensor 1 1.750
UV Sensor 2 1.750
UV Sensor 3 1.750
25.800
3.175
64.381
16.000
Defensive 
Systems
BuckEye Change Detection System
AN/AAR-54(V) 
Missile 
Warning 
System
Mini-Pointer/Tracker
UAV IFF Transponder
80.381
Total Internal Weight, Wms(int)
Total External Weight, Wms(ext)
Total Mission System Weight, Wms
Computer
Navigation
Sensors
Mission Systems
Tactical Common Data Link
MicroPilot MP2028
ToughDisk 3500
KN-4073 Digital GPS/INS
MRA Mk V
Raven Eye I
 
 
Stage I: Weight and Power
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 80.38 kg
First Gross Weight Estimate, Wg 346.90 kg
First Installed Power Estimate, Pi 78.90 kW  
 
Stage II: Fuel
Reserve Fuel 10 % of Wf
Pipeline Fuel 3 % of Wf
Flight Stages Time (mins) Power (kW) sfc (kg/kW-hr) Fuel Used (kg)
Take-Off 5 78.90 0.24 1.58
Transit 25 78.90 0.24 7.89
Counter-IED 80 78.90 0.24 25.25
Transit 25 78.90 0.24 7.89
Landing 5 78.90 0.24 1.58
Reserve Fuel 4.42
Pipeline Fuel 1.33
SUB TOTAL 140 44.18
TOTAL FUEL WEIGHT, Wf 49.93  
 
Stage III: Weight
Fuel Weight, Wf 49.93 kg
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 80.38 kg
Crew Weight, Wc 0.00 kg
Personnel Weight, Wp 0.00 kg
Total Useful Weight, Wu 130.31 kg
Chronological Ratio of Useful Weight 
to Gross Weight, Wu/Wg
0.44
Gross Weight Based on 
Chronological Data, Wg
296.16 kg
Stage 1 Weight Estimate 346.90 kg
Difference of Gross Weight to Stage 
1 Weight Estimate -50.74 kg
% Difference -17.13 %  
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Stage IV: Vertical Drag
Sector Area (m2)
A 0.142
B 2.106
C 0.440
D 0.434
E Not In Remote Wake
F Not In Remote Wake
Total Projected Area, Ap 3.122
Drag Coefficient, CD 0.3
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Vertical Drag, DV 413.45 N
Vertical Drag, DV 42.15 kg  
 
Stage V: Main Rotor System
Rotor Size
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Gross Weight, Wg 296.16 kg
Vertical Drag, DV 42.15 kg
Disk Area, AD 7.52 m2
Main Rotor Radius, RM 1.55 m
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 3.09 m
Tip Speed
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Forward Speed, VF 110.00 knots
56.58 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 412.56 ft/s
Rotational Speed, Ω 81.28 rad/sec
776.35 RPM
Solidity And Number Of Blades
Apect Ratio, AR 12
Chord, c 0.129 m
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Coefficient Of Thrust, CT 0.0228
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Number Of Blades, b 5.05
Number Of Blades (Actual), b 5
Tail Rotor
Disk Loading, DL 9.22 lb/ft2
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 10.15 ft
Tail Rotor Diameter, DT 2.18 ft
0.66 m
Tail Rotor Radius RT 0.33 m
Tail Rotor Tip Speed 125.74 m/s *Assumed approximately equal to Main Rotor Tip Speed
Tail Rotor Rotational Speed, ΩT 378.91 rad/sec
3618.95 RPM  
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Stage VI: Drag In Forward Flight
Parasite Drag
Gross Weight, Wg 296.16 kg
External Mission System Weight, Wms(ext) 16 kg
Parasite Drag-Gross Weight Constant, k 8.18E-03
Clean Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(clean) 0.00788
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Viscosity (Sea Level) 1.79E-05 kg/m.s
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
External System Diameter, d (m) Length, l (m)
Form Factor, 
λf
Reynold's 
Number, Re
Friction 
Coefficient, Cf
System Parasite Drag 
Coefficient, Cdp(sys)
Raven Eye I (Portion In Airstream) 0.26 0.26 9.50000 1.007E+06 5.097E-03 0.05568
Mini-Pointer/Tracker Turret Ball 0.14 0.14 9.50000 5.412E+05 1.767E-03 0.01931
EACH Landing Gear Skid 0.05 1.90 1.00653 7.360E+06 3.642E-03 0.00422
0.08342
Total Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09130
Profile Drag
Method 1
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Slope Of Lift Curve, a 6
Average Angle Of Attack, αav 0.17 rad-1
9.74 deg-1
Speed Of Sound, a 340 m/s
Rotor Radius, R 1.55 m
Rotational Speed, Ω 776.35 RPM
Mach At 75% Chord, M(0.75) 0.28
Check 'NACA 0012 Aerofoil' Figure
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01900
Method 2
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02240
Method 3
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01867
Average Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Total External Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(ext)
 
 
Stage VII: Power Required
In Forward Flight For Maximum Speed
Gross Weight, Wg 296.16 kg
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Disk Area, AD 7.52 m2
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09130
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Power Required, Pf 84358 W
84 kW
Miscellaneous Power Required, Pm 20.0 % of Pf
17 kW
Total Power Required, Pf 101 kW  
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• Iteration 2 
Stage I: Weight and Power
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 80.38 kg
Gross Weight Estimate, Wg 296.16 kg *Taken from Iteration 1 Stage 3 Weight
Installed Power Estimate, Pi 110.00 kW *Zoche ZO 01A installed power  
 
Stage II: Fuel
Reserve Fuel 10 % of Wf
Pipeline Fuel 3 % of Wf
*Zoche ZO 01A installed power & sfc
Flight Stages Time (mins) Power (kW) sfc (kg/kW-hr) Fuel Used (kg)
Take-Off 5 110.00 0.21 1.93
Transit 25 110.00 0.21 9.63
Counter-IED 80 110.00 0.21 30.80
Transit 25 110.00 0.21 9.63
Landing 5 110.00 0.21 1.93
Reserve Fuel 5.39
Pipeline Fuel 1.62
SUB TOTAL 140 53.90
TOTAL FUEL WEIGHT, Wf 60.91  
 
Stage III: Weight
Fuel Weight, Wf 60.91 kg
Mission Systems Weight, Wms 80.38 kg
Crew Weight, Wc 0.00 kg
Personnel Weight, Wp 0.00 kg
Total Useful Weight, Wu 141.29 kg
Chronological Ratio of Useful Weight 
to Gross Weight, Wu/Wg
0.44
Gross Weight Based on 
Chronological Data, Wg
321.11 kg
Iteration 1 Weight Estimate 296.16 kg
Difference of Gross Weight to 
Iteration 1 Weight Estimate 24.95 kg
% Difference 7.77 %  
 
Stage IV: Vertical Drag
Sector Area (m2) *Based on Iteration 1 Rotor Radius
A 0.142
B 2.106
C 0.440
D 0.073
E Not In Remote Wake
F Not In Remote Wake
Total Projected Area, Ap 2.761
Drag Coefficient, CD 0.3
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Vertical Drag, DV 365.69 N
Vertical Drag, DV 37.28 kg  
 
 170
Stage V: Main Rotor System
Rotor Size
Disk Loading, DL 45 kg/m2
Gross Weight, Wg 321.11 kg
Vertical Drag, DV 37.28 kg
Disk Area, AD 7.96 m2
Main Rotor Radius, RM 1.59 m
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 3.18 m
Tip Speed
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Forward Speed, VF 110.00 knots
56.58 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 412.56 ft/s
Rotational Speed, Ω 78.97 rad/sec
754.28 RPM
Solidity And Number Of Blades
Apect Ratio, AR 12
Chord, c 0.133 m
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Coefficient Of Thrust, CT 0.0228
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Number Of Blades, b 5.05
Number Of Blades (Actual), b 5
Tail Rotor
Disk Loading, DL 9.22 lb/ft2
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 10.45 ft
Tail Rotor Diameter, DT 1.58 ft *Fenestron design: ≈ DT/√2
0.48 m
Tail Rotor Radius RT 0.24 m
Tail Rotor Tip Speed 125.74 m/s *Assumed approximately equal to Main Rotor Tip Speed
Tail Rotor Rotational Speed, ΩT 520.63 rad/sec
4972.50 RPM  
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Stage VI: Drag In Forward Flight
Parasite Drag
Gross Weight, Wg 321.11 kg
External Mission System Weight, Wms(ext) 16 kg
Parasite Drag-Gross Weight Constant, k 8.18E-03
Clean Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(clean) 0.00791
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Viscosity (Sea Level) 1.79E-05 kg/m.s
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
External System Diameter, d (m) Length, l (m)
Form Factor, 
λf
Reynold's 
Number, Re
Friction 
Coefficient, Cf
System Parasite Drag 
Coefficient, Cdp(sys)
Raven Eye I (Portion In Airstream) 0.26 0.26 9.50000 1.007E+06 5.097E-03 0.05568
Mini-Pointer/Tracker Turret Ball 0.14 0.14 9.50000 5.412E+05 1.767E-03 0.01931
EACH Landing Gear Skid 0.05 1.90 1.00653 7.360E+06 3.642E-03 0.00422
0.08342
Total Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09132
Profile Drag
Method 1
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Slope Of Lift Curve, a 6
Average Angle Of Attack, αav 0.17 rad-1
9.74 deg-1
Speed Of Sound, a 340 m/s
Rotor Radius, R 1.59 m
Rotational Speed, Ω 754.28 RPM
Mach At 75% Chord, M(0.75) 0.28
Check 'NACA 0012 Aerofoil' Figure
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01900
Method 2
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02240
Method 3
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01867
Average Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Total External Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(ext)
 
 
Stage VII: Power Required
In Forward Flight For Maximum Speed
Gross Weight, Wg 321.11 kg
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Solidity, σ 0.1341
Disk Area, AD 7.96 m2
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09132
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Power Required, Pf 89794 W
90 kW
Miscellaneous Power Required, Pm 20.0 % of Pf
18 kW
Total Power Required, Pf 108 kW  
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Stage VIII: Refinement Of Gross Weight
*Assumed that the use of composite materials and advanced technology reduces structural weights by approximately 25%
Number Of Blades, b 5 5 Horizontal Stabiliser Area, AH 0.21 m2 2.22 ft2
Chord, c 0.133 m 0.44 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARH 5.04 5.04
Main Rotor Radius, RM 1.59 m 5.22 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 2.36 lbs
Rotational Speed, Ω 78.97 rad/sec Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 1.07 kg
Tip Speed, VT or (ΩR) 125.74 m/s 412.54 ft/s
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 23.82 lbs Vertical Stabiliser Area, AV 0.21 m
2 2.25 ft2
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 10.80 kg Vertical Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARV 1.20 1.20
Number Of Tail Rotor Gear Boxes, Ntgb 1 1
Gravitational Acceleration, g 9.81 m/s2 32.19 ft/s2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 1.85 lbs
Polar Moment Of Inertia, J 13.69 kg.m2 10.10 slug.ft2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 0.84 kg
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 8.64 lbs
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 3.92 kg Tail Rotor Radius, RT 0.24 m 0.79 ft
Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.23 lbs
Gross Weight, Wg 321.11 kg 707.92 lbs Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.10 kg
Fuselage Length, LF 5.35 m 17.54 ft
Fuselage Wetted Area, SwetF 2.76 m2 29.72 ft2 Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 32.66 lbs
Fuselage Weight, WF 58.55 lbs Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 14.81 kg
Fuselage Weight, WF 26.56 kg
Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 5.39 lbs
Number Of Wheel Legs, Nwl 0 0 Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 2.44 kg
Landing Gear Weight, WLG 0.00 lbs
Landing Skids Weight, WLG 5.00 kg Electrical System Weight, WEL 58.69 lbs
*Assumed landing skid weight Electrical System Weight, WEL 26.62 kg
Engine Dry Weight, Weng 84 kg 185.19 lbs
Instruments Weight, WI 2.23 lbs
Number Of Engines, Neng 1 1 Instruments Weight, WI 1.01 kg
Nacelle Wetted Area, SwetN 2.76 m2 29.72 ft2
Nacelle Weight, WN 29.95 lbs Total Weight Estimate 204.66 kg
Nacelle Weight, WN 13.58 kg Mission Systems Weight, Wms 80.38 kg
Fuel Weight, Wf 60.91 kg
Capacity In Gallons 60.91 kg 134.28 lbs Refined Gross Weight, Wg 345.95 kg
Number Of Tanks, Nt 1 1 Stage 3 Weight Estimate 321.11 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 18.71 lbs
Difference of Refined Gross Weight to 
Stage 3 Weight Estimate 24.84 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 8.49 kg % Difference 7.18 %
Transmission h.p rating, PT 15 h.p *Assumed 10% of power
Engine Revolution Per Minute, RPMeng 2500
Tail Rotor h.p rating 24 h.p
Main Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩM 78.97 rad/sec
Tail Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩT 520.63 rad/sec
Number Of Gear Boxes, Ngb 1
Drive System Weight, WDS 5.40 kg 11.90 lbs  
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• Iteration 3 
Stage IV: Vertical Drag
Sector Area (m2) *Based on Iteration 2 Rotor Radius
A 0.142
B 2.106
C 0.440
D 0.096
E Not In Remote Wake
F Not In Remote Wake
Total Projected Area, Ap 2.785
Drag Coefficient, CD 0.3
Disk Loading, DL 50 kg/m2
Vertical Drag, DV 409.75 N
Vertical Drag, DV 41.77 kg  
 
Stage V: Main Rotor System
Rotor Size
Disk Loading, DL 50 kg/m2
Gross Weight, Wg 345.95 kg
Vertical Drag, DV 41.77 kg
Disk Area, AD 7.75 m2
Main Rotor Radius, RM 1.57 m
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 3.14 m
Tip Speed
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Forward Speed, VF 110.00 knots
56.58 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed, VT 412.56 ft/s
Rotational Speed, Ω 80.04 rad/sec
764.42 RPM
Solidity And Number Of Blades
Apect Ratio, AR 12
Chord, c 0.131 m
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Coefficient Of Thrust, CT 0.0253
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Solidity, σ 0.1490
Number Of Blades, b 5.62
Number Of Blades (Actual), b 6
Tail Rotor
Disk Loading, DL 10.24 lb/ft2
Main Rotor Diameter, DM 10.31 ft
Tail Rotor Diameter, DT 1.66 ft *Fenestron design: ≈ DT/√2
0.51 m
Tail Rotor Radius RT 0.25 m
Tail Rotor Tip Speed 125.74 m/s *Assumed approximately equal to Main Rotor Tip Speed
Tail Rotor Rotational Speed, ΩT 496.32 rad/sec
4740.39 RPM  
 
 174
Stage VI: Drag In Forward Flight
Parasite Drag
Gross Weight, Wg 345.95 kg
External Mission System Weight, Wms(ext) 16 kg
Parasite Drag-Gross Weight Constant, k 8.18E-03
Clean Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(clean) 0.00793
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Viscosity (Sea Level) 1.79E-05 kg/m.s
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
External System Diameter, d (m) Length, l (m)
Form Factor, 
λf
Reynold's 
Number, Re
Friction 
Coefficient, Cf
System Parasite Drag 
Coefficient, Cdp(sys)
Raven Eye I (Portion In Airstream) 0.26 0.26 9.50000 1.007E+06 5.097E-03 0.05568
Mini-Pointer/Tracker Turret Ball 0.14 0.14 9.50000 5.412E+05 1.767E-03 0.01931
EACH Landing Gear Skid 0.05 1.90 1.00653 7.360E+06 3.642E-03 0.00422
0.08342
Total Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09134
Profile Drag
Method 1
Coefficient Of Thrust/Solidity, CT/σ 0.1700
Slope Of Lift Curve, a 6
Average Angle Of Attack, αav 0.17 rad-1
9.74 deg-1
Speed Of Sound, a 340 m/s
Rotor Radius, R 1.57 m
Rotational Speed, Ω 764.42 RPM
Mach At 75% Chord, M(0.75) 0.28
Check 'NACA 0012 Aerofoil' Figure
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01900
Method 2
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02240
Method 3
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.01867
Average Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Total External Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp(ext)
 
 
Stage VII: Power Required
In Forward Flight For Maximum Speed
Gross Weight, Wg 345.95 kg
Density (Sea Level), ρ 1.225 kg/m3
Solidity, σ 0.1490
Disk Area, AD 7.75 m2
Forward Speed, VF 56.58 m/s
Profile Drag Coefficient, Cdo 0.02002
Parasite Drag Coefficient, Cdp 0.09134
Tip Speed, VT 125.74 m/s
Tip Speed Ratio, μ 0.45
Power Required, Pf 89420 W
89 kW
Miscellaneous Power Required, Pm 20.0 % of Pf
18 kW
Total Power Required, Pf 107 kW  
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Stage VIII: Refinement Of Gross Weight
*Assumed that the use of composite materials and advanced technology reduces structural weights by approximately 25%
Number Of Blades, b 6 6 Horizontal Stabiliser Area, AH 0.21 m2 2.22 ft2
Chord, c 0.131 m 0.43 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARH 5.04 5.04
Main Rotor Radius, RM 1.57 m 5.15 ft Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 2.36 lbs
Rotational Speed, Ω 80.04 rad/sec Horizontal Stabiliser Weight, WH 1.07 kg
Tip Speed, VT or (ΩR) 125.74 m/s 412.54 ft/s
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 26.05 lbs Vertical Stabiliser Area, AV 0.21 m2 2.25 ft2
Main Rotor Blade Weight, WbM 11.82 kg Vertical Stabiliser Aspect Ratio, ARV 1.20 1.20
Number Of Tail Rotor Gear Boxes, Ntgb 1 1
Gravitational Acceleration, g 9.81 m/s2 32.19 ft/s2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 1.85 lbs
Polar Moment Of Inertia, J 14.58 kg.m2 10.76 slug.ft2 Vertical Stabiliser Weight, WV 0.84 kg
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 9.36 lbs
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge Weight, WhM 4.25 kg Tail Rotor Radius, RT 0.25 m 0.83 ft
Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.23 lbs
Gross Weight, Wg 345.95 kg 762.69 lbs Tail Rotor Weight, WT 0.10 kg
Fuselage Length, LF 5.35 m 17.54 ft
Fuselage Wetted Area, SwetF 2.78 m2 29.97 ft2 Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 32.66 lbs
Fuselage Weight, WF 60.85 lbs Propulsion Subsystem Weight, WPSS 14.81 kg
Fuselage Weight, WF 27.60 kg
Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 5.94 lbs
Number Of Wheel Legs, Nwl 0 0 Hydraulic System Weight, Whyd 2.69 kg
Landing Gear Weight, WLG 0.00 lbs
Landing Skids Weight, WLG 5.00 kg Electrical System Weight, WEL 56.26 lbs
*Assumed landing skid weight Electrical System Weight, WEL 25.52 kg
Engine Dry Weight, Weng 84 kg 185.19 lbs
Instruments Weight, WI 2.46 lbs
Number Of Engines, Neng 1 1 Instruments Weight, WI 1.12 kg
Nacelle Wetted Area, SwetN 2.78 m2 29.97 ft2
Nacelle Weight, WN 30.17 lbs Total Weight Estimate 206.37 kg
Nacelle Weight, WN 13.69 kg Mission Systems Weight, Wms 80.38 kg
Fuel Weight, Wf 60.91 kg
Capacity In Gallons 60.91 kg 134.28 lbs Refined Gross Weight, Wg 347.66 kg
Number Of Tanks, Nt 1 1 Iteration 2 - Stage 8 Weight Estimate 345.95 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 18.71 lbs
Difference of Refined Gross Weight to 
Iteration 2 - Stage 8 Weight Estimate 1.71 kg
Fuel System Weight, WFS 8.49 kg % Difference 0.49 %
Transmission h.p rating, PT 15 h.p *Assumed 10% of power
Engine Revolution Per Minute, RPMeng 2500
Tail Rotor h.p rating 24 h.p
Main Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩM 80.04 rad/sec
Tail Rotor Rotaional Speed, ΩT 496.32 rad/sec
Number Of Gear Boxes, Ngb 1
Drive System Weight, WDS 5.37 kg 11.84 lbs  
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Stage VIII: Refinement Of Gross Weight
(Centre Of Gravity Balancing)
Componenets Weight Location From x Datum (mm)
Moment, My 
(Nmm)
Location From y 
Datum (mm)
Moment, Mx 
(Nmm)
Tactical Common Data Link 7.03 2002 14074.06 1500 10545.00
MicroPilot MP2028 0.03 2500 70.00 1657 46.40
ToughDisk 3500 0.59 2523 1488.57 1500 885.00
KN-4073 Digital GPS/INS 3.70 2291 8476.70 1382 5113.40
MRA Mk V 0.40 2500 1000.00 1337 534.80
Raven Eye I 16.00 1900 30400.00 1500 24000.00
BuckEye Change Detection 13.61 2525 34360.20 1500 20412.00
AN/AAR-54(V) - Electronics Unit 4.80 2293 11006.40 1630 7824.00
AN/AAR-54(V) - UV Sensor 1 1.75 2219 3883.25 1682 2943.50
AN/AAR-54(V) - UV Sensor 2 1.75 2219 3883.25 1319 2308.25
AN/AAR-54(V) - UV Sensor 3 1.75 3700 6475.00 1500 2625.00
Mini-Pointer/Tracker 25.80 3100 79980.00 1500 38700.00
UAV IFF Transponder 3.18 2667 8467.73 1500 4762.50
Fuel 60.91 3840 233882.88 1500 91360.50
Main Rotor Blade 11.82 3100 36632.99 1500 17725.64
Main Rotor Hub & Hinge 4.25 3100 13163.75 1500 6369.56
Horizontal Stabiliser 1.07 6795 7285.12 1500 1608.19
Vertical Stabiliser 0.84 6655 5598.26 1500 1261.82
Tail Rotor 0.10 6570 681.90 1500 155.69
Fuselage 27.60 3030 83637.26 1500 41404.58
Landing Gear 5.00 2850 14250.00 1500 7500.00
Engine 84.00 3100 260400.00 1500 126000.00
Nacelle 13.69 3100 42427.76 1500 20529.56
Fuel System 8.49 3635 30846.04 1500 12728.76
Drive System 5.37 3095 16623.75 1500 8056.74
Propulsion Subsystem 14.81 2645 39180.90 1500 22219.79
Hydraulic System 2.69 3030 8164.43 1500 4041.80
Electrical System 25.52 3030 77322.58 1500 38278.50
Instruments Weight 1.12 1875 2093.08 1500 1674.47
Total Weight 347.66 Total Moment, My 1075755.85 Total Moment, Mx 521615.45
x C.G Location 3094.29 y C.G Location 1500.37
Mission 
Systems
Vehicle
 
 
 
 
 
• Centre-of-Gravity Analysis 
Weight (kg) x C.G Location (m)
Phase 0 - Empty Weight WE 286.75 2.94
Phase 0 - Add Fuel
Phase 1 - Take-Off Weight
Phase 3 - Mid Counter-IED WMid 317.20 3.02
Phase 5 - Landing Weight (No 
Reserve Fuel)
WE 286.75 2.94
WTO 347.66 3.09
Mission Phase
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Appendix F 
 
LOCALISATION ACCURACY ANALYSIS 
F.1 Localisation (z-value) Random Sample Data & Bayesian 
Theorem Fused Localisation 
Sigma Sqr = 3.0000 Sigma Sqr = 2.0000 Sigma Sqr = 3.0000 Sigma Sqr = 0.8571
Sigma = 1.7321 Sigma = 1.4142 Sigma = 1.7321 Sigma = 0.9258
z = 1.9270 z = 0.5638 z = 1.9687 z = 1.6018
5.3300 -2.2660 -1.0067 1.0547
-4.5552 -1.3686 -0.4352 -2.2135
-1.8382 -2.4682 -1.8026 -1.9824
-3.0995 0.9581 -0.4637 -1.0967
-0.6660 0.2302 -6.7006 -2.7049
-2.2245 -0.0669 -0.4006 -1.0012
0.2895 1.1310 -3.9876 -1.1040
-3.2713 -0.0169 0.4697 -1.0548
2.9137 -0.4555 1.5091 1.5447
0.2575 -0.4026 3.9513 1.4776
1.9978 -3.4878 -1.8579 -0.8195
2.9023 1.6006 -3.3200 0.2435 Extract 1
0.5000 0.9169 0.4391 0.5814
-3.4488 -2.9276 -0.6943 -2.2855
-0.1248 2.4128 -0.6249 0.3221
-1.7208 -4.6681 4.7316 -0.0380
2.7534 0.0988 0.1131 1.0996
-2.3385 -2.5630 -0.3379 -1.6444
1.4927 -3.7509 6.3625 2.0080
4.2798 -2.1452 -1.8922 0.3591
0.7385 0.2339 3.8134 1.7654
6.7661 -1.1835 -0.0460 2.2242
3.2362 -1.5246 -0.1933 0.7599
2.1645 0.2856 4.8305 2.6945
Bayesian TheoremLocalisation (z-value) Random Sample Data
Ground Sensor 2 
Localisation (z-value)
Ground Sensor 1 
Localisation (z-value)
Airborne Sensor 
Localisation (z-value) Fused Localisation (z-value)
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-5.4983 1.6129 1.0879 -1.2507
-3.2096 0.7046 1.3112 -0.5358
5.6464 -1.6973 -0.7054 1.4286
2.7883 -0.1509 2.0500 1.7766
-1.1417 0.0299 -0.2059 -0.4979
1.6046 -1.6017 -2.2082 -0.6268
1.8512 -3.3425 -3.2926 -1.3762
-2.2986 7.4832 0.6111 1.2380
-4.7039 -0.9953 -2.9440 -3.1168
-5.3101 1.2885 5.8187 0.5129
3.6493 -1.1242 -0.3816 0.9443
1.5117 2.3096 -4.7629 -0.6418
3.0364 -2.1054 0.9483 0.9679 Extract 2
1.2456 -1.1236 2.8717 1.2631
-1.7471 1.1984 -1.1489 -0.7864
-4.4993 -1.8511 -1.9616 -2.8856
0.9643 -0.6945 -4.0992 -1.3492
0.3812 0.9315 -1.0059 -0.0014
-3.2863 -0.7085 -0.4911 -1.5937
-6.5384 1.4339 1.7138 -1.4508
-2.7128 1.1602 -1.9121 -1.4443
0.5114 3.4205 -1.0385 0.6574
-1.1107 0.8708 0.8578 0.1228
2.8987 0.2386 -0.9931 0.7742
-0.9578 0.0262 0.6367 -0.1139  
2.9211 -0.3725 -7.4215 -1.7808
1.3728 -3.4560 -0.2066 -0.4267
0.3932 -1.1948 0.7406 0.1265
-5.8052 -1.7964 6.3495 -0.2450
3.7077 0.3866 -4.5757 -0.2288
-3.0940 1.0416 -4.6759 -2.6533
-3.1508 3.4649 -6.9143 -2.9082
-1.4047 -1.4203 3.5168 0.4369
-0.9512 2.6628 7.1231 2.9802
2.7622 1.6818 -1.1699 1.0176
-3.3476 0.6412 -3.0025 -2.2210
-1.6464 0.2302 1.6440 0.0567
4.3833 -0.5176 1.9770 2.2557 Extract 3
-7.7076 -2.7277 -2.5562 -4.5309
-1.3545 0.2136 2.4279 0.4559
1.3507 -0.8063 1.9807 1.0477
-1.5643 1.2284 -0.6224 -0.5129
-3.7980 1.7216 -4.6445 -2.7355
-4.7605 0.2921 3.0383 -0.5728
-0.8325 1.7752 2.2903 0.9905
-0.0791 0.9135 -1.0515 -0.1956
-1.3535 -1.6284 -2.0724 -1.6918
0.7702 1.2633 2.5880 1.5752
-0.9824 1.7636 1.0405 0.4627
4.1995 -4.4062 1.6688 1.0991  
 179
-1.9596 -0.5046 6.2577 1.4856
-3.3107 2.8840 0.8201 -0.2130
2.3927 -4.1041 -2.2439 -0.9702
-2.2780 2.6982 1.4389 0.3599
2.3628 1.9244 -3.6856 -0.0150
5.4703 -0.3834 1.6968 2.5918
1.4849 -0.4368 -0.4695 0.2716
1.0774 -1.9435 0.8966 0.2544
-1.2516 -1.7114 1.0712 -0.4955
-1.1692 -0.5147 0.3939 -0.4194
-2.0700 3.2607 -0.8158 -0.2670
0.4122 -1.6027 -4.0421 -1.7619
-5.3411 -2.5310 5.4910 -0.5765 Extract 4
1.1250 -1.6235 4.7931 1.8134
2.8242 2.4979 3.1465 2.8635
-2.2136 -1.0269 -4.4340 -2.7496
5.2087 1.6496 -3.3519 1.1087
-3.3566 -1.0620 1.5980 -0.9250
0.0954 3.2070 0.2206 0.9202
-2.0430 1.5445 -0.0270 -0.3901
-2.8192 1.1165 0.4837 -0.5967
-2.5198 1.7160 -5.6451 -2.6328
0.8530 1.5698 -0.7702 0.4235
1.1034 1.7441 -2.8138 -0.2054
1.1534 -2.1588 -2.9927 -1.2295  
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F.2 Probability Distributions 
 (Extract from full sample) 
• Extract 1 
Probability Distribution
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
-10.00 -8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00
Location Points, x (m)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Ground Sensor 1 Prob Airborne Sensor Prob Ground Sensor 2 Prob Fused Probability
Real Target Location
x = 0m
z = 2.9023
σ = 1.7321
zFus = 0.2435
σFus = 0.9258
z = 1.6006
σ = 1.4142
z = -3.3200
σ = 1.7321
 
 
• Extract 2 
Probability Distribution
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
-10.00 -8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00
Location Points, x (m)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Ground Sensor 1 Prob Airborne Sensor Prob Ground Sensor 2 Prob Fused Probability
Real Target Location
x = 0m
z = 3.0364
σ = 1.7321
z = 0.9483
σ = 1.7321
zFus = 0.9679
σFus = 0.9258
z = -2.1054
σ = 1.4142
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 • Extract 3 
Probability Distribution
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
-10.00 -8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00
Location Points, x (m)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Ground Sensor 1 Prob Airborne Sensor Prob Ground Sensor 2 Prob Fused Probability
Real Target Location
x = 0m
z = 4.3833
σ = 1.7321
z = 1.9770
σ = 1.7321
zFus = 2.2557
σFus = 0.9258
z = -0.5176
σ = 1.4142
 
 
• Extract 4 
Probability Distribution
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
-10.00 -8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00
Location Points, x (m)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Ground Sensor 1 Prob Airborne Sensor Prob Ground Sensor 2 Prob Fused Probability
Real Target Location
x = 0m
z = -5.3411
σ = 1.7321
zFus = -0.5765
σFus = 0.9258
z = -2.5310
σ = 1.4142
z = 5.4910
σ = 1.7321
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Appendix G 
 
ASSESSMENT MATRICES 
G.1 Confirmation Capability 
• OC1 
High +2  Confirmation Capability 
Med +4  Very Low 2 - 4 
Sensor False 
Alarm Rate 
Low +6  Low 5 - 7 
Very Far +0  Medium 8 - 12 
Far +2  High 13 - 15 
Moderate +4  Very High 16 - 18 
Inspection 
Distance 
Close-In +6    
N/A +0    
Low +2    
Med +4    
Probe/ 
Manipulation 
Capability 
High +6    
 
• OC2 
High +2  Confirmation Capability 
Med +4  Very Low 2 - 4 
Sensor False 
Alarm Rate 
Low +6  Low 5 - 7 
Very Far +0  Medium 8 - 12 
Far +2  High 13 - 15 
Moderate +4  Very High 16 - 18 
Inspection 
Distance 
Close-In +6    
N/A +0    
Low +2    
Med +4    
Probe/ 
Manipulation 
Capability 
High +6    
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G.2 Situational Awareness 
• OC1 
N/A +0  Situational Awareness Level 
Low +2  Very Low 0 - 3 
Med +4  Low 4 - 7 
Systems in the 
Network 
High +6  Medium 8 - 11 
Never +0  High 12 - 15 
Occasional +2  Very High 16 - 18 
Periodic +4    
Degree-of-
Communication 
Continuous +6    
N/A +0    
Low +2    
Med +4    
Criticality of 
Data 
High +6    
 
• OC2 
N/A +0  Situational Awareness Level 
Low +2  Very Low 0 - 3 
Med +4  Low 4 - 7 
Systems in the 
Network 
High +6  Medium 8 - 11 
Never +0  High 12 - 15 
Occasional +2  Very High 16 - 18 
Periodic +4    
Degree-of-
Communication 
Continuous +6    
N/A +0    
Low +2    
Med +4    
Criticality of 
Data 
High +6    
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G.3 Acoustic Signature 
• OC1 
Low +2  Acoustic Signature 
Med +4  Very Low 10 - 13 
Noise Level 
Based on 
Powerplant Type 
High +6  Low 14 - 17 
Low +2  Medium 18 - 22 
Med +4  High 23 - 26 
Noise Level 
Based on 
Powerplant 
Location High +6  Very High 27 - 30 
Low +2    
Med +4    Tip Speed 
High +6    
Non-squared +2    
Slightly squared +4    Tip Shape 
Highly squared +6    
Yes +2    NOTAR Design 
No +6    
 
• OC2 
Low +2  Acoustic Signature 
Med +4  Very Low 10 - 13 
Noise Level 
Based on 
Powerplant Type 
High +6  Low 14 - 17 
Low +2  Medium 18 - 22 
Med +4  High 23 - 26 
Noise Level 
Based on 
Powerplant 
Location High +6  Very High 27 - 30 
Low +2    
Med +4    Tip Speed 
High +6    
Non-squared +2    
Slightly squared +4    Tip Shape 
Highly squared +6    
Yes +2    NOTAR Design 
No +6    
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G.4 Thermal Signature 
• OC1 
Yes +2  Thermal Signature Heat Mufflers 
No +6  Low 6 - 9 
Yes +2  Medium 10 - 14 Heat Absorbing 
Materials No +6  High 15 - 18 
Yes +2    Air Cooling 
No +6    
 
• OC2 
Yes +2  Thermal Signature Heat Mufflers 
No +6  Low 6 - 9 
Yes +2  Medium 10 - 14 Heat Absorbing 
Materials No +6  High 15 - 18 
Yes +2    Air Cooling 
No +6    
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G.5 Countermeasures Contribution 
• OC1 
Survivability Contribution From Countermeasures 
  Number of Defensive Systems 
Effectiveness None Low Medium High 
Very Low   Very Low     
Low   Low     
Medium None   Medium   
High       High 
Very High   X   Very High 
 
• OC2 
Survivability Contribution From Countermeasures 
  Number of Defensive Systems 
Effectiveness None Low Medium High 
Very Low   Very Low     
Low   Low     
Medium None   Medium   
High       High 
Very High   X   Very High 
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Appendix H 
 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
H.1 Mission Systems Reliability 
VTUAV  Mission System Helicopter Equivalent System Reliability 
Navigation Navigation 0.9530 
Sensor Observation 0.9610 
Computer Fire Control Computer 0.9810 
Defensive Systems Survivability Systems 0.9510 
Weapons Armament 0.9750 
Data Link Communications 0.9640 
Ground Control Equipment - 0.9500* 
(where t = 100 hours) 
* Conservative Estimate: Low Reliability 
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H.2 Total System Reliability – Operational Set-Ups 
• OC1 
Navigation 0.9530
Computer 0.9810
Data Link 0.9640
Ground 0.9500
Navigation1 0.9530 Navigation 0.9530 Navigation2 0.9530
Data Link1 0.9640 Data Link2 0.9640
Sensors1 0.9610 Sensors 0.9610 Sensors2 0.9610
Data Link1 0.9640 Data Link2 0.9640
Computer 0.9810
Data Link 0.9640
Ground 0.9500
Defensive 0.9510 Data Link 0.9640 Sensors 0.9610 0.9999
Computer 0.9810
Defensive 0.9510
Navigation 0.9530
Computer 0.9810
Data Link 0.9640 Computer 0.9810
Ground 0.9500
* 1 denotes System in UGV1, 2 denotes System in UGV2
Reliability = 0.6694 (t = 100 hours)
Failure Rate = 0.0040
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) = 249 Hours
0.9334
0.9997
0.9998
Counter-IED
Threat
Transit/Egress
0.8562
0.8979
0.9329
Transit/Ingress
0.9984
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• OC2 
Navigation 0.9530
Computer 0.9810
Data Link 0.9640
Ground 0.9500
Navigation 0.9530
Sensors 0.9610
Computer 0.9810
Data Link 0.9640
Ground 0.9500
Defensive 0.9510 Data Link 0.9640 Sensors 0.9610 0.9999
Computer 0.9810
Defensive 0.9510
Navigation 0.9530
Computer 0.9810
Data Link 0.9640 Computer 0.9810
Ground 0.9500
Reliability = 0.6134 (t = 100 hours)
Failure Rate = 0.0049
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) = 205 Hours
0.8562
0.8228
Counter-IED
Transit/Ingress
Threat
Transit/Egress
0.9984
0.9329
0.9334
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Appendix I 
 
MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
I.1 Mission Systems Maintainability 
VTUAV Mission System Helicopter Equivalent System Maintainability 
Navigation Navigation 0.1187 
Sensor Observation 0.2525 
Computer Fire Control Computer 0.0346 
Defensive Systems Survivability Systems 0.2917 
Weapons Armament 0.0039 
Data Link Communications 0.1086 
Ground Control Equipment - 0.3000* 
Miscellaneous - 0.2000** 
(where t = 1 hour) 
* Conservative Estimate: Low Maintainability 
** Conservative Estimate: Moderate Maintainability 
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I.2 Total System Maintainability – Failure Combinations Table 
• OC1 
(Extract from full table) 
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Mcc
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x x 0 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x 0 x x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x 0 x 0 0.1086
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x 0 0 x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0.1086
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0.1086
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1086
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x 0 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x 0 x x 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x 0 x 0 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x 0 0 x 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x 0 0 0 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 x 0 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 x x 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 x 0 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 x 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 0 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x x 0 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x 0 x x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x 0 x 0 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x 0 0 x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x 0 0 0 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 x 0 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 0 x x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 0 x 0 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 0 0 x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x 0 0.1086
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 x 0.2000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0.0346
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x x 0 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x 0 x x 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x 0 x 0 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x 0 0 x 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x 0 0 0 0.2525
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x 0 x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x 0 x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000
iVTUAV UGV1 UGV2
 
Mcc Ncc Mcc × Ncc
0.3000 131072 39321.6000
0.1187 256 30.3872
0.2525 8192 2068.4800
0.0346 4 0.1384
0.2917 65536 19116.8512
0.1086 32 3.4752
0.1187 128 15.1936
0.2525 4096 1034.2400
0.0346 2 0.0692
0.2917 32768 9558.4256
0.1086 16 1.7376
0.2000 1024 204.8000
0.1187 64 7.5968
0.2525 2048 517.1200
0.0346 1 0.0346
0.2917 16384 4779.2128
0.1086 8 0.8688
0.2000 512 102.4000
Total 262143 76762.6310
Maintainability = 0.2928 (t = 1 hour)
Repair Rate = 1.2282
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) = 0.8142 Hours
= 48.85 Minutes
U
G
V
1
U
G
V
2
iV
TU
A
V
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• OC2 
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Mcc
x x x x x x 0.3000
x x x x x 0 0.3000
x x x x 0 x 0.3000
x x x x 0 0 0.3000
x x x 0 x x 0.3000
x x x 0 x 0 0.3000
x x x 0 0 x 0.3000
x x x 0 0 0 0.3000
x x 0 x x x 0.3000
x x 0 x x 0 0.3000
x x 0 x 0 x 0.3000
x x 0 x 0 0 0.3000
x x 0 0 x x 0.3000
x x 0 0 x 0 0.3000
x x 0 0 0 x 0.3000
x x 0 0 0 0 0.3000
x 0 x x x x 0.3000
x 0 x x x 0 0.3000
x 0 x x 0 x 0.3000
x 0 x x 0 0 0.3000
x 0 x 0 x x 0.3000
x 0 x 0 x 0 0.3000
x 0 x 0 0 x 0.3000
x 0 x 0 0 0 0.3000
x 0 0 x x x 0.3000
x 0 0 x x 0 0.3000
x 0 0 x 0 x 0.3000
x 0 0 x 0 0 0.3000
x 0 0 0 x x 0.3000
x 0 0 0 x 0 0.3000
x 0 0 0 0 x 0.3000
x 0 0 0 0 0 0.3000
0 x x x x x 0.2917
0 x x x x 0 0.2917
0 x x x 0 x 0.2525
0 x x x 0 0 0.2525
0 x x 0 x x 0.2917
0 x x 0 x 0 0.2917
0 x x 0 0 x 0.2525
0 x x 0 0 0 0.2525
0 x 0 x x x 0.2917
0 x 0 x x 0 0.2917
0 x 0 x 0 x 0.1187
0 x 0 x 0 0 0.1187
0 x 0 0 x x 0.2917
0 x 0 0 x 0 0.2917
0 x 0 0 0 x 0.1187
0 x 0 0 0 0 0.1187
0 0 x x x x 0.2917
0 0 x x x 0 0.2917
0 0 x x 0 x 0.2525
0 0 x x 0 0 0.2525
0 0 x 0 x x 0.2917
0 0 x 0 x 0 0.2917
0 0 x 0 0 x 0.2525
0 0 x 0 0 0 0.2525
0 0 0 x x x 0.2917
0 0 0 x x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 x 0 x 0.1086
0 0 0 x 0 0 0.0346
0 0 0 0 x x 0.2917
0 0 0 0 x 0 0.2917
0 0 0 0 0 x 0.1086
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  
Mcc Ncc Mcc × Ncc
0.3000 32 9.6000
0.1187 4 0.4748
0.2525 8 2.0200
0.0346 1 0.0346
0.2917 16 4.6672
0.1086 2 0.2172
Total 63 17.0138
Maintainability = 0.2701 (t = 1 hour)
Repair Rate = 1.3091
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) = 0.7639 Hours
= 45.83 Minutes
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Appendix J 
 
TOTAL MISSION EFFECTIVENESS 
J.1 Total Mission Effectiveness Functional Hierarchy 
 
Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV
Level V
Total Mission Effectiveness
(TME)
(OC1)
(V)
(SA) (SOR)
(A)
Visual
Situational 
Awareness
Localisation 
Accuracy
Counter-
Measures
Mission Area 
Coverage
(MAC) (LA)
Signature
(SN) (CM)
(OC2)
Operational Concept 2Operational Concept 1
ThermalAcoustic
(T)
Reliability 
Effectiveness
Maintainability 
Effectiveness
Survivability 
Effectiveness
(RE) (ME) (SE)
Stand-Off 
Range
Neutralisation 
Capability
(NC)
Counter-IED 
Effectiveness
(CE)
Confirmation 
Capability
(CC)
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J.2 Functional Level II Pairwise Comparison 
 
Level II Pairwise Comparison - Number of Matrices: 1
Total Mission Effectiveness
Number of Elements 4
Normalized Matrix
(TME) (RE) (ME) (SE) (CE) (TME) (RE) (ME) (SE) (CE) Priority Vector
(RE) 1.00 2.00 0.25 0.14 (RE) 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.09
(ME) 0.50 1.00 0.20 0.13 (ME) 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.06
(SE) 4.00 5.00 1.00 0.33 (SE) 0.32 0.31 0.22 0.21 0.27
(CE) 7.00 8.00 3.00 1.00 (CE) 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.62 0.59
Column Total 12.50 16.00 4.45 1.60
(TME) (RE) (ME) (SE) (CE) Row Sum
(RE) 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.35
(ME) 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.23
(SE) 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.20 1.10
(CE) 0.61 0.45 0.80 0.59 2.45
0.35 0.09 4.01 4.01 + 4.03 + 4.11 + 4.16 16.31
0.23 0.06 4.03 4.00
1.10 0.27 4.11
2.45 0.59 4.16
λmax - n 4.08 - 4.00 0.08
n - 1 4.00 - 1.00 3.00
Random value of the CI for n = 4 is 0.89
0.03
0.89
≈ 4.08
Consistency Index = CI = = 0.03
=
= =
= 2.9%Consistency Ratio = CR = =
λmax =
0.029
/ = 4.00
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J.3 Functional Level III Pairwise Comparison 
 
Level III Pairwise Comparison - Number of Matrices: 2
Survivability Effectiveness
Number of Elements 4
Normalized Matrix
(SE) (SA) (SOR) (SN) (CM) (SE) (SA) (SOR) (SN) (CM) Priority Vector
(SA) 1.00 3.00 0.33 4.00 (SA) 0.22 0.29 0.20 0.29 0.25
(SOR) 0.33 1.00 0.17 2.00 (SOR) 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10
(SN) 3.00 6.00 1.00 7.00 (SN) 0.65 0.57 0.61 0.50 0.58
(CM) 0.25 0.50 0.14 1.00 (CM) 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.07
Column Total 4.58 10.50 1.64 14.00
(SE) (SA) (SOR) (SN) (CM) Row Sum
(SA) 0.25 0.31 0.19 0.26 1.01
(SOR) 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.41
(SN) 0.74 0.62 0.58 0.46 2.40
(CM) 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.26
1.01 0.25 4.08 4.08 + 4.01 + 4.12 + 4.02 16.23
0.41 0.10 4.01 4.00
2.40 0.58 4.12
0.26 0.07 4.02
λmax - n 4.06 - 4.00 0.06
n - 1 4.00 - 1.00 3.00
Random value of the CI for n = 4 is 0.89
0.02
0.89
0.02
0.0217 = 2.2%Consistency Ratio = CR = =
= = = =
/ =
Consistency Index = CI
4.06λmax = = ≈
4.00
 
Counter-IED Effectiveness
Number of Elements 4
Normalized Matrix
(CE) (MAC) (LA) (CC) (NC) (CE) (MAC) (LA) (CC) (NC) Priority Vector
(MAC) 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 (MAC) 0.60 0.66 0.54 0.44 0.56
(LA) 0.33 1.00 3.00 5.00 (LA) 0.20 0.22 0.32 0.31 0.26
(CC) 0.20 0.33 1.00 3.00 (CC) 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.12
(NC) 0.14 0.20 0.33 1.00 (NC) 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06
Column Total 1.68 4.53 9.33 16.00
(CE) (MAC) (LA) (CC) (NC) Row Sum
(MAC) 0.56 0.79 0.61 0.40 2.36
(LA) 0.19 0.26 0.37 0.28 1.10
(CC) 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.49
(NC) 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.23
2.36 0.56 4.22 4.22 + 4.17 + 4.04 + 4.04 16.47
1.10 0.26 4.17 4.00
0.49 0.12 4.04
0.23 0.06 4.04
λmax - n 4.12 - 4.00 0.12
n - 1 4.00 - 1.00 3.00
Random value of the CI for n = 4 is 0.89
0.04
0.89
≈= = 4.12
Consistency Ratio = CR = = 0.0443 = 4.4%
0.04
λmax
/ = 4.00
Consistency Index = CI = = = =
 
 
 
 
 
 196
J.4 Functional Level IV Pairwise Comparison 
 
Level IV Pairwise Comparison - Number of Matrices: 1
Signature
Number of Elements 3
Normalized Matrix
(SN) (V) (A) (T) (SN) (V) (A) (T) Priority Vector
(V) 1.00 7.00 3.00 (V) 0.68 0.58 0.71 0.66
(A) 0.14 1.00 0.25 (A) 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08
(T) 0.33 4.00 1.00 (T) 0.23 0.33 0.24 0.26
Column Total 1.48 12.00 4.25
(SN) (V) (A) (T) Row Sum
(V) 0.66 0.56 0.79 2.01
(A) 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.24
(T) 0.22 0.32 0.26 0.80
2.01 0.66 3.06 3.06 + 3.01 + 3.03 9.10
0.24 / 0.08 = 3.01 3.00
0.80 0.26 3.03
λmax - n 3.03 - 3.00 0.03
n - 1 3.00 - 1.00 2.00
Random value of the CI for n = 3 is 0.52
0.02
0.52
0.0314 = 3.1%Consistency Ratio = CR = =
= = 0.02
λmax =
3.00
=
Consistency Index = CI = =
≈ 3.03
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J.5 Functional Level V Pairwise Comparison 
 
Level V Pairwise Comparison - Number of Matrices: 12
Number of Elements 2
Reliability Effectiveness Thermal
Normalized Matrix Normalized Matrix
(RE) (OC1) (OC2) (RE) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector (T) (OC1) (OC2) (T) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector
(OC1) 1.00 3.00 (OC1) 0.75 0.75 0.75 (OC1) 1.00 1.00 (OC1) 0.50 0.50 0.50
(OC2) 0.33 1.00 (OC2) 0.25 0.25 0.25 (OC2) 1.00 1.00 (OC2) 0.50 0.50 0.50
Column Total 1.33 4.00 Column Total 2.00 2.00
 
Maintainability Effectiveness Counter-Measures
Normalized Matrix Normalized Matrix
(ME) (OC1) (OC2) (ME) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector (CM) (OC1) (OC2) (CM) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector
(OC1) 1.00 0.33 (OC1) 0.25 0.25 0.25 (OC1) 1.00 1.00 (OC1) 0.50 0.50 0.50
(OC2) 3.00 1.00 (OC2) 0.75 0.75 0.75 (OC2) 1.00 1.00 (OC2) 0.50 0.50 0.50
Column Total 4.00 1.33 Column Total 2.00 2.00
 
Situational Awareness Mission Area Coverage
Normalized Matrix Normalized Matrix
(SA) (OC1) (OC2) (SA) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector (MAC) (OC1) (OC2) (MAC) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector
(OC1) 1.00 5.00 (OC1) 0.83 0.83 0.83 (OC1) 1.00 3.00 (OC1) 0.75 0.75 0.75
(OC2) 0.20 1.00 (OC2) 0.17 0.17 0.17 (OC2) 0.33 1.00 (OC2) 0.25 0.25 0.25
Column Total 1.20 6.00 Column Total 1.33 4.00
 
Stand-Off Range Localisation Accuracy
Normalized Matrix Normalized Matrix
(SOR) (OC1) (OC2) (SOR) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector (LA) (OC1) (OC2) (LA) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector
(OC1) 1.00 1.00 (OC1) 0.50 0.50 0.50 (OC1) 1.00 3.00 (OC1) 0.75 0.75 0.75
(OC2) 1.00 1.00 (OC2) 0.50 0.50 0.50 (OC2) 0.33 1.00 (OC2) 0.25 0.25 0.25
Column Total 2.00 2.00 Column Total 1.33 4.00
 
Visual Confirmation Capability
Normalized Matrix Normalized Matrix
(V) (OC1) (OC2) (V) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector (CC) (OC1) (OC2) (CC) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector
(OC1) 1.00 0.50 (OC1) 0.33 0.33 0.33 (OC1) 1.00 6.00 (OC1) 0.86 0.86 0.86
(OC2) 2.00 1.00 (OC2) 0.67 0.67 0.67 (OC2) 0.17 1.00 (OC2) 0.14 0.14 0.14
Column Total 3.00 1.50 Column Total 1.17 7.00
 
Acoustic Neutralisation Capability
Normalized Matrix Normalized Matrix
(A) (OC1) (OC2) (A) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector (NC) (OC1) (OC2) (NC) (OC1) (OC2) Priority Vector
(OC1) 1.00 1.00 (OC1) 0.50 0.50 0.50 (OC1) 1.00 8.00 (OC1) 0.89 0.89 0.89
(OC2) 1.00 1.00 (OC2) 0.50 0.50 0.50 (OC2) 0.13 1.00 (OC2) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Column Total 2.00 2.00 Column Total 1.13 9.00
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J.6 Overall Priority Synthesising 
 
Local Priorities are derived from judgements with respect to a single criteria
Global Priorities are derived from multiplication by the priority of the criteria
Overall priorities for the alternatives are derived by adding its global priorities
Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV
Level V
0.5579 0.2633 0.12190.2481 0.1031 0.5837 0.0652
Operational Concept 1 Operational Concept 2
Visual Acoustic Thermal
0.1019 0.0124 0.0412
0.6556 0.0797 0.2647
Mission Area 
Coverage
Localisation 
Accuracy
Confirmation 
Capability
0.0661 0.0275 0.1554 0.0174 0.3290 0.1553 0.0719
Situational 
Awareness
Stand-Off 
Range Signature
Counter-
Measures
0.0876 0.0564 0.2663
Reliability 
Effectiveness
Maintainability 
Effectiveness
Survivability 
Effectiveness
0.0876 0.0564 0.2663
Total Mission Effectiveness
Neutralisation 
Capability
0.0569
0.0336
Counter-IED 
Effectiveness
0.5897
0.5897
Global 
Priority
Local 
Priority
Global 
Priority
Local 
Priority
Global 
Priority
Reliability Effectiveness 0.0876 0.7501 0.0657 0.2499 0.0219
Maintainability Effectiveness 0.0564 0.2499 0.0141 0.7501 0.0423
Situational Awareness 0.0661 0.8333 0.0551 0.1667 0.0110
Stand-Off Range 0.0275 0.5000 0.0137 0.5000 0.0137
Visual 0.1019 0.3333 0.0340 0.6667 0.0679
Acoustic 0.0124 0.5000 0.0062 0.5000 0.0062
Thermal 0.0412 0.5000 0.0206 0.5000 0.0206
Counter-Measures 0.0174 0.5000 0.0087 0.5000 0.0087
Mission Area Coverage 0.3290 0.7501 0.2468 0.2499 0.0822
Localisation Accuracy 0.1553 0.7501 0.1165 0.2499 0.0388
Confirmation Capability 0.0719 0.8571 0.0616 0.1429 0.0103
Neutralisation Capability 0.0336 0.8889 0.0298 0.1111 0.0037
Overall Vector Priority 0.6727 0.3273
Operational 
Concept 1
Operational 
Concept 2Criteria/Sub-Criteria/Sub-Sub-Criteria
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Appendix K 
 
VTUAV PRODUCTION COST ESTIMATES 
  Empty Weight Based Cost Estimate MTOW Based Cost Estimate Average 
  
Empty 
Weight (lbs) 
Production Cost 
(FY02 US$) 
Production Cost 
(FY07 US$)* 
MTOW 
(lbs) 
Production Cost 
(FY03 US$) 
Production Cost 
(FY07 US$)** 
Production Cost 
(FY07 US$) 
OC1 iVTUAV 895.34 1,343,012 1,534,928 1346.45 1,911,104 2,128,970 1,831,949 
OC2 VTUAV 632.18 948,263 1,083,770 766.46 1,253,149 1,396,008 1,239,889 
* Calculated using a US Consumer Price Index (CPI) / Inflation Rate of 14.29% from Jan 2002 - Jan 2007 (CPI found from www.InflationData.com) 
** Calculated using a US Consumer Price Index (CPI) / Inflation Rate of 11.40% from Jan 2003 - Jan 2007 (CPI found from www.InflationData.com) 
 
 
 
